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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to explain the facility with 
which ratiocination in customary law courts leads to decisions 
of great import. Or, to put it as a question: how do African
Judges reach decisions as grave and far reaching as those of 
their Western counterparts without equivalent court paraphenalia? 
The answer to this is an examination of how African Judges 
think, and makes especial reference to the semantic philosophy 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its relation to traditional concepts 
of language and social structure.
3INTRODUCTION
I thought that the solution could be 
propounded very briefly, but I soon found 
that to render it probable or even intelligible 
it was necessary to discuss certain more 
general questions, some of which had hardly 
been broached before.
- Sir James Frazer, preface 
to the abridged version of 
The Golden Bough
Before undertaking a Journey, it is best to peruse a 
map of the countryside over which one is bound to travel. This 
introduction is intended to provide such a guide to the work 
which follows it. This essay roughly duplicates the organiza­
tional pattern of The Golden Bough. Like Anthropology's seminal 
giant, it begins with a specific problem and mushrooms to the 
consideration of vast and, at first sight, unrelated areas of 
thought. Finally, however, Just as Frazer returns after ten 
volumes of digression to the mystery of the priest at Nemi, 
this paper returns, with the aid of thoughts harvested in 
foreign fields, to solve the puzzle which gave it birth. Yet 
it is hoped that one may ape Frazer's virtues without copying 
his mistakes.
At the outset, it must be understood that the factual 
material presented here is, at best, third hand, and, therefore, 
whatever conjectures are based on it are Justifiably suspect. 
Ideally, one could resurrect old lav; cases. Students should be 
able to stand in the place of Judge, and witness and plaintiff 
if they are to know, with any degree of precision, what passes 
through the minds of the characters about which they write.
Time traps the form of these cases like the imprints of ancient
4flies in spheres of amber. They persistently tantalize, 
dangling beyond the hope of grasp. This is, in a sense, an 
attempt to do the impossible, and were this not admitted, 
certain parts of what follows might seem arrogant. Hopefully, 
in this instance, prior admission will obviate future conviction. 
Also, since whatever can be said about the facts of African law 
cases is perforce somewhat weak, I shall easily avoid a redupli­
cation of the Golden Bough’s cardinal mistake by not presenting 
very much of it.
Since African customary law cases are not all the same, 
it may help to generalize about the various types and say which 
are the ones here found so mystifying. Basically, I suggest, 
there are three types of cases found in the literature on African 
customary law. First, there are cases where the evidence of 
one or other litigant is corroborated and a decision is made. 
Second, there are cases where the evidence of neither litigant 
is corroborated and there follows no decision. Third, there are 
cases where the litigants1 evidence is not corroborated, or 
attempts at corroboration are equivocal, and yet a decision is 
made. This thesis is solely concerned with cases of the third 
type.
One other problem must be mentioned in the prelimin­
aries. Several attempts have been made to define "customary law". 
In fact, every author on the subject seems to juggle the term 
slightly in his own favour. The main body of this paper is 
concerned with words and meanings so that by the conclusion my 
opinion about these definitions should be clear. For the time 
being, however, the essence of "customary law" is that it is 
unwritten. This is the difference between Western courts and
. • V "  "  • . . .
5customary courts, the difference that, in fact, gives rise to 
the subject.
The thesis is really more about "logic” than "customary 
law". This concept arises from the philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and represents the furthest digression from the 
main problem. However, since it does not enter the essay until 
fairly late, and is then fully explained, it need not be born 
in mind at the moment.
Having thus drawn a few rags of apology around what 
will be the most offensive naked protuberances of this paper's 
body, the journey may commence. Judging from the- title, it is 
as if a trip through a forest were advertised and having bought 
one's ticket it turns out that the trip takes place at night 
with only the aid of a hand torch. Now, a torch may give a 
distorted impression of towering oaks, but its feeble glow will 
enable one to avoid serious injury from low hanging boughs and 
to observe a few interesting ferns along the path. If not the 
anticipated feast, then, it may at least be the plenum that 
suffices.
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7CHAPTER I 
THE PRCBIEL: : FACT FRQI.T ALLEGATION
In Lav/ '.Tithout Precedent, L.A. Fallers discusses the 
activities of the customary law courts in Busoga. He presents 
numerous instances of litigation and often quotes the actual 
statements of the participants at length. For this reason, I 
will examine one of his cases in depth in order to reveal the 
exact problem with which I am concerned. Before doing this, 
however, it is necessary to give a rough sketch of the Soga 
social system. To understand the case, it is necessary to 
understand the social organization of which it is a part.
Busoga was a congeries of petty chieftancies in 
Uganda. Traditional rulers had some power, but even the most 
powerful tolerated the presence of an alternative governmental 
system, the African Local Government, which depended on the 
British colonial authorities for support. Both chiefs and 
African Local Government officials conducted courts. Neither 
were versed in formal colonial government policy, but under 
the policy of in-direct rule, both were expected to solve 
problems on the basis of "native law and custom". The courts 
of the traditional rulers and those of the African Local 
Government did not usually compete. Traditional disputes over 
land inheritance within a lineage were generally handled by 
the chiefs, while more modern problems, such as church marriages, 
were taken to the African Local Government officials for 
settlement. Fallers does not always reveal the type of court 
in which a particular dispute occurs, but usually this is
8obvious from the context.
Litigation is an old tradition in Busoga. People 
serve as their own advocates, although Wallers thinks some get 
outside advice. There is a hierarchy of courts, most litigation 
beginning with the village headman and if satisfaction is not 
found there, appealed to the county courts.
Thus, at the time of Fallers1 study, Busoga was a 
British colonial administrative district. The population have 
a common heritage of political rule by chiefly bureaucracies. 
Also, the tradition of dispute settlement by litigation is a 
common and indigenous feature of the Soga as a whole. So, while 
traditional chiefs do exist, their authority is limited and 
waning, and Busoga may, in effect, be considered as a unit.
All Soga further share principles of organization 
based on descent. These people are extremely patrilineal.
Every man belongs to a named partilineal clan and to a corporate 
patrilineage. The most important obligation of clan membership 
is exogamy. A man and a woman with the same clan name must not 
have sexual relations. While clan membership is somewhat vague 
and as members of such people have no definite activities, 
lineages are perhaps the most important groups in Soga life. 
Lineages have corporate rights in property and whenever a member 
dies, the lineage meets to decide on a successor to his property 
and to his wives. Usually, the property goes to a son and the 
wives go to a brother. All land is owned by a lineage or is 
temporarily at the disposal of the village headman who can re­
allocate it only on the understanding that it will be inherited 
by the lineage of the man who lately held it.
Soga patrilineages are so strongly defined and so 
closely bound to the land that they severely affect marriage
9patterns. The difficulty in Soga marriage is that women grow 
up as members of their father's lineages. During this time 
they are governed by their fathers and brothers. At marriage, 
however, they move to their husband's home and are governed by 
and responsible to his lineage. Usually the bride finds this 
harsh transfer from warm affectionate surroundings to the 
emotional coolness and discipline of her new home hard to bear. 
This, no doubt, contributes to the fact that young brides are 
frequently obstrereroijs and Soga marriage is unstable. This is 
a major cause of court disputation.
A factor contributing to this instability is what may 
be called the Soga principle of "genitor-filiation" (I take 
this term from the lectures of Dr. Martin Southwold at Manchester 
University, Michaelmas Term, 1968). Descent among the Soga is 
traced not from the mother's husband to the child, but from the 
begetter, or genitor, to the child. Thus, a child will have 
rights in and obligations to the lineage of the man who impreg­
nates his mother. It does not take an overly cynical mind to 
realize that this man may not be the same one who is the husband 
of the mother. This is certainly a cause of jealousy, since 
the recruitment of new lineage members depends on the marital 
fidelity of a woman who has little objective reason to revere 
her husband's lineage. The marriages of many Soga women, 
therefore, are short and plagued with troubles and unpleasantness. 
Husbands strictly seclude their wives. Fear of adultery is 
common. Divorce, which only involves the return of bridewealth, 
is frequent.
From these inherent difficulties in the marriage 
situation, spring two major types of court activity. The first
10
Fallers translates as "'harboring", the second as "eating two 
hens". "Harbouring" is a charge made by a husband against 
his wife's father. After marriage, a woman is expected to 
spend virtually all of her time with her husband, and should 
certainly never leave without his permission. As mentioned 
earlier, wives do not like this rule and frequently abrogate 
it. If she is found to be staying with her father, he may be 
charged with "harbouring" her, and if found guilty will have 
to pay a fine and will probably spend several months in gaol as 
we 11. Judging from Fallers' case material, husbands are very 
quick to accuse fathers-in-law of this.
Even more serious than "harbouring" is the charge of 
"eating two hens". A delict of this type happens when a father 
takes his daughter from her husband, fails to return the bride­
wealth, and then accepts bridewealth from another suitor. This 
is profiteering of the worst sort. Conviction of "eating two 
hens" means a punishment in terms of fines and imprisonment even 
stiffer than that for "harbouring". This crime does not seem 
to be too frequent.
One last feature of Soga social structure relevant to 
the first case, is that their kinship terminology is of the 
Omaha type. The Soga kinship terminology is fairly unproblematic; 
only two aspects of it are important. First, that all members 
of ego's generation are called "sibling" and, second, that it 
is unthinkable that a woman should address her own and her 
"daughter's" (here meaning any lineage member of junior genera­
tion) husband by the same kin-term.
The case of "Genatio Hagino versus Yowasi IJaliwa" 
(Fallers, 19&9> PP• 128-135)i reveals the problem of this thesis.
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The case begins as Genatio Magino accuses Yowasi Maliwa of 
seducing his wife and of attempting to negotiate bridewealth 
for her. All that Genatio knows for certain is that his wife 
left him, and that three months later he found her approaching 
her father's house accompanied by Yowasi Maliwa. Genatio seizes 
Yowasi, gives him a severe beating and evidently takes back his 
wife. He merely alleges the purpose of the visit to her father.
As it is generally understood that adultery between 
siblings is impossible, Yowasi and the woman Matama defend 
themselves by claiming that they are "siblings-of-the-opposite- 
sex", the literal translation of a Soga kinship term. If this 
relationship is a valid one, it gives a perfectly acceptable 
reason for Matama being in Yowasifs house. His claim to innocence 
is increased by saying that Matama stayed in his house for only 
three days. The court begins to investigate Yowasi's claim by 
asking him how many times he had visited Matama while she was 
living with Genatio. This is an important question, for 
brothers are entitled to visit their married sisters. Yowasi 
replies that he had visited them, adding that they also visited 
him and when they did so he prepared relish to serve them himself, 
no doubt the sign of a generous host. But the court is not 
satisfied. They next demand proof from Yowasi that he is Matama's 
brother. He claims as his evidence the testimony of Yose Toli 
the first husband of Kale.
Having listened to Yowasi, the court examines Matama.
Her defense is less vigorous than his. She states that she and 
Yowasi are not "from the same womb", but that his father was 
married to her mother and that they were reared together. When
asked how frequently Yowasi had visited her after her marriage, 
she replies that while he was still young he did visit, but
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after &e grew up, he no longer visited. The court is curious 
about this relationship and so she clarifies: ". . . because
I grew up in his father's house, I call Yowasi 'brother' but we 
are not of the same clan; I have one father, he another" 
(Fallers, 1969 > p* 128). Matama further explains that as she 
was travelling through the countryside, darkness overtook her 
and she stopped at Yowasi's house. He was not at home then, 
but the next morning he put her on; a bicycle and was returning 
her to their father, Yose Toli, when their trip was interrupted 
by Genatio. After further questioning, she Confirms that she 
had left her husband and had successfully avoided him for three 
months. This, then, is the case for the defence. The relations 
of those involved may be traced on the following diagram 
adapted from Fallers, 1969, p* 129):
(Baisengobi clan)
i-------------- ------------------------ --
1 , ' 2  2 X
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\
\
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\ /
\ /
Yowasi and Matama claim relationship through the marriage of 
Eintu and Eale, who are now both dead. Eale was first married 
to Yose Toli and by this union bore Matama. Likewise, Eintu's 
first marriage was to Musubika who is Yowasi's mother. Thus, 
in the Soga kinship terminology, Yose Toli, Kale, Eintu, and
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Musubika are all called "parent" by Matama and Yowasi. It 
later becomes significant that Yowasi's two wives, Musekwa and 
Namwase are members of the same clan as Matama and of senior 
generation, so therefore would be obliged to call her "daughter". 
As mentioned earlier, that "mothers" and "daughters" should 
ever call the same man "husband" is unthinkable.
Having examined the defendant, the court examines 
Genatio, the plaintiff. Genatio denys knowing Yowasi or the 
family connections on which his defense is based. He says that 
when his wife left him he reported the matter to the subvillage 
and village headmen, but took the matter no further. An inter­
esting thing then happens. The court asks Genatio: "This Yose
Toli of whom Yowasi speaks - did he marry [Yowasi's] mother, 
Musubika?" (Fallers, 1969> p« 130)* Judging from this question, 
the court has misunderstood Yowasi's defense; they have confused 
the genealogy and have asked Genatio if Matama's begetter' 
married Yowasi1s bearer, when in fact Yowasi claims the converse. 
Genatio, of course, denys that this marriage took place, and 
his answer is correct, but since the question is improper, his 
response may confuse the court.
Next, the court moves beyond the genealogical issues, 
and asks Genatio how he knows that it was Yowasi who took his 
wife and how on the day he found them that he knew Yowasi was 
going to negotiate bridewealth. Genatio replies that as he was 
going to market, he discovered them at his in-law's house and 
assumed the motive for their visit. That is, he assumed that 
Yowasi was about to negotiate bridewealth for Matama with Yose 
Toli. After further questioning, he admits that he has no real 
evidence that bridewealth negotiations were in fact occurring.
14
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Next, the court asks Genatio j£f he informed his in-law Yose Toli 
when his wife left; he answers yes, and adds that he visited 
Yose Toli twice. Their final question returns to the genea­
logical issue: MYowase says that Matama is his sister and that
he used to visit your home. How is that?" And Genatio's 
response is: "I don't know that and I call upon Yose Toli.
If he knows that Yowasi is the brother of Matama, then I won't 
plead further”.
Several important items emerge from Genatio's testimony. 
The court establishes that his behaviour is consistent with that 
of an agrieved husband, that is, he informed all the right 
people when she left him. They establish a lack of evidence in 
his claim that Yowasi was negotiating bridewealth for Matama.
And the court succeeds in getting him to admit that if Yowasi's 
claim to be Matama's brother is truthful, then he will drop the 
case. Significantly, Yowasi and Genatio both appeal to Yose 
Toli as authority on the genealogical aspects of the case.
The next task of the court is to examine Yose Toli.
Yosi Toli is already in some difficulty. His daughter admits 
to being away from her husband for three months and he is, 
therefore, open to the charge of ’'harbouring". Even worse,
Genatio alleges that Yowasi tried to negotiate bridewealth for 
Matama which implies that Yose Toli is guilty of "eating two 
hens". So, while Yose Toli's name has hardly been mentioned in 
the proceedings, every charge by Genatio against Yowasi threatens 
him with a possible fine and prison sentence.
Upon examination, Yose Toli shows no signs of equivo­
cation. Genatio is his in-law, Matama is his daughter, but 
Yowasi, he does not know. He further agrees with Genatio, that
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Yowasi did indeed seduce Matama. Yose Toli acknowledges that 
Genatio found the pair coming toward his house "but denys any 
intention of beginning bridewealth negotiations. Yose Toli 
does not really deny the facts on which Yowasi bases his case - 
the marriage between Kale and Kintu. Rather, Yose claims that 
Kintu stole Kale from him and never property married her, but 
Fallers ascribes this to the re-activation of ail old wouad 
rather than to anything directly significant.
Yowasi*s key witness, thus, disappoints him. After 
pointing this out to him, the court asks him if he has another 
witness. He offers to bring forth Sryeza who is supposed to 
know that Matama and he were reared together. The court, how­
ever, is not interested in further testimony. In a brief 
decision that makes no reference to the arguments, they decide 
against Yowasi. Genatio receives one-hundred shillings in 
compensation, and Yowasi is fined fifty shillings and imprisoned 
for four months.
Although convicted, Yowasi appeals the case to the 
county chief. In the second trial he adds two more contentions 
to his case. First, that his intention in being at Yose Toli1s 
house could not have been .to negotiate bridewealth because he 
brought with him no accompanying party or money or livestock to 
give as presents. He argues that Genatio attacked him rashly 
without asking any questions and beat him severely. Yowasi 
further claims that because of this unwarranted beating, Genatio 
himself fears prosecution and is therefore doubly intent upon 
seeing him convicted of adulter’.
Yowasi1s second new contention is that it is a custom 
of the Soga that there is more than one kind of relationship
16
between people. Even though he and Matama are not of the same 
clan and consequently not forbidden to marry, marriage for them 
would be equally unthinkable because having grown up together 
they are like brother and sister. He further claims that on 
the basis of this, Yose Toli’s testimony is sufficient to 
exonerate him. This is also the point at which he insists 
that since his two present wives are "mother" to Matama, a 
marriage between them is impossible.
In spite of these new arguments, the county court is 
unimpressed and Yowasi stays in gaol to complete his original 
sentence. The final verdict of the court is what Fallers calls 
an "utterly fact-minded decision" (Fallers, 1969? P« 321). The 
last statement of the fudges is simply: "there is no true
evidence that Matama is a sister. For that reason he is 
defeated".
The obvious question arising from these proceedings 
is how has Yowasi been convicted? At what point in the trial 
is his guilt determined? This is not a simple problem and no 
answer can be given at present. Rather, there is a problematic 
aspect of the case which when properly analysed will yield sin 
answer to the larger question. The problem is this: In the
case of Genatio versus Yowasi, there are numerous allegations 
and remarkably few facts. The court is essentially presented 
with a history. This history is reported from several points 
of view by different people, the various fortunes of which are 
all intimately bound up with the details of the history and the 
final decision as to which version is right. They agree on 
few parts of this history as fact, and each adamantly clings
to his own account of disputable points. Yet, a decision is 
reached with little ratiocination, a harsh sentence is passed,
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and is upheld on appeal. How is this possible?
The first point, that there is a dearth of facts, is 
a crucial one. Exactly what has happened? That Matama left 
her husband is generally acknowledged. Approximately three 
months elapse before she encounters him again. This meeting is 
a tumultuous one, with the interpretations given by the various 
participants differing wildly. The elements on which all agree 
are these: Matama is on Yowasi1s bicycle and together they are
nearing the house of Yose Toli, her father. Genatio and several 
of his friends happen along the path. He is incensed at finding 
his recalcitrant wife with another man and he and his friends 
fall on Yowasi and severely beat him. Genatio takes the two 
facts - that Yowasi and Matama are together at Yosi Toli's 
house - and constructs a picture of the situation. In his 
picture, Yowasi is bringing Matama to her father's house in 
order to pay bridewealth for her. This is the picture he brings 
to court as an accusation. In attacking this picture, Yowasi 
is most eloquent, Yosi Tole most adamant, and the court most 
sceptical. Genatio's picture is thus declared invalid.
The mass of allegations generated by Genatio's hastily 
drawn picture are easily dispersed. But equally important are 
the questions its dismissal raises. When all testimony is 
complete there are three interpretations of the events in this 
encounter. Yowasi accounts for his being there by claiming to 
have been returning Matama to her father. This' gives him 
motive and reason for being with Matama and for their being in 
Yose Toli's courtyard. Genatio accounts for their being there 
by giving the negotiation of bridewealth as their motive. Yose 
Toli's is the most incoherent. He explains why Matama is with 
Yowasi, but he does not explain what they are doing at his house.
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After careful probing, the court throws out Genatio1s version 
of the history. This leaves only two choices. Now, the impor­
tant thing is that if Yowasi's account is accepted, then Yose 
Toli is implicated in "harbouring". For if after three months 
separation from her husband, a wife is found with her father, 
a conviction for "harbouring" i^Likely to result. Thus, if 
Yowasi's version of events is correct, Yosi Toli is, in effect, 
left in possession of stolen goods. With Genatio's interpretatior 
rejected, Yowasi's is the only complete one remaining, the only 
one able to account for his being at Yose Toli’s house. The 
court rejects his version, but by so doing they leave the 
question: why did Yowasi bring Matama to her father? Were
they only en route to another place? Would an adulteress bring 
her lover to her father's home without some sort of understanding 
with him?
But a fact more central to the case is simply that 
Yowasi has been caught with another man's wife. Now, Soga have 
a very handy interpretation for this situation. With some 
exceptions, they recognize only one reason that a man would be 
with another man's wife, and that is adultery. This is, no doubt, 
a product of the obsession Soga have with the protection of 
their wives. The sons of a wife even suspected of adultry may 
turn out to be less than sons. Yowasi's defense is an attempt 
to fit himself into one of the exceptional cases. Brothers do 
not commit adultery with their sisters, in the Soga scheme of 
things. If sexual relations occur it would be incest and this 
is a matter to be handled within the lineage. Yowasi reasons 
toward the concept of siblingship in two directions. First,
that his behaviour is typically that of a brother, and, second, 
that he and Matama grewr up in the same household treating each
19
other as siblings.
The most important part of the first contention is his 
claim to have exchanged visits with Matama since her marriage. 
Proof of this would virtually be an admission by Genatio that 
Yowasi is his in-law. There are three different statements on 
this point. Yowasi claims that vifeiting was frequent and 
reciprocal, Matama that visiting was occasional and ceased when 
Yowasi grew up, and Genatio that visiting never occurred, or, 
Genatio implies this by avoiding the question altogether. In 
fact, Genatio claims not even to know Yowasi at all as eventually 
does Yose Toli. Most likely these claims are merely a rhetorical 
rejection of Yowasi (see Mailers, 1969? p . 131)- Clearly, all 
the parties in this dispute are known to one another. One may 
speculate that Matama1s statement is the most likely, if for no 
other reason than that it is the least extreme and after all, 
she has least to win or lose in the case. So, speculating 
further, probably Yowasi did visit Matama after her marriage.
Does his stopping to visit after maturity indicate a change of 
status? Ordinarily it would not. Yowasi has two wives of his 
own and since these marriages probably coincided with his own 
maturation, that the frequency of his brotherly visits then 
decreased is not surprising. This phenomenon is, after all, 
fairly universal. But, regardless of the strength or weakness 
of the argument, the court does not find it particularly 
relevant.
The second issue is obvioqsly the crucial one. 
Significantly, Yowasi calls on Yose Toli to confirm his acoount 
of his step-siblingship with Matama, and he agrees to abide by 
Yose Toli's testimony. Even when Yose Toli denys his claim,
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he still, in the appeal after conviction, contends that there 
is sufficient evidence in Yose Toli’s testimony to exonerate 
him. It turns out tiat the court does not think so, hut the 
interesting point is why he should think so. Yowasi expects 
Yose Toli to confirm that they call each other "father” and 
"son". On the other hand, Genatio seemingly expects him to 
deny this. Genatio is right. Yose Toli denys that Yowasi is 
his son. He admits that his ex-wife, Yatama's hearer, left him 
and subsequently married Eintu who hegat Yowasi hy a previous 
marriage. How both litigants claim justification from this 
testimony. Genatio because of the bald denial of kinship, and 
Yowasi because of the admission of relevant historical data.
Was this all that Yowasi expected of Yose Tmli? Probably not, 
or he would not have been addressing him as "father" earlier 
in the trial. At any rate, Yose Toli's statement does not 
obviously decide the issue of guilt or innocence.
One difficulty in evaluating Yose Toli's evidence is 
that he is himself so vulnerable to Genatio's charges against 
Yowasi. One thing that clearly results from the trial is that 
Yose Toli does not suffer. Thus the purpose of his testimony 
is clear and if his evidence is a means to that end, he must at 
least be suspected of some dissimulation. This certainly 
complicates the trial. Yowasi must be disappointed with Yose 
Toli's behaviour, but he cites his evidence as authoritative 
until the very end. The reason for this is that when the scanty 
admissions concerning Yowasi's family history are fitted into 
the kinship terminology Yowasi is to Yose Toli in the relation 
of "son" to "father". Prom this position his conclusions is 
quite logical. For who is "daughter" to my "father" is "sister" 
to me. ?rom the viewpoint of the kinship terminology, then,
A21
Yowasi's genealogical evidence demonstrates his innocence. But 
the courts do not think this is true evidence that Matama is 
a sister.
The object of analysing this case is to disclose its 
complexity. There are essentially two facts which cause liti­
gation: Matama's leaving her husband and her being found with
Yowasi. This is virtually prima facia conviction of adultery 
unless Yowasi is entitled by virtue of kinship to be so intimate 
with her. This he attempts to prove. His first stumbling block 
is Yose Toli, whose deceitful testimony considerably weakens his 
case. But if Yowasi is innocent, then Yose Toli, by implication, 
is guilty of "harbouring", "eating two hens", or both. In this 
either/or situation Yose Toli's conduct is understandable if 
not laudable. But in spite of Yose Toli's deceit, a third fact 
emerges: that Matama and Yowasi did grow up in the same house­
hold. Unfortunately for them, the master and mistress of this 
household are both dead, and they are probably the only ones 
who are qualified to describe their childhood circumstances.
But the court shows no interest. There is also a contradiction 
between the final verdict and the kinship terminology, which 
adds to the difficulty of understanding why this decision is 
made.
The total picture of the case "Genatio Magino versus 
Yowasi Maliwa", then, is one of few facts, much allegation and 
some deception. Argumentation is long, involved and sometimes, 
by Soga standards, remarkably!'lucid. Yet the final decision is 
curt and seems to ignore many of the arguments. Fallers passes 
this over by referring to the "fact mindedness" of the court.
But there are few facts and they are somewhat contradictory.
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Also, the judges evince no difficulty in reaching a decision. 
Often the judges will disagree, but this is a quick and 
seemingly effortless verdict. All this adds up to the conclusion 
that, taking everything into account, the decision of the 
judges is not obvious, which is to say that the arguments are 
not logically resolved into a conclusion. It is true that both 
litigants agree on ascertain core of facts, slender though that 
core is. Therefore, either they see the facts differently or 
the decision hinges upon something beyond the facts. The 
remainder of this thesis is a search for that something beyond 
the facts.
I have thus proposed a question: How do the customary
law courts of the Basoga make judicial decisions? How do they 
determine who is innocent and who guilty? How do they separate 
fact from allegation? And why is justice sometimes dispensed 
with so little consideration of seemingly relevant arguments?
How, every action in the Soga courts does not exhibit all of 
these quandaries. Some cases are solved simply by verification 
of a litigant's claims by a trustworthy and disinterested third 
party. TThen the preponderance of evidence favours neither side, 
as in the example given above, then the court must go beyond 
the facts to reach a decision. That they must do so frequently, 
and are able to do so with little hesitation is the puzzle I 
shall attempt to solve.
Before a solution is obvious, however, the case of 
"Genatio I agino versus Yowasi Maliwa" must be analysed in terms 
far more subtle than those so far attempted. The case must be 
broken down into its finest elements and the nature of these 
elements must be discovered. By distilling this complexity
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into its constituent vapors and fluids, some strand of logic, 
some statement of cause and effect, may emerge where now there 
seems only to be an arbitrary and whimsical judgement. As is 
so often the case, the basic constituents are found in the 
broadest and most obvious traits of the court's activity.
The most obvious, and for that reason sometimes the 
least considered, attribute of judicial process is the simple 
matter that it is the most purely linguistic mode of human 
conflict. Of course, things other than speaking do take place, 
but the genius of court activity lies in its ability to replace 
cruder forms of confli ct with language. And the language of 
the court is not simply the language of everday speech. Even 
in the somewhat simple conditions of customary law, the vocabu­
lary is appreciably different. Taking "Genatio Magino versus 
Yowasi Maliwa" as an example, the frequency v/ith which categorical 
personal nouns are used is truely astonishing. "Brother", 
"sister", "step-sibling", "in-law", "adulterer", "husband",
"wife" and so on are the very idiom of the litigation. Behind 
these words lie the reasons for coming to court. And it is with 
these words that Genatio finally succeeds in convicting Yowasi. 
Furthermore, each of the participants uses these words in his 
argumentation and each persists in his own definition or under­
standing of the words. Here, then, is an bbvious dimension of 
the problem which is fundamental and yet generally ignored.
The examination of the uses of language in African 
customary law court cases is closely linked with the end of 
language - meaning. Participants in Genatio's action against 
Yowasi are intimately connected with the words they use. They 
argue forcefully and cogently about the meaning of the word
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"sister", and because this word fails to apply to Yowasi's 
relationship to I.'abama, he is penalised harshly. Language 
and meaning as such are, of course, enormous problems and the 
amount of literature on each topic is staggering. A clearer 
point of entry is afforded, however, through one last obvious 
factor which gives some organization to these, the smallest 
discrete units of the puzzle.
The third obvious component of ratiocination in African 
customary law is that the personal nouns which are the foundation 
of thought are ordered in a configuration. There are only so 
many terms and they bear constant, though fluid, relations to 
one another. Thus, "son-in-law” and "father-in-law" are terms 
with sufficiently clear definitions to enable all concerned to 
infer that charges of "harbouring" or "eating two hens" would 
result against Yose Toli from Yowasi’s acquital. Over this the 
litigants need not quibble, for it is an ordered and defined 
relationship. Likewise "brother" and "sister", are in a constant 
relationship on which all agree. Furthermore, the same is true 
of "husband" and "wife". In fact, an accurate definition of any 
of the terms can only be given by its relation to one or more 
of the others. The riddle placed before the Soga judges is 
whether a particular unknown instance is congruent with a 
general form which is ?/ell known. But even coming this far 
there is no answer to the question of how exactly they do it.
It is as if one suspects that there is a rabbit in the bottom 
of the hat, and one then sees the magician pull the rabbit out 
of the hat, but to know how he did it, one must know the method 
of tucking a rabbit into a hat. This, in effect, is the 
mystery.
Thus, there is a history and a general problem
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arising from the history, it is hoped that by breaking the 
problem into its natural parts a solution will be clear. There 
are, essentially two natural and obvious parts of the problem: 
Language and meaning being one part, and the ordering of the all 
important personal nouns the second. The later part is usually 
subsumed under the ideas of "social role", and social structure, 
and since they are simpler and more accessible than the other 
dimension, it is convenient to begin there to attack the problem 
of judicial decision making through ratiocination in African 
customary law.
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CHAPTER II 
THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL ROLE
In this essay, I reason in one direction: from what
is obvious but complicated to what is not obvious and is uncom­
plicated. This is the path of analysis. It is the method used 
in the first chapter to display the problem; it is the method used 
now to unravel the concept of a "social role".
To begin, with an obvious point, "role" is not a word 
invented by social scientists. Its heritage is long, and in 
strange ways phantoms from its past haunt those who trifle with 
its subtle meanings, even in the thoroughly exorcised Twentieth- 
Century. Considering the nature of words, this is no surprise.
Of course, the nature of words is not uncomplicated. In this 
essay, I take a particular view of words as being the correct 
one, it is known as Ordinary Language Philosophy. The principles 
of this view have been formulated by J.L. Austin (J.L. Austin, 
1961, pp. 149-151)- The two attributes of his philosophy most 
relevant to this study are, first, that words rarely shake off 
their past and etymology is consequently always important, and, 
second, that the history of a word will often reveal that it is 
based on a very simple model of reality, that these models are 
often forgotten and that this forgetfulness confuses modern 
speakers. This is exactly the case with the word "role".
The idea of a role is both old and widespread. It is 
a function of the drama. Throughout the long history of this 
artistic form, where men have acted in plays, they have thought 
of plays as composed of various parts which are roles. Thus an
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actor in a play is the prototypical model of reality behind the 
word "role". Central to a role is the idea that it controls the 
actions of the individual who plays it, and yet it is not part 
of the individual who plays it; it may be put aside freely.
Curiously, while the idea of a role follows the drama, 
it has rarely been restricted to it. Shortly after the ancient 
Greeks began writing and viewing plays, the Stoics expanded the 
simple idea of a role in a play into a complete system of morals. 
The philosophy of Zeno and his school is wrapped up in a drama­
turgical analogy:
"Life is not like a battle but like a play, in 
which God has handed each man his part unread, 
and the good man proceeds to act it to the best 
of his power, not knowing what may happen in the 
last scene. He may become a crowned king, he 
may be a slave dying in torment. What matters 
is: The good actor can play either part. All
that matters is that he shall act his best, 
accept the order of the Cosmos and obey the 
Purpose of the great Dramaturge".
(Gilbert Murray, 1930, p. 124).
In the same fashion, this simple notion slips into social 
science, bringing with it these ancient connotations. And this 
heritage creates flaws and cracks in some of sociology's most 
imposing theoretical edifices.
The idea that human life is in some ways analogous to 
the drama is, thus, somewhat illustrious. Yet, actually the 
converse of this is nearer the truth; that in some ways the 
drama is similar to life. Excepting Pirandello's baffled 
characters, nobody seriously confuses the artifice of the stage 
with the realities of life. Yet through many centuries the 
stage has been an accurate reflection of life. It is no wonder, 
then, that when, in recent years, men's minds have attempted a 
scientific expression of the components of social life they
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should turn to this most ancient of abstractions. The develop­
ment of "role theory" in social science closely follows the 
inception of the subject and has even been welcomed as its key 
(for example in Banton, 1965). The question posed here, then, 
is can purposively rigorous theories of human life profit from 
borrowing the terms of the drama?
Perhaps the first person to attempt a scientific 
specialization of the word "role" is Ralph Linton. Linton begins 
by defining the concept "status". A social "status" is a 
position in the "pattern of society", so that it is proper to 
say that an individual has many statuses. But, the status of 
any individual means the total number of statuses which he 
occupies. Linton goes on to say that: "A status, as distinct
from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection
i
of rights and duties" (Linton, 1936, p. 113)• In a later publi­
cation, he elaborates these "rights and duties" into "the sum 
total of the culture patterns associated with a particular status" 
(Linton, 1947* P* 50). So a role includes all attitudes, values 
and behaviour supposed by a society to be attached to a status. 
For Linton:
"a role represents the dynamic aspect of a status.
The individual is socially assigned to a status 
and occupies it with relation to other statuses.
When he puts the rights and duties which constitute 
the status into effect, he is performing a rule"
(Linton, 1936, p. 114).
A further difference is that one usually has little or no control 
over which statuses are attached to oneself, but one must learn 
the behaviour expected of those roles in which one is inadver­
tently placed (Linton, 1947, pp. 50-51)* Thus, a status may be 
based on age or sex, but since different behaviour is expected
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of the different ages and sexes one must often strive to learn 
and display what is proper. Consequently, in the sense that 
roles are learned and statuses are not, the claim that the 
former is active and the later passive is an accurate one. The 
learning of a role involves not only knowing the range of 
behaviour expected of the status, but also of the cues which 
activate a status (Linton, 194-7* PP* 63)- Linton argues that 
while an individual has many statuses, he does not use them all 
at once. Some are relevant to him and govern his behaviour only 
on certain occassions. Of all one's statuses, then, some are 
latent and some not. The learning of "cues" enables one to 
know which of the repertoire to activate, and when. Thus, a 
role is the enactment of a status. Or, to force Linton*s 
terminology back onto the drama, a "status" is a "part" which 
becomes a role only when it is being enacted. The analogy is 
this: Hamlet is an ideal patterned structure, an ordered
collection of parts, the inter-relation of which is unalterable; 
within this structure is the status ("part") Hamlet, which 
becomes a "role" only Then it is being acted, and it is in the 
role enactment that individual qualities are important; Olivier's 
Hamlet is not the same as Richard Burton's. Linton's terminology 
permits the same things to be said about social life. English 
"society" is an ideal patterned structure, an ordered collection 
of parts the interrelation of which is inalterable (whoever acts 
Hamlet cannot act Laerttss and whoever acts the Barrister cannot 
act the insurance agent); within this structure is the status, 
Barrister, which only becomes a role when it is being acted and 
it is in the role enactment that individual qualities are 
important, there are good and bad advocates; the good Barrister
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may be a bad insurance agent and vica versa, at any rate one 
cannot be both at once.
Linton contends that "status" and "role" are insepa­
rable in any but an academic sense. In his view, there are no 
roles without statuses and no statuses without roles. As with 
status, every individual has a series of roles as well as a 
role which is the combination of all his roles. In Linton's 
terminology, an individual occupies particular statuses and 
exercises the roles of those statuses. One way of making the 
difference between "status" and "role" more simple is to con­
centrate on the more abstract implications of their meanings. 
"Status" is a concept of relation. Any noun is related to some 
other nouns in such a way that regardless of their content they 
cannot be the same. A great variety of beasts are called "dog",
but "dog" can never be "cat". In this relational aspect the
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important factor is the drisoroti-en of the term. "Role", on the 
other hand, is a definitive concept. It is like the definition 
of a single word. There comes a time when one must say more 
than "mammals are not reptiles", one must say exactly what 
mammals are. To use another similie, the concept of "status", 
is like arranging bottles on a shelf; but whether a particular 
bottle contains beer or cider is expressed by the "role" concept.
The significance of the status-role is that it repre­
sents the minimum of attitudes and behaviour which an individual 
must assume if he is to participate in the overt expression of 
the social pattern. Status hnd role, to Linton, are a way of 
reducing the ideal patterns for social life to a level easily 
understood by the individuals who use them. Status and role 
"become models for organizing the attitudms and behaviour of
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the individual so that these will he congruous with those of 
other individuals participating in the expression of the 
pattern1 (Linton, 1936, P* 114) • Knowledge of proper role 
behaviour forearms the individual against most new situations, 
according to Linton. Only rarely does behavioural innovation 
take place. Having made this explanation of what "role" and 
"status" are, Linton discusses the types of roles and statuses 
to be found in social systems. There are two: those which are
earned (achieved) and those which are unearned (ascribed).
The first conspicuous thing about Linton's theory is 
that it is blatently culled from the theatrical prototype.
"Role" does not enter social science as a unitary concept, but 
as a part of a connected group of ideas. There are three 
separate ideas in Linton's theory: the "ideal social pattern",
the "status" which is a collection of rights and duties and 
forms a partt of the "ideal pattern", and the "role" which is the 
status enacted by an individual. This scheme permits social 
life to be analysed as if it were a play. Now, to say that 
Linton's theory does nothing more than to strike an analogy 
between theatrical productions and social life is no criticism. 
This method of theory-building is not new in the social sciences; 
it is typical of the heuristic approach to knowledge. With this 
method a theory is constructed, or an analogy cast, and then 
set to work to see what results it produces or what new state­
ments about social life it allows, or how well it fits reality.
Beyond the possible heuristic merits of Linton's 
scheme, certain points about the theory qua theory may be made. 
First, Linton's presentation of status and role as concepts 
depends on a foundation of philosophical idealism. The element
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of this theory about which he says least is, in fact, the most 
important - the "ideal pattern of society". About the nature of 
this, Linton is mute; his source of knowledge is unstated. Yet, 
the whole purpose of the status-role idea is to articulate the 
individual to the overriding "ideal patterns for social life", 
to "reduce" it to individual terms. Something seems to inform 
the actions of individuals, but Linton does not clearly state 
what it is or how it operates; he only states its destination.
Returning to the dramaturgical analogy: the "ideal
patterns for social life" are equivalent to the play as a whole, 
in the unity of which all parts and roles are fragments, which 
is to say that they exist in it and are defined by it. Now, the 
essential unity of the play lies in the creative genius of some 
playwrite. The playwrite conceives of an end or effect, and he 
uses various means to produce this. And to this end all parts 
are subordinate. What governs the actor is his part. And what 
governs the part is the design of the play. This scheme does 
not float away into idealism because it is one reality; it is, 
in fact, a single idea created by at most a few men. The analogy, 
then, begs the following question: do the "ideal patterns for
social life" have a similar unifying spirit? Linton does not 
answer this question, and here is the place where his fcheory 
begins to break down. This point may clearly be seen in Linton's 
sentence: "Status and role serve to reduce the ideal patterns
for social life to individual terms" (Linton, 1936, p. 114).
Two aspects of this thought are problematical. The hypostatiza- 
tion of "ideal patterns" is unjustified. This is only to point 
out the flaw in Linton's argument. His position pos^sibly might 
be justified, but the interesting thing is that he does not
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think it necessary to do so. The other problem is that these 
"ideal patterns" are for social life. By this it sounds as if 
social life is determined by these "ideal patterns". Perhaps 
this is more than is actually in Linton's writing, but a ten­
dency in this direction is clear. At least some writers on this 
subject would assert that any ideal pattern of social life that 
may be found is a reflection of social life rather than a pattern 
for it. So, Linton's idealistic foundation is unproven. There 
is however a sort of self-propelling logic in Linton's position, 
and this is its consistency with the dramaturgical analogy.
The second major difficulty with Linton's theory is 
also of a philosophical nature. Idealism is not in itself 
indefensible, but to link it up with terms of a different con­
stitution and then effect a switch is a very unpalatable sort of 
dualism. That Linton feels he must find a way of "reducing" the 
ideal pattern to individual terms introduces the opposition of 
body and mind which Gilbert Ryle has so brilliantly exposed in 
The Concept of Mind. This is a serious blunder and is unfor­
tunately found to be at the bottom of many of the muddles in 
the literature on role theory.
At least some of Linton's shortcomings may be forgiven, 
however, in light of the difficulty of his task. He sets about 
to borrow a term from the drama and show that it can be specia­
lized for other uses. He fails to borrow the word "role" by 
itself and drags along its associated concepts. He introduces 
the word in the context of a total play jjthe "ideal pattern") 
and a part in the play (a "status"). The word "role" comes 
into social thought, as J.L. Austin puts it, "trailing clouds 
of etymology". The strong flavour of idealism teased out of
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Linton*s theory is, at least in part, due to the nature of the 
concept of a role. The very usage of the phrase "an actor in 
a role" which is characteristic of Linton and most other writers 
on this subject, implies the existence of a part, or a script. 
One cannot act out a role if the content of the role is not 
known; this is fairly obvious. Therefore, the very presence of 
the word "roltt" entails the existence of a body of knowledge 
about what to do which is accessable to anyone who enacts the 
role. In the terms of the theater this is not coloured with 
idealism because the play itself is accessible and easily under­
stood. But the existence of Linton*s "ideal patterns" is not so 
clear; therefore to place it in the analogy alongside the play 
is to hypostatize it. In a sense, then, the idealistic basis 
of Linton's position is unavoidable. It is inherent in his 
choice of words and, indeed, in the process of specializing a 
word by taking it from one body of thought to another. This is, 
no doubt, one of the greatest pitfalls to social science, the 
problem neither beginning, nor ending, with Linton.
If this analysis of Linton's ideas on status and role 
seems inordinately long, it is because, while his theory is 
compact, when developed by others the quantity of verbage mush­
rooms. The difficulties of Linton's formulation of "status" and 
"role" are at the heart of the work of those who follow him, and 
are most efficiently brought to light in their most simple 
expression.
Linton's argument presents a structure which is shared 
by most theories of social role. Careful analysis reveals an 
underlying set of binary oppositions as dramatically as in a 
Levi-Straussian analysis of myth. For Linton, there are three
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important terms: "role", "status", and "ideal pattern". These
are spread in order along a line. On one end of the line there 
is an empirically founded element; at the other end of the line 
is an ideally founded element. The middle term serves to effect 
a translation of one pole into the other. The ideal term is 
invariably hypostatized. This fallacious reification produces 
theories that perform a kind of "Indian rope trick". They begin 
down on the ground with the completely obvious - the individual 
- and then they proceed to ever more abstract positions, until 
finally they reach the top of the rope and continue into the 
unknowable. "Role" is empirical in so far as it is a matter of 
knowledge. What people truly know is demonstrable. Or what a 
man knows may be inferred from his actions which it is possible 
to witness or hear about. "Status" is not so clear. "Role" 
is a part of a "status" but they are not the same. A "status" 
is only related to other "statuses". And when it comes to earth 
it is no longer a "status" but a "role". Nor does the relational 
property of "status" influence its manifestation as "role". If 
a man is kind to a child, I might say that this was done because 
he is the child's father, and one part of his "role" as father 
is to be kind to his children. But by the same token he could 
be the child's uncle, cousin, or grandfather; or even a con­
siderate stranger. So while all these statuses are different 
and are discrete one from the other, they share some behavioural 
aspects when they are manifested. But because a man is being 
kind to the child, it is clearly not his mother, aunt, or sister. 
This distinction can be made at the purely relational level. So 
while "status" is too ideal to be pinned down, the clouds
sometimes pull apart for a moment to afford precious glimpses.
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The next level of abstraction, the "ideal social 
pattern", is the most elusive. Linton says almost nothing about 
it, except that it embraces all statuses. Perhaps he is only 
forced into claiming its existence by the underlying logic of 
the dramaturgical analogy.
The structure of Linton*s theory and the oppositions 
it contains may be seen in the following diagram:
STRUCTURAL DIAGRAM OF LINTON*S THEORY OF ROLES:
Linton's terms role status ideal socio­
cultural 
pattern
suggested 
translations 
for Linton's 
terms individual knowledge society
Dramaturgical 
equivalents to 
Linton's terms actor part play
implied dualism 
in Linton's 
formulation
empirical
foundation
ideal
foundation
Talcott Parsons' works are the second step in the 
development of the idea of a social role. Parsons' theories 
are notoriously difficult to understand, and I claim no special 
insights. In fact, of all the authors discussed in this thesis, 
Parsons is the most opaque. This is due to the unfortunate 
frequency with which he invents new or specializes old words. 
What was said previously about the stubbor^iess of words in
reference to Ralph Linton's writings goes double for those of
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Talcott Parsons. My interpretation of his work leans heavily 
on the summary of Edward C. Devereux, Jr. (Devereux, Jr., 1961). 
Parsons' theory is constructed upon the importance of action.
But the actor is not alone; he has a set of orientations to his 
situation. These orientations include goals and norms which 
help the actor to chose the right way of acting in the particular 
situation. Parsons sees most action taking place in systems; 
that is, certain aspects of the situation become stabalized and 
the action itself takes on a recurrent character. Furthermore, 
most action systems occur in a society. By this Parsons means 
that other persons are significant objects in the situation of 
the actor. The action system, then, broadens to become one of 
interaction. Devereux describes a simple came of this with one 
ego and one alter:
ego has alter as a significant object 
in his situation and alter has ego as an object 
in his own. In acting with respect to alter, 
ego must predict how he will respond; in effect, 
his action is designed to produce a certain 
desired reaction in alter. And of course alter 
is presumably doing the same sort of thing with 
respect to ego. Interaction thus has the charac­
teristic which Parsons has called double contin­
gency. If the two are not well acquainted, we 
may expect that there well be many wrong predic­
tions at first, and many communication failures.
But after a while, Parsons observes, they may 
get to be rather good at it. Their actions with 
respect to one another tend to become patterned 
and stabilized: when interacting, ego comes to
play a specific sort of role in relation to alter 
and expects alter to play a specific sort of 
role in relation to himself. In some such manner, 
a child and his mother learn what to expect of 
one another and we have a miniature two-role social 
system, in which each role is complementary to 
the other. {Devereux, Jr. 1961, pp. 25-26).
This simplest of all interaction systems - and the mother-child
relationship is probably the only empirical case with any
resemblance to it - differs from a real social situation in that
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most interaction develops in the matrix of a more or less 
defined sociocultural system. In the simple picture of inter­
action described above, the roles with which mother and child 
can finally predict and understand each other's behaviour are 
the product of long compulsory association, trial, error and 
emendation. It may be true that some relationships are forged 
with such care, but most are not. Most goals, roles and nor­
mative standards exist before the individuals who occupy or 
pursue them. They are, in other words, institutionalized. The 
Durkheimian position is the correct one here (Durkheim, 1938).
In fact, Parson's description of a mother and child "evolving" 
their own little social system is a distortion of what actually 
takes place. The Durkheimian position is very persuasive here, 
for even at his mother's breast a child is bombarded with 
socializing demands. Mothers, who have been taught by their 
own mothelrs or Dr. Spock, teach children rather than visa versa. 
What Parsons describes may have occured in the days of proto-man. 
But even then only for the mother's first child. After the 
first, she would have expectations about children in general, 
that is, a theory of child rearing. Men seldom have sufficient
we must grab for the abstractions that are near to hand. Parson's 
simple picture of action misses this essential characteristic of 
social behaviour. But Parsons' ideas are more sophisticated 
than the simple picutre of interaction. In the Parsonian scheme 
every role relationship consists of both an institutionalized 
nexus and a particular nexus. He uses the term "social role" 
to mean the institutionally defined and regulated component of 
roles. For analytical purposes he treats the institutionalized
•e
leisure to build unique social systems.
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aspect of role as being separable from the particularistic 
aspect.
Parsons makes it clear that the "act” is the basic 
unit of his thought, but he uses the ideas of status and role 
for purposes of the macroscopic analysis of social systems. He 
purports to use these words in the same way as Linton, but there 
are subtle differences which are of considerable importance.
Parsons explains "status" as the positional aspect of 
the social system. It is here some actor is "located" in the 
social system relative to other actors; or, in other words, 
the actor's place in the relationship system considered as a 
structure, a patterned system of parts. Within this pattern, 
each actor is an "object of orientation" for other actors (and 
for himself). And, conversely, the significance of the social 
object as a point of orientation is derived from its place in 
the social relationship system, and that it is significant makes 
it a social object.
Like Linton, Parsons sees "role" as being the processual 
aspect of a "status". A "social role" is the action of an 
individual in his relations with other actors in so far as this 
action gains significance by its relation to the social system.
In this capacity an individual acts; he does more than serve as 
an object. Having thus formulated a theory of "role", Parsons 
proceeds to explain the operational property of any possible 
role with his now famous five pattern variables.
The Parsonian use of the concept "role" is basically 
no more than an alteration of Linton's earlier theory. To say 
the least, Parsons makes the earlier theory more complicated, 
seemingly only in the pursuit of theoretical elegance. But in
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the process he alters the nature of the ideas with which "role” 
is associated.
Parsons replaces Linton*s "ideal pattern" with both 
the "social system" and the "social object". In this way, the 
ideal extreme of Linton*s progression from "role" to "ideal 
pattern" is broken in half. What Parsons does is to add a 
fourth term to the three used both by Linton and the prototype. 
For Parsons a "role" is an aspect of "status"; a "status" is a 
"social object"; a "social object" is part of a "social system". 
If nothing else, Parsons can be credited with multiplying the 
total ambiguity of the role proposition, for while he adds to 
Linton*s statement, he does so only at the mystical extreme.
One element, however, is a push toward clarification - that a 
status is a social object. This proposition enables Parsons 
to show how a "status" is relevant to an individual. One can 
expand Parsons' idea and say that individuals have ideas about 
what other people in the abstract are supposed to be like and 
that these ideas permit him to expect and anticipate the action 
of others.
But Parsons falls into the mind versus body trap. He 
establishes an ideal term, "status", and explains how it is 
useful to individual actors, which is good. But he then intro­
duces a non-ideal term, the "role", and is unable to say how 
the two are related. The Parsonian view of the relation between 
the individual as actor in a role and the status of which his 
role is but a manifestation is that the "status" is like an 
object; it does not change. The actor moves through life 
glancing from time to time at the star-like "social objects" 
which inform his behaviour. But this is an improvement over
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Linton's theory. At least Parsons explains how the actor is 
related to the "status"; he looks at it from afar, over a gulf. 
This view of human action is reminiscent of Aristotle's physics. 
Here is man trapped in the midst of flux and decay contemplating 
unchanging perfection revealed in the stars. Thus, Parsons 
performs the same rope trick as Linton, hut with greater elegance. 
He disappears more slowly. That the mind/body dichotomy is 
behind this is clear. Given two different worlds, it is obvious 
that one cannot be reduced to the other. Thus for Parsons, an 
actor peers across an impassable gulf at the ideal representation 
of what life should be, but of which it is only a faint reflec­
tion. The role he plays is like the "status", but it is not the 
"status". He knows the status "teacher", but none of his 
teachers are exactly like it. And the knowledge of the status 
of teacher only helps him understand teachers when one is not 
actually around to be dealt with. For when an actual confron­
tation occurs, the relationship becomes so complicated that the 
ideal is of limited use. The heavens become distorted in this 
sub-lunary sphere. Thus, Parsons slips out of the problem of 
roles being connected with a script by saying that there are 
roles and there are scripts, and actors know the script, but 
when they are on stage, they do not always follow it. But the 
script is not useless, because the actors know who will be on 
stage even if they do not know from the script what they will do 
when they get there. Parson's theory seems to imply, for example,
that the status "student" and the status "tutor" have some
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relationship in the social structure and that as individuals 
plan their actions, they may occasionally glance at the ideal 
system, but the two axe far from congruent. Now, according to
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Parsons, if I enact the "student” status, the abstract relation 
of student to tutor is eclipsed by a more personal relationship, 
namely that of Lawrence to Dr. So-and-So. Careful thought 
about what interaction would take place reveals that the 
Parsonian barrier between role and status is a false one. These 
terms do not, as he claims, correspond to universal and particular 
interaction. Regardless of who my tutor is, his primary obli­
gation to me is to see that I am prepared for examinations, or 
finish my thesis. This will be the case whether our interaction 
is cold and distant or warm and friendly. Also, my decision 
about whether or not to request a new tutor will depend on how 
well the abstract expectations are fulfilled. If old So-and-So 
does not know his stuff, I had better move on, for this is the 
minimum expectation of a tutor. Likewise, the ideal of "tutor” 
may give rise to such back handed compliments as "old So-and-So 
can be rather rude, but he really knows his stuff and keeps me 
on my toes". The point of all this is that Parson's poles of 
universal and particular, and therefore status and role, do not 
represent a logical disjunction. To English people who know me 
very well it still is important to khow that I am American, and 
if I stayed in this country forever, this would still be the 
case. Familiarity on the particular level does not obviate 
knowledge of universal characteristics. The poles are not 
logically, or really, separate. I can conceive of a purely 
universal relation totally based on formal and abstract guides, 
but not of a purely particular relationship. There is no "true 
self" that exists beyond the relevant categories, the universal 
categories are rather a part of any possible self, but it true
or otherwise. Abstract concepts enter into the relations of
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close friends and even parents and children. What is psycho­
analysis but the interpretation of the most intimate relationships 
in the light of external and abstract categories? Thus, it is 
mistaken to see particularity and universality as an either/or 
situation.
To summarize, then, there are several flaws common to 
the theories of both Parsons and Linton. Both depend on at 
least one hypostatized term. The arguments have a common 
structure, that is, they are each a collection of terms arranged 
on a line bounded by the oppositions individual/society-culture, 
matter/mind, and empiricism/idealism. Both introduce mechanism* 
to describe the way in which the divergent poles are articulated 
one to the other. It is in showing how the empirical partici­
pates in the ideal that both theorists resort to metaphorical 
description. And, for the reasons given above, both mmtaphors 
misrepresent the nature of human thought and action.
The discussion of role as a social scientific concept 
is continued by Marion J. Levy, Jr. Levy uses "role" to mean 
"any position differentiated in terms of a given social structure 
whether the position be institutionalized or not". (Levy, 
159-160). For Legy, these roles involve obligations, rights 
and expected performances of the individuals who hold them. He 
includes a variety of terms in his concept of role: thief,
doctor, outcast, and injured man are all considered by Levy to 
be roles. Levy then draws a distinction between ideal and 
actual roles. An ideal role is institutionalized, it contains 
normative standards, conformity with which is generally to be 
expected, and failure to conform with which is met by moral 
indignation. An actual role, he goes on to say, is that one
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actually held by an individual. Levy thinks that his "actual 
role" is similar to the "role" of Linton and Parsons, and his 
"ideal role" is very similar to their "status". Leyy, then, 
employs two terms not used by Parsons or Linton, but fits them 
into the same structure. "Actual role" replaces "role", "ideal 
role" replaces "status" and this is in turn included in a socio­
cultural system. To give him his due, Levy does say something 
new; he not only gives new names to old slots in the structure, 
but he gives them new definitions as well. "Ideal role" is not 
quite the same as "status" in the sense that Linton and Parsons 
use that word. Linton, especially, contends that "status" and 
"role" are distinctly different. In fact, both of Levy's ideas 
are incorporated into Linton's original concept, for Linton 
talks about a role as manifested behaviour and as a body of 
knowledge. So Levy's "ideal role" is not really the same thing 
as Linton's original idea. What he drops is the relational 
dimension of the "status" concept. That this is so is no 
criticism, except that Levy misrepresents his own theory.
Now, by deleting the relational meaning of the status 
concept, and saying that it is no more than a role in ideal form, 
Levy falls prey to a simple, but very sticky problem. In Levy's 
terms there is "ideal" role behaviour and "actual", i.e. real 
role behaviour. This makes sense, and is actually more lucid 
than Parsons or Linton. Levy's two terms are exactly the same, 
except that one is a man in action and the other is the idea of 
a man in action. While this formulation still partakes of 
Cartesian dualism, it is simpler than the others. Levy gets 
in trouble by confusing the two meanings of the word "ideal".
As a result of this, he adds a dual meaning to his "ideal role".
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It is ideal in the sense of being noncorporeal, and it is ideal
in the sens of being perfect. Confusing the two meanings of
the word "ideal" creates an absuriduty in Levy's work which is 
more serious than any mistake in the theories previously con­
sidered. Defining "ideal role" as that which "involves normative 
standards, conformity with which is generally to be expected, 
and failure to conform with which is met by moral indignation" 
(Levy, 1952, p. 160), implies that unless people exhibit "ideal 
role" behaviour they will ordinarily be incurring the wrath of 
others. But "ideal roles" are not performed. They are the 
opposite of what people really do, the "actual role". But this 
could not be the case, for the excitement of indignation is not 
an ordinary event. Most people do what they are expected to do.
If not the rosy paradise of "ideal roles", "statuses" and
"social objects" this life is at least tolerable for most people. 
Levy, in effect, deprives people of the possibility of doing 
well in their role behaviour. Therefore, reductio ad absurdum, 
Levy's position is untenable.
corrected. But is the correction worth while? Levy makes a 
praiseworthy attempt to clarify Parsonian theory, but by making 
it understandable, he erases its complexity. And in this com­
plexity lies its interest. As demonstrated earlier, there seems 
to be some reality in the relational property of the status 
concept. And it would be unfortunate if one were to lose track 
of it.
After Levy, R.K. Merton is the next to make a serious 
contribution to the scientific specialization of the word "role". 
Merton projects "role" into a theory of "reference groups".
►v
Levy's bl er is so simple that it could easily be
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The "reference group" of a person is the group or the idea of 
a group with which he associates and from which he derives 
guidance and inspiration. A merchant and an impoverished 
aristocrat may have very similar life situations in terms of 
income, housing, entertainment style, and yet the aristocrat's 
behaviour will be vastly different from that of the parvenu.
His "reference group" is different. His behaviour is guided 
by the values and expectations of people who are generally 
wealthier than himself. Merton's "reference group" is very 
similar to Parsons' idea of a "social object". It is an ideal 
with which individuals associate or in which they see themselves 
reflected and with which they organize their lives; they are the 
North Stars of man's social existence. Merton sees roles and 
statuses as providing the context for "reference group behaviour". 
In other words, statuses and roles are "reference groups", or 
more accurately, "reference" is the activity of statuses and 
roles. Thus, Merton gives a name to the process which Linton 
describes, but never labels, and that Parsons calls the "social 
object".
Merton tries to conform very closely to Linton's use 
of the concept "role", but with one exception. He argues that 
any social status involves not a single role, but an assortment 
of associated roles. He sees this as a basic characteristic of 
social structure and labels it the "role set". Merton defines 
this concisely as "that complement of role relationships which 
persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status" 
(Merton, 1957* P« 423)• The example Merton gives is that there 
is a status, medical student, and conjoined with it many roles, 
the role of medical student interacting with a nurse, or another
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student or with a doctor. All of these relationships, Merton 
thinks, are different roles, different ways of enacting one 
status.
Merton goes on to elaborate the idea of status in the 
same way. Any given individual is the focus of many statuses, 
so that to say that Mrs Jones is a teacher, wife, mother, 
Catholic, and Labourite is to describe her "status-set”. He 
defines this "complement of social statuses” of an individual 
as his "status set”, each of the statuses in turn having its 
distinctive "role-set” (Merton, 1957* PP- 423-4-24). Again,
Merton is doing no more than giving names to ideas originated 
by Linton. Indeed, the idea that people play many roles and 
have numerous statuses is one of Linton's key points.
Both "role-set” and "status-set" as Merton introduce 
them are ways of describing a society at a particular time; they 
are synchronic tools. Merton introduces a third term to describe 
at least one kind of change. Some statuses suceed each other 
with regularity; this he calls a "status-sequence". His example 
is again drawn from the education of an American physician: a
person becoming a doctor succesively occupies the statuses of 
Medical student, intern, resident and practicing physician.
Merton argues that there are sequences of "role-sets" and 
sequences of "status-sets".
Merton's theory is basically an elaboration of Linton's 
"status" and "role" terminology. He produces a theory of seven 
terms, all of which fit into the interstices of Linton's "role"/ 
"status"/"ideal pattern" program. The theory is this in 
skeletal form: "role" is included in "role-set" which is
included in "status" which is included in "status-set" which
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is a "reference group" which is part of the "social structure" 
and the locus of a "status set" is an individual, which is the 
seventh term. From the critical point of view, the relation of 
inclusiveness connecting the terms is the important thing. A 
small concrete term is put into a larger more abstract term, 
and this manoeuvre is repeated up to "social structure". This 
is the Indian rope trick again. But at least Merton is visible 
while he climbs the rope. This is a definite improvement over 
his predecessors.
Parsons. In one sense, Merton's profusion of words is very- 
nice. His is the most lucid theory so far considered. But as 
he squeezes ambiguity from Linton's work, he also drains it of 
interest. Neologism, in this case, tends to fragment the 
original theory. Linton's way of expressing the same thing is 
more fluid, and while he cannot specify the process, he does 
allow for its presence. Merton tends to obscure the process 
behind his elaborate terminology. The recurrent problem with 
these theories is how to make them relevant to the action of an 
individual. The only obvious point is that people as individuals 
do act. All else - "role-sets", "societies", "cultural patterns", 
and so forth - are only abstractions from the action of various 
individuals. Thus, to claim that these abstractions are relevant 
to human action is to draw on oneself the burden of showing how 
they are actually used by an individual in a real situation.
This is what Merton fails to do. The reason for this is that 
his theory is au fond a nominalistic one.
Like Levy, Merton arranges his terms in a reductionist 
Again, this deviates from the views of Linton and
Merton's preoccupation with words leads him away from
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the all important consideration of reality. Every term in 
Merton's theory is a fragmentation of a person. Some are sub­
individual, others are supra-individual, but none add up to the 
totality of a person. Merton's theory breaks down the elements 
of a person but they are not the elements relevant to an actor 
as he choses or commits an action. Merton's "status-set" is 
the attribute of an individual but he does not show how this is 
used by an individual or how it is, in a real situation, used 
differently from a single status or a role or a role-set. It 
truly may be said of Merton's theory that the sum of its parts 
do not equal a whole. It is a cleanly integrated system of 
terms but its relation to human life is at best tangential.
When Merton says that "role", "role-set", "status", and "status- 
set" are all components of the "reference group", he implies 
that "reference group" is a category in which the others are 
included. But the components are actually inseparable. One 
cannot chose to play the role "medical-student-to nurse" and 
then chose not to play the role of "medical student-to-doctor"; 
the two are so firmly bound together that any terminological 
distinction is highly artificial.
Another way of expressing Merton's idea is advocated 
by Phillip K. Bock. He argues that Merton's terms are more 
accurately arranged if they are viewed as analogs with a 
morphemic linguistic analysis. Bock further things that a role 
is a class concept with various members, the appearance of any 
one of which is linked to its particular environment. He 
displays the linguistic parallel as follows:
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Isomorphism of Two Structural Statements
Role A, "teacher”
variant a-^  with B, "pupil” 
variant a2 with C, "colleague” 
variant a^ with D, "principal” 
etc.
Morpheme /-S/, "plural”
/-s/ with Class I noun stems 
/-z/ with Class II noun stems 
/- z/ with Class III noun stems 
etc. (Bock, Phillip, K., 1908, p. 215)
Bock does a very nice job of re-ordering Merton1s 
vocabulary. Two advantages result from this. First, he maintains 
the relation of the parts to the whole, at least for that part 
of Merton's theory below the "status-set” level. Second, he 
invents no new words and obviates Merton's creations. Adhering 
to the principle that neologism is never a virtue, the later 
advantage is truly laudable. That Bock does this under the 
inspiration of structural linguistics is highly significant. 
Unfortunately, Bock is content to re-structure Merton's ter­
minology; had he drawn bolder conclusions, his work would be 
even more interesting.
Thus, Merton's theory is an interesting elaboration of 
Linton's earlier ideas. He tries to state it more accurately 
and while he succeeds with parts he also fails with parts. 
Unfortunately, he does copy Linton's essential error, which is 
the whole structure of the theory, the arrangement of the terms 
along the continuum from empirical to ideal. And for this 
reason, the most damaging criticism which can be aimed at Merton 
are thos previously leveled at Linton's own work.
A fourth contribution to the development of role
theory comes from Aidan Southall. Southall is clearer about
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his purposes than the earlier writers. He is interested in 
comparing one society with another and tries to specialize 
"role” to meet those ends. He explicitly denies any interest 
in "the systems of action of persons as such" (Southall, 21).
But in spite of his avowed disinterest in action theory,
Southall stumbles into one of the major problems of the other 
theorists.
Southall's theory has the advantage of introducing no 
new terms. In fact, he discards both "status" and "sociocultural 
system" which makes it the simplest theory yet considered. He 
also makes it clear that there is no single bearer of a role; 
for him, a role does not refer to a type of activity springing 
from an individual, but to "the reciprocal behaviour of the 
individuals with whom the role is played". And he goes on to 
say: "For the essence of the role is the reciprocity of behaviour
and expectation between those who participate in a role rela­
tionship" (Southall, 20).
The novelty in Southall's formulation of "role" is 
that the locus of a role becomes not an individual but a plurality 
of people. It is important to note that he claims a role must 
exist between two people, not two relationships, which is the 
direction of Merton's theory. The problem raised by Southall's 
theory is the one faced by Linton and Parsons, that is, if there 
is an actor in a role then what and where is the script of 
their play? This problem is even more ac<^ute for Southall, 
because for the existence of a role, he requires at least two 
actors. Now, if two actors are playing the same role they must 
be reading the same script. This not only implies that there 
is an ideal element directing an actor, but that the ideal
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element is so diffuse that two actors have access to the same 
script and that both interpret it in exactly the same way. 
Southall assumes that such "reciprocity and expectation" exist 
and that they work harmoniously, but, unfortunately, he does 
not discuss this cloud of directives. Thus, in Southall's 
theory, the ideal pole looms ever larger.
There is an easy escape route from the dilemma of 
finding a script shared by the actors. That is, simply to say 
that there is no script, that one actor shares nothing with 
another and can know nothing about the other actor except his 
actual deeds. This approach claims that there is no need to 
talk about the knowledge of roles being shared, but only of 
"equivalence structures" that exist between several individuals. 
This is the approach of Anthony Wallace in his Culture and 
Personality. Wallace holds that it is "impossible to demonstrate 
empirically that any social system is operated by individuals 
all driven by the same motives" (Wallace, I960, p. 30). If 
overt behaviour is predictable then actors may enter into it 
for any reason, and these reasons will not matter. Human 
relationships, Wallace says, are "bhsed not on a sharing, but 
on a complementarity of cognitions and motives" (Wallace, I960, 
p. 4-1). That none of the theorists considered thus far have 
taken this option reveals either their fortitude in resisting 
behaviourist psychology or their ignorance of it. Especially 
in the case of Parsons, the former is correct; his entire theory 
of action is an attempt to circumnavigate the answer offered by 
the Behaviourists. No doubt, this is the case with the others 
as well.
The burden carried by every thinker discussed so far
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is the problem of knowledge and other people’s minds. Or, to 
put it in the form of a question: How can one know what another
person knows? How can one penetrate another's mind? None of 
the authors have asked this directly, because they are all 
snagged on the dualism of mind and body. This dualism raises 
the problem but it prohibits the questions that could solve it. 
For this reason the theories considered so far make little sense 
beyond the level of metaphor. Their philosophical presuppositions 
do not furnish them with tools to study or discuss the human 
mind. The real problem is that they talk about the human mind 
all along, but only in idealistic terms, and that is why their 
more abstract statements are so metaphorical. Wallace's beha­
viourism at least has the advantage of stopping short of 
statements about mind. His is therefore the tidiest theory yet 
seen. Wallace operates with Cartesian dualism just as much as 
Linton or Parsons, but while the later reach the wall of the 
mind/body divide and speculate about how the path might continue, 
Wallace stops and is content to build a theory only out of those 
things he has collected before reaching the wall. There is an 
admirable degree of honesty in this. And, when with the aid of 
Ryle's philosophy, this barrier is pulled down, the answers 
yielded will in some respects be more like those of behaviourist 
psychology than traditional sociology. A logical step in this 
direction is the work of S.F. Nadel. His is, in fact, the most 
elegant and penetrating theory of its type.
S.F. Nadel's TheTheory of Social Structure is, as the 
title indicates, concerned with much more than role theory. In 
its scope, this theory is only comparable to the work of Talcott 
Parsons. Yet both theories are built around the concept of
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social role. Judging by the space allocated by each author to 
the explanation of the concept, it is relatively more important 
to Nadel them to Parsons. But while Parsons disposes of the 
’role" idea with comparatively little elaboration, his theory 
hangs upon its validity as much as Nadel's. Compared with 
Parsons, Nadel's emphasis is more on role and less on social 
structure. In fact, once Nadel1s ideas about role are set out, 
his formulation of social structure is rather obvious. This, 
again, is the opposite of Talcott Parsons. And by concentrating 
his thought on the role part of a grand theory of society, Nadel 
avoids the most damaging trap in which all other theories have 
been snared - the reification of ideal terms. The reason for 
Nadel's eluding this trap is clear. He is the first to approach 
the study of social roles and social structure from a realist 
point of view.
To my knowledge, there has never been a controversy 
between nominalism and realism in sociology. In sociology, 
nominalism has won an easy victory. This is unfortunate. The 
debate between nominalists and realists is as old as the Middle 
Ages; it is not yet solved. In the higher levels of semantic 
analysis it is still a very open question. But the level at 
which most sociologists have unwittingly chosen a solution to 
this old problem is not a complicated one. Stated very simply, 
nominalism is the conviction that men can devise no concepts or 
images that correspond to reality. Realism, on the other hand, 
is the view that behind abstract words is a clear reality. The 
distinction between the two ideas is important when one tries 
to discover if there is such a thing as "white" or "angry" in 
the same way as there is a "dog" or a "house". These questions
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constitute a legitimate puzzle. The level at which social 
science has adopted the nominalist solution, however, is much
more obvious. Here, nominalism is blatantly inappropriate.
• I
What most sociologists, Linton and Parsons among them, have 
done is to treat nouns as if they possessed the same ambiguity 
as adjectives. Embracing this extreme nominalism often leads 
sociologists to omit the scrutiny of the realities to which 
their theoretical constructs refer. In fact, they seldom seem 
to worry about reality until the formulation of the construct is 
complete. Thus, one may wade through a thousand pages of socio­
logical theorizing without so much as the hint of any reality.
As if to compound the problem, sociology's acceptance of the 
nominalist fallacy has been largely tacit. Few sociologists seem 
to realize that behind the time-honoured rubric "heuristic" lurks 
the pitfall of nominalism. From its beginning, sociology has 
leaned on the idea that its theories are heuristic. Whatever 
its contribution to sociology in its embryonic stages, in the 
hands of more recent theorists, the word has become a subterfuge 
for inexactitude. That if one's theory is confronted with 
incongruous facts one must only reply "but of course all this 
is only heuristic" and one is immediately let off the hook, is 
a standard ruse quickly learnt by every student in the subject.
It is a distortion of the word "theory" to say that they are 
non-verifiable, or have no relation to reality. That this 
thought process should be called "scientific" is a further dis­
tortion of language. Yet this is the result of the nominalist 
fallacy masquerading as "heuristic" tools, devices and theories.
Somewhere in the history of sociology there may have 
been a genuine use of the word "heuristic". Once a sociologist
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must have used this word as being synonomous with a scientific 
hypothesis. This is legitimate, for heuristic ideas like 
scientific hypotheses bear no relation to reality at all; they 
are like fictions, or what Ross has recently dubbed "fabulation" 
(Ross, 1968, p. 29). In legitimate sciences, hypotheses are 
no liability, for they are subjected to testing and verification. 
However, this has not been the case in the social sciences.
Here, hypotheses are created in vacuo, labeled "heuristic” and 
then never tested. Consequently, sociological theories are 
rarely rejected; they tend to accumulate. Perhaps nominalism 
is the reason why the word "hypothesis" has never been popular 
in sociological writings.
Nadel seems to be undecided on this issue. At certain 
places in the book, he refers to his theory as heuristic, or 
points to the insights it will produce as a heuristic device.
But he also makes some strongly realistic statements. Most 
important of these is: ". . . the role concept is not an
invention of anthropologists or sociologists but is employed by 
the very people they study" (Nadel, 1957? P* 20). Furthermore, 
he clearly points to the reality behind the role concept: ".
it is the existence of names describing classes of people 
which makes us think of roles" (Nadel, 1957» P» 4-5)* Faced with 
this apparent contradiction, I suggest that the realist bias of 
Nadel's thought predominates sufficiently to credit him with 
first breaking the nominalist dominance of sociological thought. 
The touchstone of reality accomplishing this feat is speech (as 
used by de Saussure, 1966). Nadel's respect for speech is the 
beginning of a realist approach to the study of social roles.
His view of speech is consonant with the principles of Ordinary
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Language Philosophy as developed by J.L. Austin and used earlier 
in this chapter: . . our common stock of words embodies
all the distinctions men have found worth marking, in the life­
times of many generations: these surely are likely to be more
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test 
of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all 
ordinary and reasonably practical matters than any that you or 
I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the 
most favoured alternative method" (J.L. Austin, 1961, p. 130).
The argument of The Theory of Social Structure is 
built up around a set of very carefully delineated concepts.
Nadel begins by defining the word "social". This word indicates 
that: ". . . w e  are here speaking of ways of acting governed
by rules and hence in some measure stereotyped (or rendered 
'determinate')". And he further clarifies this statement:
"For 'determinate ways of acting towards or in regard to one 
another' we usually say 'relationships', and we indicate that 
they follow from rules by calling them 'institutionalized' or 
'social' (as against 'private' or 'personal') relationships" 
(Nadel, 1957» PP« 8-9)* Nadel further states that each relation­
ship has a variety of "concrete representations" and that the 
idea of the general relationship implies all of the various 
representations. Or, to turn the process around, when one 
identifies a relationship, what one does is to abstract from 
fluctuating behaviour a relational aspect of that behaviour 
which is constant. To put it yet another way, people's behaviour 
signifies the relationship that exists between them.
Nadel thus builds up slowly to the "role" concept.
This is introduced as follows: ". . . individuals become
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actors in relationships in virtue of some brief; which brief is 
obviously as invariant as the relationships that hinge on it.
And instead of speaking of individuals 'being actors in virtue 
of some brief1, we usually speak of individuals enacting roles" 
(Nadel, 1957* P» H ) • As a concept, "role" is intended to 
contrast the variations of the actor with the constancy others 
expect of him by describing this as a part to be played. Nadel 
thus puts forward the proposition that in at least one respect 
human existence is like a drama. But the relationship between 
the two is a simile, and no more. Thus, while Nadel elaborates 
the dramaturgical analogy more than previous writers, he makes 
the analogical nature of his thought clear. For this reason, he 
is able to use the descriptive force of the analogy with drama 
and not let this restrict his ability to make more penetrating 
statements. In short, he is not confused by using one word for 
two different phenomena. He proceeds quickly from the analogy 
with drama to the statement that ". . . relationships and
roles (more precisely, relationships in virtue of roles) 'arrange* 
and 'order' the human beings who make up the society . . ."
(Nadel, 1957» p« 11)• This is the most ambitious account of 
social roles yet seen, for it puts "role" into the active voice. 
This is a vastly different idea from the "polar star" thinking 
of Linton and Farsons.
The basic quandary of role theory is that in the human 
experience some things seem always to change and some things 
seem never to change, or to change imperceptibly. Thus, the 
reconciliation of Heraclitus and Parmenides is a prime, though 
cbifrferieal, target of sociology. Nadel acknowledges this 
problem, criticises the approach that Linton and Parsons have
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taken to it, and offers a new solution:
It is relevant to emphasize, as Linton and Parsons 
have done, that in role behaviour something is 
translated into action. But the important thing 
about this 'something' is not that it is static 
or positional while the actual role is dynamic or 
processual; these are incidental features. The 
important thing is that in one case we have the 
execution of certain rights and obligations, that 
is, a performance, and in the other, this set of 
rights and obligations embodied in a piece of 
knowledge - in a norm or prescription, or perhaps 
only in an image people carry in their heads. In 
brief, we have a rule and its application.
(Nadel, 1957, p. 29).
Extending this, Nadel decides that the "status" concept of
previous thinkers is "not only redundant but misleading" (Nadel,
1957, P* 29). Unfortunately, Nadel picks up the word "status"
himself. After making the point that some roles are not as well
defined as others, he labels those poorly defined ones "quasi-
roles" or "statuses". While this is a bit of a red-herring, it
is not seriously misleading.
Nadel proceeds to the idea of a "role system" via his
earlier idea about behaviour implying a role. Not only the
existence of a role may be inferred from behaviour, but if the
presence of one role is known then concomitant roles may be
inferred. This is the property that draws roles into systems.
As the role "mother" appears one may quickly infer the totality
of a kinship system. This is the case with most role-names. The
quality that links separate roles into a role-system is, then,
a logical one - the possibility of inferring one role from the
presence of another, or, to put it another way: the existence
of one role is entailed in the definition of some other role.
The discussion of role systems reveals Nadel's
tendency towards a realist approach. He states clearly that
role systems must be discovered in the speech of the people
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being studied. To isolate a role system one must first collect
a "role inventory", and this "lies in the total vocabulary
current in any given society and expressing its notions about
differences of persons" (Nadel, 1957* P* 61). Interestingly
enough, much the same point was made at about the same time by
J.R. Firth, allinguist:
The grown man has to play many parts, functioning 
in many characters, and unless he knows his lines 
as well as his role he is no use in the play. If 
you do not know your part and your lines, there 
are no cues for the other fellow, and therefore 
no place or excuse for his lines either.
The multiplicity of social roles we have to 
play as members of a race, nation, class, family, 
school, club, as sons, brothers, lovers, fathers, 
workers, churchgoers, golfers, newspaper readers, 
public speakers, involves also a certain degree 
of linguistic specialization. (J.R. Firth, p. 29).
The importance of the analysis of speech in Nadel*s
theory cannot be overemphasised. For example, he says that if
a relationship is not clearly named as in that between "father"
and "father-in-law", we should suspect that the relationship
is not sufficiently distinct or important, and the respective
kinship degrees not really 'roles' worth naming specifically"
(Nadel, 1957* p. 83). Statements like this are only possible
with the adoption of an approach to semantics. These particular
expressions are similar to the ideas of B.L. Whorf on linguistic
relativity. If Nadel's work is influenced by Whorf - and there
is no reference to prove this - he emphasises a facft of Whorf's
thinking that is largely covert. This is, that the relativity
of language only becomes significant when premised upon the
reality of language. If the language of a people does not embody
or reflect the realities of their social existence, then there
is no point in basing the study of role systems on the analysis
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of "role inventories” which are, after all, no more than a 
section of a vocabulary. It is important to emphasise two points 
here: (1) Nadel places great stress on the importance of speech,
and the meaning of words, and (2) underlying the centrality of 
speech and language in Nadel*s thinking is an approach toward 
semantics. Here, then, is the unification of the two obvious 
questions arising from the case of "G-enatio Magino versus Yowasi 
Maliwa”. Pursuit of the concept of social role leads directly 
into the importance of words and their meanings. That the two 
were ever separate is the major cause of shortcomings in socio­
logical role theory. The impact of linguistics is the single 
most exciting development i^ Nadel*s book. It certainly adds a 
unique clarity to his formulation of ”role system", for it makes 
possible the use of concepts, such as inference, drawn from 
subjects more intellequjbally robust than anthropology. Only a 
few conceptual steps beyond "role system", however, he lands in 
hot water.
The leap from "role system" to "social system" is a 
difficult one. To make this jump, Nadel postulates that members 
of the same social system share knowledge of the "role system". 
Several key phrases reveal this attitude: "complementarity of
expectations", "mutual steering", and, "congruence of role 
conceptions" (Nadel, 1957* PP- 50-56). Thus, on the question 
of how one knows the minds of other people, Nadel takes a strong 
stand. The word "congruence" is the most revealing. For Nadel, 
interaction between two people is possible because they both 
know the same things. All actors have the same script, or to 
use Nadel's synonym, "brief". Nor does he allow for a period 
of trial and error before the "role system" is known equally to
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both actors, as Parsons does: 11. . . in 'real' situations
the roles and relationships have a significant pre-history; they 
are not created ex novo in the contexts in which they are observed 
to operate. In a sense they are always imported from outside, 
that is from the society by whose norms they are decreed and by 
whose institutions they are fashioned" (Nadel, 1957> p. 114). 
Nadel's view is, to say the least, extreme. Wallace's "equiva- 
lence structures" cover the same phenomenon more efficiently.
One final difference between Nadel and those prece^ding 
him is his rejection of the "general role" idea. This is impor­
tant, because it changes the way in which an individual is 
articulated to a role system. Consistent with his other ideas, 
he places the emphasis heavily on the system, giving the indivi­
dual few decisions to make within it:
These names ["general role", "role personality", 
or "social personality"] actually suggest more 
than a mere summation, namely a merging or inte- 
. gration of all roles in some sort of super-role.
This seems to me a dubious assumption; I frankly 
cannot picture the concrete case. Indeed, I 
would suggest that closer analysis will always 
show the alleged super-role to be in effect only 
one of the several roles enacted by an individual 
selected because it appears to be the one most 
powerful in his life or the one most consequential 
considering the general character of the society 
(Nadel, 1957» p. 65).
This, then, completes the summarization of what Nadel calls the
"external structure" of roles.
Nadel expresses the external structure of roles in the
formula^ = a, b, c . . . n where stands for role,^
is the sign for series and a, b, c . . . n stand for a list
of behaviour traits necessarily entailed in the role. This
basic formula undergoes four transformations according to the
type of internal structure of the roles under consideration.
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Nadel's system of notation is open to criticism. Part lie 
invented himself, and for part he altered the meaning of standard 
mathematical symbols. However, I find it lucid, and economical, 
especially in comparing his system with others. Nevertheless, 
what he has to say can be grasped without mastering his notation.
Nadel's discussion of the "internal structure" of 
social roles goes a long way toward the elaboration of the ideas 
first presented in his treatment of the external structure. The 
centrality of the inference process is especially important. He 
argues that the internal structure of roles is derived from one 
fact, that the various attributes of a role occupy places of 
graded relevance. All roles thus have a hierarchical structure. 
That is, some of the series a, b, c . . • n are more important
to the role than others. He sees three types of role attribute. 
Some aspects are optional. Some are sufficiently relevant to 
make a difference in the way roles are perceived; that is, if 
some traits are not present the role will be difficult to per­
ceive or even if easy to perceive will be considered a bad per­
formance. And third, some aspects are basic or "pivotal" in 
that if they are absent the nature of the role will change. The
1/m/n, where p stands for the pivotal aspect, and / stands for 
an option between traits. Scrutiny of this formula reveals the 
difference between Nadel's "role" and his "quasi-role" or 
"status". A preponderance of optional attributes over those 
necessarily entailed produces a "quasi-role". But this makes 
it clear that the "status" or "quasi-role" is only a kind of 
"role", albeit a rather weakly defined one. There are roles
inclusive of many things and roles inclusive of few things, but
formula of a total role then
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they are still roles and, haye the same structure as expressed 
in the equation. The introduction of two names for this tends 
to hide the essential comtinuity. While this is certainly a 
weakness in Nadel's theory, this sort of muddle is not common 
to his thought in general.
The heart of Nadelfs theory of roles is in the way in 
which the pivotal aspect of a role is discovered. He states it 
explicitly: "The simplest and quickest way to decide what a
role 'basically' means is to refer to the semantic content of 
the conventional role name. . ." (Nadel, 1957* p. 55)* In
this statement the realist foundation of Nadel's thought is 
clear. The semantic content of a role name is important only 
if the role and the word that represents it are real entities.
For Nadel, a role is a real factor or influence in the behaviour 
of the members of the society in whose vocabulary it is included.
Nadel maintains that the semantic approach is valid 
since "role names (like all class names) are shorthand symbols 
for the array of properties which the entity named is presumed 
to possess" (Nadel, 19571 P» 33)• He does allow, however, that 
some role names are more informative than others. An "artist" 
is primarily one who produces works of art, but "elder" may 
indicate much more than age. For the purposes of theory building, 
he assumes that all role names are of the more informative kind. 
This assumption enables Nadel to go a long way toward elucidating 
the problem of social roles. The approach to semantics he uses 
is somewhat naive, but even without an adequate theory he is 
moving in the right direction.
The assumption of The Theory of Social Structure, then, 
is that all role names have a "correctly informative semantic
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structure" and that the property named by the role can "serve 
as a paradigm of the property 'basic' to the role" (Nadel, 1957* 
p. 33)• A property that fulfills both of these conditions, he 
calls a "governing" property.
On the basis of variation in the "governing property" 
Nadel erects a typology of roles. He sees four types of roles. 
The first type of role is marked by the governing property being 
a state over which the incumbent of the role has no control.
From the governing property, all of the secondary aspects follow.
The governing property, then, is also the method of recruitment, 
and for this reason the first type of role is called a "recruit­
ment role". The individual is forced into the role or at least 
his choice is constricted by the governing property. The idea 
of a "governing property" makes most sense when it is seen as 
the particular "concrete representation" that implies all other 
representations of the role. It is the act that permits the 
inference of a role, and is thus what Gilbert Ryle calls an 
"inference ticket" (Gilbert Ryle, 194-9* P* 117) • Nadel sees 
his "recruitment role" as being similar to Linton's "ascribed 
status". The recruitment role is represented in the following
formula: e -s p, a, b . . . m, n if p^ >(a, b . . .
m, n)^+ and p - r. For this and the next three role types,
 ^
Nadel introduces a few more symbols: ^___. stand for entailment
(antecedent and consequent respectively); p stands for the 
governing property which is also the pivotal aspect; a, b . 
m, n for the further characteristics of the role; t for the time 
at which role behaviour is assumed or exhibited, and + for any 
modification of t; and r for recruitment.
The second type of role is one in which the governing
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property is a behavioural attribute which individuals may choose 
to accept or reject. The further characteristics may be entailed 
as preconditions for or as consequences of the governing property. 
Thus, Nadel calls this an "achievement role" which is similar to 
Linton's "achieved status". It is represented in the following
calls a "developing role". This one has no fixed hierarchy; 
there is no precise pivotal aspect or principle of recruitment. 
The role names usually make no reference to a governing property; 
they are, rather, expressed generally, for example: friend,
lover, enemy. These roles have no more than a sequence of traits 
which becomes apparent as the role is played. The equation for 
this role type looks like this: ( ^ ^ = ^ a , b .  . . n i f
a^— >nt+. Nadel admits that this role type needs considerably 
more thought.
The fourth type of role is based on the principle of 
"linked options"; these options are of the form that one of two 
traits may appear but a different consequent will spring from 
each antecedent. It is represented thus: = 2L Pi a/b,
c/d . . .  if a^— >ct+, b^— >d^+ . Nadel has least to say 
about this role and does not give a clear example of how it 
works in reality or why it cannot be split into two separate 
roles. Unless one can show a real "p" for this equation, that 
is, one role name with possibly two distinct natures, it is not 
necessary. It would seem that these "linked options" could be 
a part of any of the first three role types described. In fact, 
there is nothing discrete about the fourth type at all, it is a
2 = * p, a, b . . . m, n i f  (a, b .  . .1)
•(m, n)t+ and (a, b . . . 1) = r.
Nadel develops two more role types. The third he
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possibility in the conception of any role type, not a logically 
separate one itself.
There are several flaws in Nadel's theory. Perhaps 
the most serious is that he equates a "governing property" with 
a "pivotal aspect" when, in fact, he uses the two terms quite 
differently. As Nadel uses the concept "governing property" it 
is the keystone of the role; it is related to the internal 
structure of the role in that it governs which attributes can 
join in the composition of the role. The governing property is 
active in regard to the internal structure.
A "pivotal aspect", on the other hand, is related to 
the perception of a role. It is a percept that allows an indivi­
dual to make an inference, to be sure of the unknown by reference 
to the known. It is the particular aspect that gives meaning to 
behaviour by categorizing it into roles. The "pivotal aspect" 
is what operates as an inference-ticket. Ryle's idea warrants 
elaboration: "A law is used as, so to speak:, an inference-ticket
which licenses its possessors to move from asserting factual 
statements to asserting other factual statements" (Ryle, 194-9* 
p. 117)* A social role is a rule, which is in this respect like 
a law, containing inference-tickets which permit the possessor 
of one ticket to infer all or some of the body of the role. A 
role is a body of knowledge connected in a regular way. The 
regularity of role structure resembles Ryle's discussion of a 
law. It is enough to say that a role has some integrity and 
that certain of its components may serve as inference-tickets 
to the whole. It is extremely important to realize that this 
process takes place in the mind of an individual as he tries to 
understand the behaviour of a second party. Whether he is
68
trying to anticipate, avoid, predict, or pre-empt the behaviour 
of the second party is irrelevant, because he must first under­
stand it, and this is what the knowledge of the role as a unit 
does. But it can only be known as a unit by predicting with the 
aid of inference-tickets what future events will be. This is 
where the role equations represent a mental reality, in the mind 
of some observer, some actor within the confines of a social 
structure; it is a mechanism of classification.
There is another slight confusion in Nadel's discussion. 
When he says that a role name will be a pivotal attribute he 
gives rise to a tautology, since this is equivalent to saying: 
"Because I heard it said that he is a teacher, I know that he 
instructs pupils". This is, of course, a true, but redundant 
and uninteresting statement. Role names may be validly inserted 
into the equation at the "p" position, but more frequently the 
role name will be the consequent of the pivotal aspect, the 
conclusion drawn from its appearance.
Furthermore, the mistake in Nadel's third role type is 
now obvious. He confuses the location of the mental events he 
describes. There might be a "developing role" from the viewpoint 
of an anthropologist who does not understand the people he is 
studying. But the existence of this situation in the mind of 
a real actor is inconceivable. Surely most people know who 
their friends are and what the content of each friendship is.
And, there are different sorts of friends, some from whom, for 
example, one may borrow money and some from whom one would not. 
But even so, placing the process in the mind of some intra- 
cultural observer, there would be inference-tickets, that is, 
some way of knowing whether someone is a friend or not. There
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may not be one ordered way in which every friendship develops, 
but there is an ordered way in which every process of reasoning 
resulting in the conclusion "A is a friend of B" or "A is a 
friend of mine” operates. And this operation takes the form of 
an inference.
The only difficulty in Nadel*s thinking - and the 
mistakes previously considered partly spring from this - is the 
lack of an accurate theory of meaning. But his great breakthrough 
is realizing the importance of speech and meaning in the study 
of roles and social structure. Nadel takes a bold step in The 
Theory of Social Structure, the mistakes made by doing this 
without a clear approach to semantics are made up for by the 
energy and originality of the theory that is presented. One 
reason for the richness of Nadel's theory of social structure 
is his use of terms generally considered part of the vocabulary 
of academic subjects other than anthropology or sociology. Thus, 
he boldly uses the word "signifies", "implies", "infers" and 
"rules" all of which are common to philosophy and linguistics. 
There is much written on each of these concepts and each is 
capable of much elaboration. For this reason Nadel's ideas are 
very elastic, and through this elasticity the shortcomings of 
his thinking may be rectified.
Nadel's work is in bold relief when compared to all 
previous thinking on this topic. He alone is not overcome by 
the problems of drawing an analogy between human existence and 
dramatic performances. While he does operate with real indivi­
duals and ideal roles, he brings the ideal element down to earth 
as knowledge, real ideas in the minds of real actors. Thus, 
his ideal term is not hypostatized. Nadel is also the first to
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make the ideal element the active part of behaviour; ideas, for 
him, are not static, but active as imperatives and directives.
The ideas embodied in roles are the rules of relationships; 
they govern them. Through appreciating the importance of human 
speech, Nadel establishes an empirical touchstone for the ideas 
involved in social roles. Nadel postulates the sharing of these 
ideas by all members of a society, indeed, the process of sharing 
is what makes a social system possible. And, whatever the con­
ceptual loose ends of this view, it can account for the facility 
of interaction between actors unknown to one another with a 
degree of efficiency lacking in the other theories considered.
And it also accounts for the degree to which abstract concepts 
penetrate even the closest human relationships. The connection 
he posits between roles is a logical one, the ease with which 
one may be inferred from another. Finally, he erects a typology 
of the internal structure of roles based on the presence of 
inference tickets. These are the primary innovations of Nadel*s 
The Theory of Social Structure.
Two studies complementary to that of Ngdel are those 
of Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1961), and Ward H. Goodenough 
(Goodenough, 1969)• The Theory of Social Structure is mentioned 
by both Goffman and Goodenough, but neither sees his work as 
building on Nadel's thought. These authors do not attempt a 
grand theory of social structure, but the limited aims of each 
demonstrate the importance of Nadel's central idea, that social 
roles are linguistic formulae governing the meaning of social 
relationships.
Goffman1s book, Encounters, is written from the view­
point of social psychology. He is interested in looking at
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social roles as they are relevant to individuals. While admitting 
that Linton's terminology is somewhat slippery, he uses it with 
few alterations. Thus, he talks about "roles" and "positions".
By starting with the individual and working up to the role 
concept, Goffman1s main problem is to show how people's indivi- 
dulaity is maintained in spite of their being lumped together 
in categories. Realizing that roles are the basic units of 
socialization and that they imply a form of social determinism, 
Goffman's effort is directed toward rescuing the individual.
He does this by arguing in two directions, one on a theoretical 
plane and the other largely empirical.
Goffman has one major theoretical dispute with Linton.
He does not think that roles are the hearers of rights and 
obligations. Goffman takes the social "position" (Linton's 
"status") as being the ideal reality and then claims that a 
"role" is no more than the typical response of the incumbents 
of a particular position. Goffman thus converts "role" into a 
statistical generalization. The word "role", according to 
Goffman, should be replaced by three concepts: typical role,
normative role and the actual role of a particular individual.
This fragmentation raises a problem: what to do with the concept
of "social position" which is the idea behind the statistical 
regularities of a typical role? Are statistical regularities 
sufficiently like roles to warrant using one word for both?
Can statistical means and averages ever be separated from the 
directives which generate them? Are not norms those principles 
behind statistical measurements? An affirmitive answer to this
I
last question undermines Goffman's trichotomization of the role 
concept. He bases his discussion on a false understanding of
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the relation between norms and behaviour. But, just as Goffman 
uses Linton's terminology without worrying about doing so con-
I
sistently, he is not troubled by his own system, and it therefore 
does not affect his empirical observations.
Goffman is primarily interested in face-to-face inter­
actions, which he calls "situated activity systems". From this 
new title he derives the phrase "situated role" to describe the 
object of his investigations. His enquiry is thus severely 
limited in scope, and these limitations are responsible for the 
major blunder in his theory. By far the greatest oversight in 
Goffman's role terminology is the failure to see a social role 
as knowledge. Goffman sees that people know some social norms 
like the Ten Commandments, but they do not act in accordance 
with those norms; at this point he throws up his hands and 
latches onto statistics as being separable from the norms. This 
is not the case; people know things like the Ten Commandments 
that are normative, but they know a lot besides that which are 
also normative. So that it is still an organized body of know­
ledge that directs their activities. Nadel overcomes this 
problem and focuses on the really rather obvious point that 
social roles are something people know, and a great deal of 
knowledge is organized around the inventory of role concepts. 
Goffman's theory is therefore unedifying, but the observations 
he makes of actual behaviour are interestingly congruent with 
those previously outlined by Nadel.
Goffman's book contains several descriptions of his 
own observations of actors in roles. He describes children on 
a merry-go-round, girls riding horses for the first time, and 
surgeons at work in the operating theatre. All of these
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episodes lead to one conclusion: that between the role and the
actor is a "role distance" which gives the actor opportunity to 
reveal his attitude toward the role. Thus young physicians may 
mock the gravity expected of surgeons. Or an older child may 
affect nonchalance to show that he does not take riding a merry- 
go-round seriously. Encounters is packed with examples of "role- 
distance" and this idea does meet Goffman's social psychological 
urge to free the individual from the social role. At the same 
time, however, it demonstrates the ruling function of the social 
roles. None of the "role distance" activities described by 
Goffman can make sense without assuming that all actors have a 
clear knowledge of what the role in question is. What can be 
understood as mockery of a surgeon is limited or defined by what 
a surgeon, in the abstract, is known to be. So the knowledge 
bound up in the role "surgeon", then, governs not only what a 
person must do in order to be a surgeon, but what constitutes 
being a bad surgeon and what can be understood as "role distance" 
behaviour. Individuals thus may squirm within their roles, but 
that some of their actions are understood as squirming is due to 
the definitive nature of the role.
determinism". What he means by this phrase is not clear. It has 
become too much of a red herring to be of much communicative 
value in the social sciences. Goffman1s claim that the concept 
of social role implies social determinism is tendentious and 
possibly responsible for the tone of his "role distance" theory. 
Social determinism of a level to warrant Goffman's reaction is 
not to be found in any of the writings so far discussed. But in 
the process of tilting at windmills, Goffman uncovers an
Finally problem of "social
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import ant phenomenon. "Role distance" is a sort of behaviour 
that must be incorporated into any theory of roles. And his 
examples show the degree to which social roles define and govern 
behaviour revolving around them.
cation of Nadel's ideas. Though since the fieldwork on which 
Goodenough1s essay is founded was done long before the publication 
of The Theory of Social Structure, it must be seen as a parallel 
invention. Significantly, Goodenough draws inspiration from 
structural linguistics; this could well be the basis of the 
similarities his theory has with Nadel's.
He sees that Linton uses this word in two incompatable senses. 
"Status" refers to both collections of rights and duties and to 
categories of people. The two are not logically connected. 
Abrogation of the normative demands of a status does not neces­
sarily mean that one is dropped from the category. Goodenough 
uses the example that a brother is a brother even if he does not 
act like a brother. Of course this may sometimes and for some 
purposes be true, but in others it is not. That unfilial 
behaviour may result in the statement, "You are no son of mine" 
is not an impossibility. But, even so, Goodenough's point is 
well taken, for some sorts of status name, legal disenfranchise­
ment will not alter the application of the name. Goodenough's 
example, however, is not a random one; I can think of none but 
kinship terms to which this point would apply. Certainly the 
normative and categorical aspects of professional statuses are 
connected. A priest who is defrocked is no priest; a man
disba L is no lawyer. An anthropological proccupation with
In many ways, Goodenough's paper looks like an appli
Goodenough first attacks Linton's ideas of "status"
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kinship seems to have gotten the best of Goodenough on this 
point; but if confined to kinship statuses, his argument is 
correct. And his own study is confined to kinship statuses.
On the basis of this distinction between the normative and 
categorical aspects of "status", Goodenough prposes yet another 
system of role terminology. Since the foundation of this termi­
nology is a half-truth, however, it is not really worth con­
sidering. Fortunately, Goodenough1s effortdoes not end here.
He goes on to make a significant contribution to the understanding 
of social roles as the rules governing the meaning of social 
relationships. Goodenoughfs study is, in fact, the best empirical 
example of this function of social roles.
Goodenough advocated a process for grouping duties 
with the social identities (Goodenough1s term which is roughly 
similar to Nadel's "role") among which they are distributed.
His method is first to look for the named duties, see how they 
distribute among the social identities of a people (this is 
roughly a role inventory) and then group the identities together 
that share the same duties. The clusters of social identities 
are then given numerical rankings, those demanding the perfor­
mance of most duties being number one and so on. As an example 
Goodenough uses two "duty scales" refined from his study of the 
Truk islanders. The first plots the distribution of six duties, 
all of which are related to "setting oneself above another".
The duties are:
(a) to use the greeting f&a.jiro when encountering 
alter;
(b) to avoid being physically higher than alter 
in alterfs presence, and therefore to crouch 
or crawl if alter is seated;
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(c) to avoid initiating direct interaction with 
alter, to interact with him only at his 
pleasure;
(d) to honor any request that alter can make 
of ego, if alter insists;
(e) to avoid speaking harshly to alter or taking 
him personally to task for his actions;
(f) to avoid using 'fight talk' to alter or 
directly assaulting him, regardless of 
provocation.
(Goodenough, 1969 > p. 320)
The entire scale looks like this:
Table 2. (Goodenough, 1969» P* 321) Duty Scale of 'Setting 
Oneself Above Another' in Truck
SCALE RELATIONSHIP IN 
WHICH DUTY TYPE OWED
MUST
SAY
FAAJIRO
MUST
CRAWL
MUST
AVOID
MUST
OBEY
MUST
NOT
SCOLD
MUST
NOT
FIGH'
1 Non-kinsman to chief Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-kinsman to .litas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Man to femal neji No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Man to Wi's mwaani No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Woman to So of mwaani No Yes No(?) Yes Yes Yes
Woman to mwaani
Woman to So of Hu's older
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pwii.i No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Woman to Wi of mwaani No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 Man to older pwiii 
Woman to older pwii.i
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
4- Man to male neii No No No Yes Yes Yes
Man to Wi of older pwiij No No No Yes Yes Yes
Woman to Da of mwaani No No No Yes Yes Yes
Woman to Da of Hu's pwiij 
Woman ito So of Hu's
No No No Yes Yes Yes
younger pwiij 
Woman to Da of Hu's
No No No Yes Yes Yes
feefine.i
Woman to So of Hu's
No No No Yes Yes Yes
feefine.i No No No Yes Yes Yes
Woman to Hu of older pwii.i No No No Yes Yes Yes
Woman to Da's Hu No No No Yes Yes Yes
Woman to So's Wi No No No Yes Yes Yes
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SCALE RELATIONSHIP IN MUSTSAY
FMJIRO
MUST MUST MUST MUSTNOT
SCOLD
MUST
NOT
FIGHTWHICH DUTY TYPE OWED CRAWL AVOID OBEY
5 Man to younger pwii^ No No No No Yes Yes
Man to Wi's older pwii.i No No No No Yes Yes
Woman to younger pwiij No No No No Yes Yes
Woman to So of pwii.i 
Woman to Hu's older pwii.i
No No No No Yes Yes
No No No No Yes Yes
6 Man to Wi of younger 
pwii.i
Woman to own So
No No No No No Yes
No No No No No Yes
Woman to Hu's younger
Rwii A No No No No No Yes
7 Man to seme^ j No No No No No No
Man to .iinen 
Man to ieefmej
No No No No No No
No No No No No No
Man to Hu of feefinej No No No No No No
Man to Wi No No No No No No
Man to Wi's younger pwii^ No No No No No No
Woman to semej No No No No No No
Woman to jinej No No No No No No
Woman to own Da No No No No No No
Woman to Da of pwiij No No No No No No
Woman to Hu No No No No No No
Woman to Ju of younger 
pwii.i
Woman to Hu's feefine.i
No No No No No No
No No No No No No
KEY: Abbreviations are; Hu, husband ; so, son; and Wi , wife •
The Trukese terms designate categories of kin. English 
kin terms are used only to subdivide the Trukese kinship 
categories when behavioral distinctions are made within 
them.
Goodenough presents another chart plotting the dis­
tribution of duties pertaining to "sexual distance": (Goodenough
1969, p. 322)
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Table 3. Status Scale of Sexual Distance in Truk
STATUS
OR
AVOIDANCE DUTIES
SCALE
TYPE EGO IN RELATION 
TO ALTER
Sleep Be Seen See 
ifi Same in Breasts 
House Company Exposed
Have
Inter­
course
Joke 
Sexually 
in Pub­
lic
1 Lan 'Man* witln feefine.i F F F F F
2 Man with female 
ne.ii (except Da of 
Wi's mwaani A A D F F
3 Man with Da of Wi 1 
mwaani
s
A A D F F
4- Man with consan- 
guineal .iine.i A A A F F
5 Man with affinal 
Jinej A A A D D
6 Man with Wi A A A A D
7 Man with pwynywe.i 
(other tnan Wi) A A A A A
Key: Abbreviations used are: A , allowed; D, disapproved ; f ,
forbidden; Da, daughter; Wi, wife. The Trukese terms
designate categories of kin.
Goodenough makes it clear that he is plotting a real 
culture: "in every identity relationship in which a person
participates he has a duty-status and a right-status on every 
status dimension in his culture's system of social relationships" 
(in Tyler, 1969> P« 322). His position is more strongly realist 
than Nadel's. The charts presented are intended to represent 
the knowledge of an actor as he goes about his daily life.
The significance of these charts becomes obvious in
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the only'case history Goodenough presents:
let us consider the occasion I encoun­
tered when an irate father struct his married 
daughter (right-status 2 ), to whom he owed all 
duties hut the greeting f aajiro. Informants 
explained that he was angry, or he would not 
have done such a thing. Indeed, the fact that 
he was six points down the seven-point scale 
was a measure of how very angry he was. His 
daughter, it happened, was a self-centered and 
disagreeable young woman, whose petulant beha­
vior had been getting on her kinsmen's nerves 
for some time. A good, hard jolt was just what 
she deserved. Being struck by her brother or 
husband, who were under no obligation not to 
strike her, would have had little dramatic impact.
That her father struck her, however, the last 
man in the world who should, this was something 
she could not dismiss lightly. What provoked 
the incident was her indulgence in an early 
morning tirade against her husband whom she 
suspected of having just come from an amorous 
visit to her lineage sister next door. It is 
a Trukese man's privilege to sleep with his 
wife's lineage sisters (he is in duty-status 
7 to them in Table 3) , ancL men and woman are 
not supposed to show any feelings of jealousy 
when this privilege is exercised. Her shrieking 
outburst against her husband, therefore, was 
another example of the 'spoiled child' behavior 
that made her unpleasant to live with. Witnesses 
seemed to relish her undoing as, full of what 
we would call 'poetic justice'. (Goodenough,
1969, PP. 326-327).
A great leap of imagination is not necessary to relate 
this to Nadel's theory. What happens here is a case of deviant 
behaviour. But the deviance does not nullify the formal structure 
of relations between rights and duties and social roles. On the 
contrary, the formal structure expressed in tables two and three 
makes the deviance comprehensible. Or, in other words the 
abnormal behaviour only has meaning in relation to the formal 
structure of rights and obligations. This is the best instance 
of what social roles do - they govern the meaning of any 
behaviour related to them. They, in fact, are the only way of 
defining deviance, and, as in the case cited above, of explaining
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it.
This chapter thus comes to a pointed conclusion: social
roles govern the meaning of social relationships. Chapter One 
left two paths of investigation, the nature of social roles, and 
the meaning of words. In Nadel’s theory of social structure, 
the two become one. In the empirical studies of Goodenough and 
Goffman the centrality of meaning is manifest. The case is, 
however, not yet closed. Nadel’s theory gains richness at the 
price of several loose ends; in particular, the many ideas he 
borrows from linguistics and philosophy are poorly integrated. 
Meaning is important; that is the conclusion drawn thus far.
But meaning is an enormously weighty topic, and some of its 
complexity must be ordered before a solution to the problem of 
ratiocination in African customary law can be attempted. The 
discussion will, therefore, grow more abstract before it again 
becomes specific. The problems of semantics relevant to this 
case are taken up in the third chapter.
81
CHAPTER III 
FART 1
THE THEORY OP MEANING AND THE THEORY OF ROLES
Two problems arise from Nadel's The Theory of Social 
Structure: First, the nature of meaning and, second, the problem
of communication, or "other minds". The result of chapter II 
is that as long as these problems remain unsolved, the theory 
of social roles will be inadequate. Now, while Nadel confronts 
the problem of meaning, "other minds" is a problem only by 
implication. However, the two are not unrelated; in fact, each 
is accessible from the other. There is, therefore, nothing 
inherently advantageous in discussing the nature of meaning 
before the problem of "other minds". In this context, it seems 
more natural to discuss meaning first since that is the arrange­
ment of Nadel's book. And above all else, this chapter is an 
effort to clarify and elaborate Nadel's theory of social struc­
ture .
There can be few topics in the humanities more volu­
minous and complex than semantic philosophy. Few modern works 
on the subject fail to mention either Plato or Aristotle or an 
assortment of obscure Schoolmen. On the other hand, semantic 
philosophy is a stronger obcession in the Twentieth-Century than 
ever before. Indeed, it has been hailed by one writer as the 
beginning of a new era in philosophy (S. Langer, pp. 29-31)*
Oddly enough, the enthusiasm for the potential of linguistic
philosophy to solve philosophical problems approximates the
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hope held by one anthropologist, mentioned in the last chapter, 
that the ’’social role" idea would solve all sociological problems. 
And so, ironically, one Copernican Revolution comes to the 
rescue of another. But this is more a comment on the pitfalls 
of intellectual enthusiasm than the particular merits of either 
line of thought. At any rate, language and semantics are compli­
cated, so in order to display the various alternative theories 
of meaning, I shall lean on an interpretation of the entire 
subject by G.H.R. Parkinson (Parkinson, 1968, pp. 1-15). With 
the aid of this list, it will be easy to see which theories are 
likely to be relevant either to Nadel's theory of social structure 
or to the customary law case described in Chapter I. Once the 
unlikely theories have been spotted and discarded, the more 
promising ones can be elaborated. Parkinson's list of semantic 
theories serves the same purpose as the review of theories of 
social role in the previous chapter. There is one difficulty 
in this method. Parkinson's arrangement of semantic philosophy 
is "ideal typical” in the sense that he categorizes all theories 
of meaning on the basis of shared traits. T&is is only possible 
at a high level of abstraction, and the categories are, conse­
quently, not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. Parkinson's 
discussion is, thus, nominalist and heuristic. To describe 
theories of meaning would be to give a history of all theories 
of meaning, which is clearly beyond the scope of this essay.
But realizing that Parkinson's work is only a digest, it has 
the advantage of putting the facts in the open as if they were 
items in a shop window. The only reason that this is advanta­
geous is that if an item in a shop window seems interesting, one
may decide to learn more about it and this requires a trip to
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the factory in which the specimen was originally made. Parkin­
son's classification is thus both limited and useful; but useful 
only because it points the way back to the reality of which it 
is a simplification; and it is useful only so long as faith in 
its essential accuracy is sustained and the route between it 
and what it purports to represent is unempeded. Having previously 
criticised "heuristic" devices in sociology, I feel it necessary 
to Justify using one here.
‘
According to Parkinson, there are basically six 
theories about meaning. The first two are concerned only with 
the meaning of words and phrases; the later four dwell on the 
meaning of sentences. Some of the theories are closely inter­
woven and some are relatively isolated, but these complexities 
must be ignored for the present Interest in the philosophy of 
meaning was revived in the Nineteenth-Century by John Stuart 
Mill and since his ideas of "connotation" and "denotation" have 
been incorporated into standard English, they should not be 
ignored. Mill's work exerted a great deal of influence on 
philosophers in the early part of this century. In a nutshell, 
Mill's idea is that every word does two things. First, a word 
"denotes" the thing that it is, or to put it another way, a word 
is a name for some particular thing. Second, a word "connotes" 
the attributes of the thing it names. According to Mill, 
meaning is connotation. For him all words are names, and each 
name means all characteristics of the thing named. Thus, the 
word "dog" denotes in the sense that when dogs appear one can 
say "that is a dog" and "this is a dog"; but the connotative 
side of the word, its meaning, is seen when there is no dog in 
view and one can still say, "'dog' means four-footed hairy
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animals that wag their tails when happy and salivate when hungry 
and so on". Mill’s idea is not wholly satisfactory, It is not 
clear what some names denote; "dog" is an example. Does it 
mean all dogs, a generalized dog or an archetypal dog in a 
Platonic heaven? On the other hand, some names do not connote. 
"Fido" only denotes; it means my dog "Fido" and no other dog. 
Mill’s theory breaks up on this rocky problem, but his wreck 
gave philosophical cartographers a new reference point. Since 
Mill's day many thinkers have attempted to round this promontory. 
Most have foundered on the same inhospitable shore.
So much for historical digression. From henceforth 
the discussion follows Parkinson's outline. The first theory
of meaning has an elaborate development but a simple conclusion.
*■
It is an attempt to expand the denotation side of Mill's theory. 
Betrand Russell is responsible for its importance in modern 
philosophy, though in other forms it must be as old as philosophy 
itself. It is known as the "denotation theory of meaning", a 
title copied from Russell's own essay, "On Denoting" (Russell, 
1905)• The theory is solely concerned with words and phrases 
that denote. Many different phrases denote: "a man", "some man",
"the present King of France", "the present Queen of England",
"the centre of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of 
the twentieth century" are all denoting phrases. Russell empha­
sizes that phrases denote only in virtue of their form. Denota­
tion may take three different forms: (1 ) a phrase may be
denoting and yet not denote anything, for example, "the present 
King of France"; (2) a phrase may denote one definite object, 
for example, "the present Queen of England"; and (3) a phrase
may denote ambiguously, for example, "a man" denotes not many
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men, but an ambiguous man.
Russell is careful to distinguish between denotation 
and acquaintance. A denotation of the second form can take 
place without the certainty with which one knows of the Queen 
of England. Russell gives an example of denotation without 
acquaintance: M. . . w e  know that the centre of mass of the
Solar System at a definite instant is some definite point, and 
we can affirm a number of propositions about it; but we have no 
immediate acquaintance with this point, which is only known to 
us by description" (Russell, 1905? p* 479)* point of this
is that one may talk about things without acquaintance of them. 
Russell's view is that all thinking starts with acquaintance, or 
perception, but that one can think beyond the realm of acquain­
tance is due to denotation which points to things with which 
one cannot become acquainted. Abstract logical words and other 
people's minds are further examples of this characteristic of 
denotation.
"Everything", "nothing" and "something" are, in 
Russell's scheme, the most primitive denoting phrases. These 
words have no meaning in isolation, but a meaning is assigned 
to every sentence in which they occur. Russell generalises to 
suggest that this is the most important thing about denoting 
phrases, that they "never have any meaning in themselves, but 
that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has 
a meaning" (Russell, 1905? p* 480). This principle results in 
the following interpretations of the sentence, "I met a man". 
This sentence does not, as it might seem, mean, "I met some 
definite man"; or that is not the proposition affirmed, since 
this is the ambiguous form of denotation outlined above.
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According to Russell, what is affirmed by the sentence is this:
11'I met x, and x is human' is not always false". 
Generally, defining the class of men as the class 
of objects having the predicate human, we say 
that: ---
"C (a man) CC(x) in Russell's notation stands 
for a propositional function in which x is a 
constituent, and x, the variable, is completely 
undetermined] means " 'C (x) and x is human' 
is not always false". (Russell, 1905» P* 481).
This analysis leaves the denoting phrase "a man" without meaning,
but as Russell intends, it does give meaning to any proposition
in which "a man" is an argument of the propositional function x.
A more lucid way of saying this is that although "a man" has no
intrinsic meaning, from this analysis it is possible to say what
is true of any subject to which "a man" may be predicated. Thus,
it is the proposition that has meaning and not the denoting
phrase.
Russell's theory of denetation developed in opposition 
to theories that regard any grammatically correct denoting phrase 
as standing for an object. Odd as it may sound, some people have 
argued that even though there is no King of Francs, the phrase 
"the present King of France" denotes an object. Strict adherence 
to Mill's idea of denotation is the foundation of this way of 
thinking. As Russell says, this view is intolerable and he 
provides a way around it.
Russell has an even more serious squabble with the 
view that each denoting phrase has both a meaning and a denota­
tion. Russell's main antagonist here is not Mill, but Frege, 
whose ideas are similar to Mill's. (Frege, 1952)* Frege argues 
that denotation (Bedeutung) and meaning (Sinn) are entirely 
different. In his terms one could say that although the "morning 
star" and the "evening star" have different meanings, they have
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the same denotation, the planet Venus. Russell’s objection to 
this is that there must be a logical connection between meaning 
and denotation and that this can only be found by saying the 
"meaning denotes the denotation" (Russell, 1905 > p. 486). So 
that, in effect, there is no meaning without denotation. This 
is certainly the case in Frege’s example, since the planet Venus 
has logical primacy over "the morning star" or "the evening star" 
which is to say that without Venus there would be no way of 
saying what either of the other terms refers to. When asked 
"what does the ’morning star' mean?", someone of Frege's con­
viction could only respond by answering, "Venus".
The final explanation of denotation is revealed in the 
analysis of the sentence "Scott was the author of Waverly". In 
crude terms, the analysis is "One and only one entity wrote 
Waverly, and Scott was identical with that one"; or more expli­
citly: "It is not always false of x that x wrote Waverly [which
is Russell's way of explaining that some x wrote Waverly] that 
it is always true of y that if y wrote Waverly y is identical 
with x and that Scott is identical with x". Futting this in 
more general terms, if "C" stands for a denoting phrase, it is 
possible that there is an entity x (Russell asserts there cannot 
be more than one) for which the proposition "x is identical with 
C" is true, and this proposition would be interpreted as the one 
above. Here, then, is the final statement, that the entity x is 
the denotation of the phrase "C". The denotation of a denoting 
phrase, then, is the unique x which is identical to the phrase 
"C". Russell's idea implies that for most names, the meaning of 
the name is the physical object that bears the name. Or, in
other words, a name denotes a physical object, and the object
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is what the word means. This account is accurate for denoting 
phrases of objects with which one may be acquainted. All 
denoting phrases, MThe Collossus of Rhodes1' or "the centre of 
mass of the Solar System" for example, do not denote that sort 
of object. And while we will never be acquainted with those 
objects, the denoting phrases permit us to know some of their 
properties. As Russell puts it: "What we know is 'So-and-so
has a mind which has such and such properties' but we do not 
know "A has such and such properties', where A is the mind in 
question" (Russell, 1905 > P« 4-93)* Thus, Russell's theory of 
denotation clings to perhaps the simplest view of meaning - that 
a word means the object it names - and yet shows how even when 
acquaintance with the denotation of some phrases is impossible, 
the process of meaning works the same way.
The most important criticism of Russell's theory is 
that it is too limited. While it works well for nouns, nouns 
are not the main constituent of language. Adjectives are not 
physical objects; neither are verbs. In fact, most nouns are 
so abstract that to point to one particular physical object as 
its meaning is misleading. Abstract nouns are not inaccessible 
in the same way as "the centre of mass of the Solar System", or 
"other people's minds". This problem was, after all, the begin­
ning of Plato's ideal forms. It is also the point on which Mill 
goes astray. But these are all errors of omission. While it is 
easy to point out that Russell's idea does not apply to many 
sorts of words, it is equally important to realize fefcat it does 
apply to names. The problem is to evaluate the extent to which 
what is true of names may be true of other parts of speech as 
well. Actually, several of the approaches to meaning discussed
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later are attempts to explain or modify this very simple idea.
The second theory of meaning is known as the "image 
theory”. The idea behind this is also rather simple. According 
to Sapir (Sapir, 1921, pp. 3-24-), the author of the "image 
theory", what a word means is an image in the mind of the speaker. 
Seeing meaning in this way facilitates the understanding of words 
which are problematical for the denotation theory. That the 
physical object behind a word no longer exists, or that several 
words are related to the same physical object and yet clearly 
have different meanings are no problems for the image theory. 
Neither is the problem of abstract names like "house" or "dog".
The meaning of genera is, of course, one of the most persistent 
and thorny in semantic philosophy and certainly Russell's 
theory cannot begin to cope with it. But it is easily solved 
by Sapirfs image theory; or, to say the thing in a different 
way, Sapir's image theory lends respectability to the most 
ancient solution of the problem - Plato's theory of ideal forms. 
Plato's approach is to say that since every chair is in one way 
or another different from every other chair, the only reason why 
one can apply t&e word "chair" to them all is that there is an 
essential chair composed solely of those attributes possessed 
by every chair. Plato asserts that this least common denominator 
has an ideal existence and that what the word "chatt*' means is 
really the archetype of all chairs, and following from this that 
every object is or is not a chair as it is similar or dissimilar 
to the archetype. Plato's theory is very persuasive and has 
enjoyed wider popularity than any other linguistic theory. The 
most conspicuous example of its force is Linnaeus' classification 
of animals. Now, Sapir makes this theory more respectable by
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saying, not that the archetype has an ideal existence beyond 
individual people, but that it is only an image in individual 
minds.
The overwhelming objection to the image theory is that 
it results in the fragmentation of language. Because every 
speaker has his own image and what he means by his words are 
his own images, it is impossible for one speaker to know what 
another speaker means. Thus, while covering over the unsolved 
problems of denotation theory, Sapir paints himself into the 
corner of private images, private languages, and unique meanings. 
His tendency to do so is, in part, related to the idea.* recurrent 
in the American linguistic tradition, that the first form of 
speech is the "ideolect". The Bloomfieldian view, and this is 
the guiding light of the American school of linguistics, is that 
children first develop a private language, or "idiolect", and 
during maturation learn to translate this into the common 
language. The image theory of meaning is the only one consonant 
with this view of child development and probably a product of 
it. At any rate, the two conjoined produce a theory of language 
which, operating with the fairly obvious assumption that commu­
nication does occur between people, defies common sense. The 
mistakes inherent in this viewpoint are more obvious in relation 
to the question of "other minds". On this issue, the "image 
theory of meaning" results in the "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis of 
linguistic relativity. This is the view that the speaker of 
one language lives in an entirely different world from the 
speaker of another. The germ of this idea comes from Whorf 
(Whorf, 1956), but Sapir, as Whorf*s teacher and friend, was 
influential in its formation. The classic example of this is
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that the Eskimo have seven words for snow while the Aztec have 
only one word for snow, ice, and cold fog. From this data,
Whorf argues that exotic languages cannot really be translated 
into Western ones, and vice"versa. Like the idea of an ideolect, 
there is some truth in this but it is overstated. The final 
irony is that Whorf himself shows the limits of linguistic 
relativ^ity by describing the idea in English. Roger Brown also 
brings out this point: "Too many travellers (among them the
linguists who described the languages) have learned to see the 
Laplander’s snows and the Wintu's cows. Too many of us reading 
the reports of such travellers have grasped these concepts from 
description - all in English" (R.W. Brown, "Language and Cate­
gories". Appendix to J.S. Bruner, et all, A Study of Thinking, 
1956, p. 307)« Brown's point is well taken. The relativity of 
language is less extreme than Whorf and Sapir make it out to be. 
If one does know a theory by its fruits, linguistic relativity 
and the concept of the ideolect are sad comments indeed on the 
image theory of meaning. In fact, the only way out of the con- 
nundrum of the image theory is to say that images are shared by 
speakers, and that therefore what their images have in common 
is the object from which the image is formed. To say this, 
however, is to revert to the denotation theory and all its 
shortcomings.
The next four theories of meaning are more ambitious 
than the first two. Each tries to deal with the question of 
how sentences have meaning, whereas Sapir and Russell are 
primarily concerned with the meaning of words. The first of 
these theories is Wittgenstein's "picture theory" of meaning.
This is characteristic of Wittgenstein's early approach to
92
philosophy expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(Wittgenstein, 1921). The Tractatus is a singularly difficult 
book to understand and there are various conflicting commentaries 
on the work. The main problem in appreciating the importance of 
the Tractatus is that Wittgenstein’s later work seems to super- 
c^edf and contradict it. Less than twenty years after his death, 
however, enthusiasts are even debating this point. The diffi­
culties are far from insurmountable, however. In fact, continued 
publication of comment and criticism testifies to its being of 
more than historical interest. And, what philosophers call 
obscure often seems lucid in comparison with the murky classics 
of sociology. Having acknowledged the existence and importance 
of the Tractatus, it is convenient to forgo a complete elucidation 
of its principles here. Its sense is more apparent in juxta­
position to all other theories of meaning, even though in -one 
way op-another, m oot a H  ether theories of meaning, even though 
in one way or another, most current theories are derived from it.
Two theories of meaning which are derived from the 
Tractatus make use of the idea of verification. Both are asso­
ciated with the so-called "logical positivists"; the first of 
these is called "the verification theory of meaning" and the 
second "the verification principle". In each case the verifi­
cation referred to is by observation and other sensory procedures.
"The verification theoryfcof meaning is advocated by 
Schlick and is typified by his dogan: "The meaning of a propo­
sition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, p. 148). 
Schlick's intention is clear. Propositions only have meaning 
if there is some method for converting what they say into other
statements which are either true or false; and if there is no
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method of discerning the truth or falsity of a proposition then 
it is meaningless. Unfortunately, Schlick misuses the word 
"proposition"; in its normal usage in philosophy, a "proposition" 
is a sentence that is either true or false. But what Schlick 
intends to say is that only those sentences which are propositions 
or can be broken into propositions, have meaning. This is a 
simple matter to correct. The main criticism of this theory is 
that the method of verification is too closely bound up with 
observation. Through observation, the sentence "this book is 
seven inches thick" can easily be declared true or false. But 
while the sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is open to 
investigation, observation alone is not likely to make it true 
or false; its veracity cannot be determined by direct observation. 
Thus, strict application of the "method of verification" results 
in the abrogation of common sense. The method clearly separates 
sentences like "Smith is in his study", and "God is in his 
heaven", into the categories of meaningful and meaningless.
But there is no point in throwing "Caesar crossed the Rubicon"
into the same category as "God is in his heaven", Even if the
.
two latter sentences are unverifiable, they are not meaningless
v ■’ .?V;ivy f '
in the same way. This is a serious indictment against "the
.
verification theory of meaning".
A.J. Ayer attempts to remedy some of the difficulties 
of "the verification theory of meaning" with what is known as 
the "verification principle". This is stated as follows: "A
sentence is factually significant to a given person if, and only 
if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to 
express" (Ayer, p. 35)• What this expresses is actually only a
criterion of meaning, but even so it gets into great difficulty.
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First, it is not clear what Ayer means by "factually significant". 
It seems he is again drawing the line between "God is in his 
heaven", and "Smith is in his study". After this, however, he 
parts company with Schlick and says that "verify" must be taken 
in a wider sense, ^hat Ayer calls the "weak principle of veri­
fication" includes not only conclusive proof of the truth of 
propositions, but any evidence relevant to the truth of what 
is said. The obvious problem here is to constitute the limits 
of relevance. And this is where the "verification principle" 
falls down. The nature of verification is still a lively issue 
in philosophy, so the problem is far from being solved.
The idea of verification is very attractive in relation 
to the problems of Judicial reasoning. Often it seems that 
judges look for some way to reduce allegation to propositions 
which can be corroborated by a third party. This is, no doubt, 
more important in court systems with established rules of evi­
dence, but the rudiments of this thought process are to be found 
in tie customary law cases with \toich this thesis is concerned.
While it is important to stress that the theories of 
meaning using the verification idea are an offshoot from Witt­
genstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it is equally impor­
tant to stress that Wittgenstein produced another theory of 
meaning which has had an equal impact on philosophy and a greater 
impact on the social sciences. This is the idea that the meaning 
of a word is its use in a sentence and that the meaning of a 
sentence is also its use. In the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein explicitly denies that a word or sentence has one 
meaning. A word, he argues, has as many meanings as it has 
uses, and the aggregation of all possible uses of a word does
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not constitute an essence, they are rather like the members of 
a large family who have only a vague resemblance. Likewise, a 
sentence has as many meanings as it has uses in the larger 
context of language. Wittgenstein's intention can be clarified 
by comparing it with the denotation theory. An adherent of the 
denotation theory may well agree that the meaning of a word is 
its use, but he would go on to say that the use of a word is to 
denote. Prom Wittgenstein's point of view, however, this is a 
mistake, for it suggests that a word can have meaning outside of 
a sentence. One objection to the use theory is that it is two 
vague, that it never tells what meaning of a word should go into 
what sentence. Wittgenstein's response to this is that "use 
theory" only points the way to the proper study of semantics; 
to study moral philosophy, for example, one must study the way 
moral philosophers use words. This directive has been received 
with enthusiasm in anthropology, where very elaborate studies of 
kinship vocabularies are constructed on the basis of Wittgensteins 
idea. Anthropologists are also using this approach to semantics 
in the study of law (see Fospisil, 1965, and Black and Metzger, 
"Ethnographic Description and the Study of Law", in Tyler, 1969). 
Use of the theory in anthropology has resulted only in specialized 
techniques of description, however, not in theories of social 
structure relevant to the question of ratiocination in customary 
law courts.
5
One problem in this view is that its advocate^ tend 
to interchange the expressions: "the meaning of a word as its
use" and "the meaning of a word is the rules of its use" (see 
Waismann, 1965, Chapter VIII). The two are clearly not the 
same. To place the emphasis on rules is to posit a closer
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relationship than a mere "family resemblance". In spite of this 
the "use theory" of meaning is enthusiastically accepted as a 
method of enquiry into the meaning of words. But even Wittgen­
stein realized that it is not a theory of meaning in the old 
sense; it is rather a tool for finding out what words mean.
The final theory of meaning is a product of behaviour­
ism. By this account, the meaning of a word or sentence is the 
response that follows it. The classic example, of course, is 
Pavlov*s salivating dog. Through the association of dissimilar 
events, the ringing of a bell comes to mean food. In a similar 
fashion, people learn that clouds mean rain and that lightening 
means thunder. Acknowledging that people are more complex than 
dogs, the theory states that the response need not take place 
for the meaning to be recognized. At the least, a dispostion 
to respond in the appropriate manner must occur. For example, 
the sentence "it is going to rain" may cause one to stay indoors 
or take an umbrella, or it may make one curse the weather and 
march out unprotected; it may even cause the faint hearted to 
head for southern France. Advocates of the "causal theory of 
meaning" are convinced that in back of all these activities is 
a disposition triggered by the sentence "it is going to rain".
Where the causal theory fails is obvious. Parkinson 
points out that it is completely unable to say what a word means 
That one "disposition" is found behind myriad responses speaks 
more strongly for the conviction of the advocate than the 
accuracy of the theory. The disposition to respond is entirely 
too vague and promiscuous to be convincing. Like most behavior­
istic theories, the causal theory of meaning is too mechanical 
to reflect the complex realities of human life and thought.
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Furthermore, like the "image theory", the causal theory is only 
able to describe meanings which are unique to each speaker, 
since regardless of the consequent of the word or sentence, its 
meaning is whatever follows it. But, as odd and mistaken as 
this theory sounds, it is of considerable importance.
If nothing else is obvious by reviewing the existent 
theories of meaning, it should at least be clear that, in part, 
the variation among the theories is due to the ambiguity of the 
word "meaning". They are, in effect, answers to different 
questions. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein’s latter writings, 
it is helpful to enumerate the possible uses of the word "meaning” 
and see what the differences are. Parkinson (Parkinson, 1968, 
p. 1) distinguishes four types of statement using the word 
"meaning": (1) "Football means everything to him". A substitute
for "meaning" in this example could be "is important". (2) "I 
mean to work this evening". Here, "intend" would be an accurate 
replacement. Another instance of this usage is: "In spite of
his ruining everything, he clearly meant well". (5) "Those 
black clouds mean rain". "Signify" could be inserted into this 
sentence without altering its sense. The process here is called 
signification; this is the case when one thing is known to 
stand for another thing. The "causal theory of meaning" attempts 
to generalize from this sort of sentence to all others containing 
the word "meaning". (4-) "The Latin word 'pluvia' means ’rain'". 
Perhaps the best replacement of "means" here would be "is the 
equivalent of", or simply "is". This is also sometimes called 
the "symbol" sense of "meaning". Statements of this type are 
often seen as similar to those of category (3)« An alternative 
is to say that "pluvia" and "rain" mean the same thing; this is
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the solution of the denotation theory. An additional use of 
"meaning” is this one: "I read Crime and Punishment, but I do
not know what it means”.; or, coming from a policeman, "alright, 
what is the meaning of this;” or "What is the meaning of life, 
the "Gospel of John", etc. These are cases when "meaning" 
closely approximates "interpretation" and "understanding". It 
is crucial to note that use of "meaning" in this sense takes 
the form, "what is the meaning of the Logos", and not "what does 
logos mean", which is the usage of (4-). That the two are vastly 
different is clear from the consistent bewilderment of readers 
of the New Testament in English who see only the translation, 
"word", but that students of Greek are not perplexed by the word 
itself.
The material from the first two chapters gives two 
points of view from which the problem of "meaning" might be 
simplified. This thesis is, after all, not an attempt to unravel 
all the knotty problems of human speech, but rather to refine
answers to specific problems of semantics in order to use the
- - ' solutions to understand the nature of customary law. The first
question, then, is, which use of the word "meaning" is found in
the case "Genatio Magino versus Yowasi Maliwa?" And the second
is, does Nadel’s theory of social structure implicitly contain
■ V'
a theory of meaning, and, if so is it intrinsically correct or 
relevant to the use of "meaning" in the sort of African law case 
typified by "Genatio Magino versus Yowasi Maliwa", or both?
The first question is easily answered. Every customary 
law case of the sort being considered here has a certain number 
of common elements which give rise to the consistent employment 
of one kind of statement with "meaning". The most obvious thing
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about customary law decisions is that they are passed by a Judge. 
Whether there is one Judge, as among the Soga, or several, as 
among certain tribes discussed in the final chapter, the process 
of Judgement always takes place. And the phases of the process 
are usually the same. In general, there is a plaintiff and a 
defendant, and, surrounding them, a history. The history is 
primarily concerned with a particular deed such as an assault 
or an adul thf which becomes the indictment. Most argument
U
centers on the indictment and the events leading up to the deed 
which has become the indictment. Though events happening after 
the indictment are sometimes counted as relevant. In most cases, 
few of the particulars of the history are clearly factual. 
Witnesses, either through confusion, ignorance or malice, fre­
quently contradict one another. Or, if agreement is reached on 
occvrr*nc£
the o e o u A oq of an event, its significance is disputed. A 
further confusing factor is often that not only are specific 
occurances denied, but the untrustworthy character of a witness 
is alleged. Thus, events trapped within the past, forever 
beyond the possibility of observation, are scrambled by witnesses 
who frequently have strong personal reasons for obfuscating the 
narrative. There are, consequently, no true facts to help the 
customary law Judge. Or, rather, the nature of the facts closely 
resembles E.H. Carr’s description of an historian's facts: "The
facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmongers slab. 
They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inac­
cessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, 
partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses 
to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use - these two factors 
being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to
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catch. By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts 
he wants. History means interpretation". (E.H. Carr, 1961* 
p. 23). And as with historians, so with the judges of African 
customary law cases. That facts emerge from the past is due to 
a process of interpretation. And this is the answer to the 
question about what sort of use "meaning" has in customary law; 
the relevant usage is the final one discussed above, that usage 
which can be replaced with "understanding" or "interpretation".
In the course of reasoning, the judges are likely to ask questions 
such as these: "What is the meaning of his testimony"; "What is
the meaning of this accusation"; "What is the meaning of his 
silence"? And the activity in all of these questions is inter­
pretation. Yet another cue can be taken from E.H. Carr's dis­
cussion of how historians think and this is that to understand 
the history one must understand the historian; or, as he somewhat 
pithily puts it: "Study the historian before you begin to study
the facts. This is after all, not very abstruse. It is what 
is already done by the intelligent undergraduate who, when 
recommended to read a work by that great scholar Jones of St. 
Jude's goes sound to a friend at St. Jude's to ask whajf sort of 
chap Jones is, and what bees he has in his bonnet. When you 
read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing".
(E.H. Carr, 1961, p. 23)* Likewise, to understand how facts 
are produced in an African Customary law case, study the judge, 
who is responsible for the interpretation, and not the events 
of the case as if they were discrete and obvious. In other 
words, the proper question in the study of customary law is: 
what bees does the judge have buzzing in his bonnet? And to
answer this, one needs a precise theory of interpretation. Thus,
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the road of inquiry into African customary law is open. And, 
not surprisingly, the first gate along this route is Nadel's 
theory of social structure which closely resembles, and might 
be derived from, one of the oldest theories of interpretation.
Although Nadel does not acknowledge the influence of 
any single theory of meaning, there are two reasons for thinking 
that the theory of "contextual reference” put forward by Ogden 
and Richards (Ogden and Richards, 1923) is of especial signifi­
cance in its formulation. The first is that the two are remark­
ably similar, so much so in fact that the degree of congruity 
between the two would be uncanny without some influence one way 
or the other. Since The Meaning of Meaning was published thirty- 
four years before The Theory of Social Structure, the direction 
of influence is obvious. The second piece of evidence leading
to this conclusion is that Nadel spoke with some enthusiasm of
k.
Ogden and Richards' work in his lectures at the London School
of Economics (private communication from Professor F.H. Gulliver).
Furthermore, the omission of a reference to The Meaning of Meaning
is not surprising since Nadel's own work was published postjimouslj
I
and may be excused the lack of such scholarly polish as a biblio­
graphy. But, convincing as these points may be, the real proof 
lies in the resemblance of Nadel's theory to the work of Ogden 
and Richards.
The semantic theory of Ogden and Richards is based on 
the proposition that words only have meaning when they are used 
by a thinker. Moreover, the contribution of the thinker is one 
of interpretation. For them, three factors are involved whenever 
a statement is made or understood, which is to say whenever a 
word has meaning. Ogden and Richards conceive of this in a
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diagram: (Ogden and Richards, p. 11)
THOUGHT or REFERENCE
SYMBOL Stands for REFERENT 
(an imputed relation)
TRUE
The relation of thought to symbol is a causal one. The employ­
ment of a symbol is at least partly caused by the reference made 
by the speaker, and partly by other factors, especially the 
desired effect of the symbols on potential hearers. For a hearer, 
the perception of a symbol causes the occurrance of a reference, 
or to put it another way, a thought is stimulated by the percep­
tion of a symbol. The authors of this theory recognize the 
dangerous proclivities of the word "cause" and apologize for its 
use. Avoiding the many connotations of the word, they state 
that the idea they express is simply a relation of material 
implication, or an "if-theri*statement. Thus, for a speaker if 
there is a reference there is a symbol. And for a hearer if 
there is a symbol there is a reference. With the exception of 
the word 2C0RRECT", which will be discussed along with its large 
case equivalents at a later spot, the left-hand side of the 
diagram should be comprehensible.
The relation between the Thought and the Referent is
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also a causal one, sometimes direct and sometimes very indirect.
The Referent is always a "thing" of some sort. And as a "thing"
it is the antecedent of any thought about it. The "thing" which
is the Referent, may be more or less accessible; it may be as
immediate as a green coloured surface or as remote (remote in
the sense of being at the end of a long series of intervening
"sign-situations") as Napoleon. The way in which a Referent
causes a Reference is somewhat strange, but Ogden and Richards
state the point most explicitly:
The suggestion that to say 'I am thinking of A 1 
is the same thing as to say 'My thought is being 
caused by A' will shock every right-minded person; 
and yet when for 'caused' we substitute an expanded 
account, this strange suggestion will be found 
to be the solution. (Ogden and Richards, 1923? 
p. 55).
The promised "expanded account" turns out to be their entire 
theory of contextual reference. When the theory is disclosed, 
they assume this point is obvious, so I shall follow their 
example.
The bottom of the triangle is so different from either 
side that it is only sketched in with a dotted line. Ogden and 
Richards contend that there is never anything more than an
imputed relationship between a Symbol and a Referent. To say
>, - y. '
anything else would be to deny their opening premise - that words
by themselves have no meaning whatsoever. However, the imputatior
' . ‘ '* v "
of a concrete relationship between these two terms is the semantic
.
theory of everyday people and everyday dictionaries. The base 
of the triangle is completed in order to locate the source of 
most errors people make when thinking about language and meaning. 
This way of representing the relation of words (Symbols) and 
things (Referents) is similar to what de Saussure calls the
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"arbitrary nature of the sign” (de Saussure, 67)* The idea of 
arbitrariness is of great importance in linguistics and even 
more so in this thesis; it is therefore expedient to clarify it 
now, at its introduction. By "arbitrary", de Saussure does not 
mean that every speaker can give whatever meaning he pleases 
to words, but that there is nothing intrinsically necessary in 
the relation between a word and its meaning. An example is that 
there is nothing necessary between the sounds of the word "dog" 
and the common animals to which that name applies; the sounds 
of the word "Hund" can serve the same purpose as "dog", and for 
this reason, the connection between word and object is arbitrary. 
Within a given linguistic community, however, the relation is not 
arbitrary. According to the rules of English, one is not free 
to select arbitrarily the words "chien" or "Hund" to mean "dog" 
without running a grave risk of being misunderstood. Thus, while 
there is no logical connection between word and meaning, there 
is a conventional rule which binds them together. Ogden and 
Richards repeat de Saussure's valuable argument in the bottom 
of their triangular representation of meaning, but they make 
very little use of the idea. That they underrate its importance 
to the study of meaning is a mistake not to be repeated here.
In fact, it is the single most important aspect of the process 
through which speech acquires meaning.
The large case words written over the sides of the 
diagram describe the success or failure of the substantive terms 
positioned on the corners. These words describe the various 
ways in which the process of interpretation may break down.
This has certain advantages in that it is a system of terms
which if properly used can eliminate ambiguities from allegations
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of falsity. For example, in the sentence, "what he said is 
false", it is not clear whether his symbol or his referent is 
false, that is, whether "what he said is false", or, "what he 
said is false". These, however, are problems of stylistics and 
are only peripherial to the purely semantic part of the theory 
of contextual reference which is the part most directly related 
to Nadel's theory of social roles.
The theory of contextual reference of Ogden and Richards 
may, thus far, be summarized into one sentence: a symbol is
chosen by a thinker to symbolize a Reference which is a thought 
stimulated by a Referent, which is a thing. The process of 
meaning, then, takes place in the mind of some thinker. The 
thinker perceives, and these percepts trigger off various thoughts 
which, if the thinker choses to express, he does by representing 
with a symbol. Symbols are usually sentences and propositions.
The critical happenings are all on the right-hand side of the 
triangle. Here, a thing becomes a thought. This is the key,
Ogden and Richards claim, to the understanding of meaning, and 
they therefore give it the ambitious title of "a natural theory 
of thinking".
The theory of interpretation is at least as complicated 
as all that has gone into the theoretical outline of thinking. 
Ogden and Richards build this part of their argument on the 
assumption that human experience is characterized by recurrence. 
By "recurrence" they mean that experience comes in more or less 
uniform contexts. Their definition of "context" is fairly 
straightforward: "A context is a set of entities (things or
events) related in a certain way; these entities have each a 
character such that other sets of entities occur having the same
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characters and related by the same relation; and these occur 
'nearly uniformly1" (Ogden and Richards, 58). Thus, their 
picture of mental reality is a series of recurring sets the 
members of which have something in common.
Now, as the events within a context appear, disappear, 
and re-occur, people form memories of their comings and goings. 
Ogden and Richards call such memories "engrains". Engrams are 
simply the residual traces of past events. The presence of these 
engrams leads to expectation. Although Ogden and Richards use 
the word "expectation" in the conventional sense - that of a 
person thinking that the future is bringing something particular*
- they give its definition a new twist in order to fit it into 
the scheme of their semantic theory. Their definition of 
"expectation" is "the excitation of part of an engram complex 
which is called up by a stimulus similar to a part only of the 
original stimulus-situation (Ogden and Richards, 52)•
The process of expectation, then, is the result of the 
interpretation of a sign which occurs in isolation as belonging 
to some greater whole, a memory of which is stored in the mind. 
The nature of interpretation is now manifest, its peculiarity 
being that "when a context has affected us in the past the recur­
rence of merely a part of the context will cause us to react in 
the way in which we acted before" (Ogden and Richards, p. 55)•
To sum up everything said so far about the theory of contextual 
reference, then: Expectation is excited by the stimulation of
an Engram by a sign, which is a part of, or in some way related 
to, the Engram. When this occurs, the sign is said to be inter­
preted, which is the same as saying that it has meaning.
With only two more terminological additions, the theory
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of contextual reference will be complete. For Ogden ard Richards, 
there are both External contexts and Internal or Psychological 
Contexts. These terms are used in a fairly obvious way. An 
External context exists in the physical world, it is natural; 
men have no control over it. Psychological Contexts, on the 
other hand, are sets of ideas. The Psychological Context is 
the storehouse of engrams. It is through the Psychological 
Context that men give meaning to the events occuring in External 
Contexts. It is also through the allocation of meaning via the 
Psychological Context that men are able to understand, order and 
control the physical universe. There is one important difference 
between the two contexts which makes this possible. An External 
Context is a set of events which are somehow strung together.
The nature of this relation is temporal; one aspect of the 
context follows another. These events may be spread over vast 
stretches of time, temporal distances between one event and 
another varying. Psychological Contexts, on the other hand, are 
virtually timeless. They exist as a unit in the mind (f some 
observer. The appearance of one part does not depend on its 
immediate antecedent. If any one part of it is perceived, the 
presence of the totality is known. Thus, the process of inter­
pretation is explosive. A sign appears, it is fitted into a 
Psychological Context which gives it meaning and consequently 
it endows meaning to a host of other events, some of which may 
helong in the past, some of which may be expectations about the 
future. In this difference between physical reality and mental 
reality, according to Ogden and Richards, lies the efficacy of 
all -human action.
Nadel's theory of social structure takes over several
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key ideas from Ogden and Richards. Remember that the heart of 
Nadel’s theory is in the equation for a total role, all other 
types of role being but transformations of that equation and
These are mental events in the process of classification. As a
body of.knowledge, these mental events have a timeless existence, 
exeats
When ecited by perception of a pivotal aspect (p) they result 
in a socially relevant interpretation or expectation.
theory of social structure and Ogden and Richards' theory of 
interpretation, I shall reiterate the latter theory in a form 
likely to facilitate comparison. In this theory, there is a 
body of knowledge (the Psychological Context) which is a con­
figuration of memory impressions (the engram), the constituents 
of which are representations of empirical things (the External 
Context); the Psychological Context is a unity of knowledge 
which does not change over time, and, as a body, it is called 
into prominence by the perception of a part of itself in the 
External Context in isolation (the sign). The sign becomes 
meaningful in relation to the whole body of knowledge which is 
subsequently used to interpret past events or to anticipate 
future ones. Note that Ogden and Richards realize that a variety 
of the different parts of a Psychological Context may be signs 
for the whole, thus replacing the pivotal aspect (p) of Nadel’s 
formula with the proposition that given the correct sequence of 
events in the External Context, any member of the psychological
all larger social structures compounded of it. '^ his formula
1/m/n. Or, in words, this means 
that there is a body of knowledge ((^  ) composed of a group of
attributes some of which are optional 1/m/n).
In order to highlight the similarities between Nadel's
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context may be a sign. Adoption of this view would correct 
the fault in Nadel*s theory which was pointed out in the last 
chapter, that it is inaccurate to think that for each role 
there is only one attribute that could be pivotal. Other than 
this, the symbols from Nadel correspond to the theory of Ogden
the members and the structure of the Psychological Context.
Thus, the salient ideas held in common by the two 
theories are, firstly, that of context, both internal and 
external. Secondly, that a sign which represents (stands for) 
something in the External context refers (points to) something 
in the internal context. Thirdly, the Psychological Context 
has a structure which provides a form for external reality. 
Fourthly, that the internal context changes relatively little 
through time and, fifthly, provides a way of interpreting past 
events and expecting future ones. This demonstration should 
show that even if the ideas of Ogden and Richards are not seminal 
to those of Nadel, they are at least so remarkably similar that 
the analogy of the former being parent to the latter is not 
without some foundation. An alternative way to relate the two 
theories is to say that due to their obvious congruence, the 
semantic principles behind Nadel's thought must be very close 
to what Ogden and Richards argue in The Meaning of Meaning.
Taken either way, the advantage of seeing the connection bdtween 
the two is that criticism of The Meaning of Meaning becomes 
relevant to The Theory of Social Structure and will therefore 
further the aim of understanding the significance of semantics
in theories of social structure.
and Richards in the following
p = sign; = indicator of context; and a, b...1/m/n/ = both
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The most serious flaw in Ogden and Richards' theory is 
that the relation between the Psychological Context and the 
External Context is unconvincing. In fact, their division of 
experience into the "external” and "psychological" is the same 
sort of mind-bodyism disparaged in the previous chapter. The 
authors of the theory seem to imply that events in the External 
Context are connected in much the same way as events in the 
Psychological Context In fact, they argue that the Psychological 
Context is learned by memorizing the regularities of the external 
context. From the viewpoint of Ogden and Richards' hypothetical 
learner, it is hard to imagine that the causal relations of the 
empirical world are as obviously united into contexts as they 
imagine. Nor does reducing causation to material implication 
eradicate this problem. Every event is preceded and followed 
by a variety of other events, yet most people think that very 
few of the events have been caused by the events in time which 
immediately prece^ded it. If I take a walk, drink a cup of 
coffee and then have an idea, was it the walk or the coffee 
that caused the idea? The answer to this, of course, is neither. 
But Ogden and Richards are unable to discount this sort of 
reasoning. Now, people make mistakes based on post hoc ergo 
propter hoc reasoning it is true, but if Ogden and Richards' 
view were correct, there would be no way of linking events other 
than post hoc ergo propter hoc, and to think of all interpre­
tation as based on faulty logic is unreasonable. The contextual 
reference theory does allow for verification to be made so that 
only those Psychological Contexts which are accurate will be 
retained. But the idea that people go around with hypotheses 
of potential psychological contexts and test them to see which
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may be retained as true is not at all plausible. The problem 
again is, how are the hypotheses formed in the first place? 
Without some knowledge of the empirical world, one would have 
to hypothesise a causal relation between every possible ante­
cedent of every possible consequent and test each. Following 
this procedure, a lifetime would quickly pass before acquiring 
enough Psychological Contexts to meet the problems of adult 
life, much less acquire enough confidence in them to teach them 
to future generations. But the important point is this: without
using language these hypotheses could never be formulated.
Ogden and Richards postulate a way of learning language which 
could only be successful with prior facility in the use of 
language. In essence, they see an ordered world and an ordered 
mind and the order of the mind copies the order of the world.
As shown above, as a theory of language learning, it is inade­
quate. But beyond this failure it is a metaphysical view, and 
as such its inadequacy is even grosser. The world and the mind 
are not things of the same kind. The only way one can speak 
about the mind is to speak about language. This is the view 
of mind advocated by Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind. 
According to Ryle, language is the mind; there is no thinking 
without words, there is no;perception without language. How 
then has language, which is no more than a logically related 
system of sounds, taken over the order of the world which is 
in no sense linguistic. In effect, Ogden and Richards presuppose
\‘ ? v
a way of knowing the world that does not need language, or, 
which is less credible still, a mystical influence of the world 
upon language. Ogden and Richards stumble onto a legitimate 
problem, but their proffered solutions are not persuasive.
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Without actually discussing them, Ogden and Richards deny two 
of the most important views in Fhilosophy, each of which has a 
considerable number of modern supporters. The ideas referred 
to are "Hume's Thesis" concerning the connection of events in 
time, and Kant's theory of causality. "Hume's theses" asserts 
that there cannot be any necessary, that is to say "logical", 
connection between an event at one point in time and an event 
at another point in time. Whatever connections are thought to 
exist are the product of inductive inference and are, therefore, 
hypothetical. Thus, material implication is never certain. If 
Hume's position is correct, it would seriously modify the way in 
which Ogden and Richards could connect their External and Psycho­
logical Contexts, in effect, making any possible link more 
shadowy and tenuous than they indicate in the The Meaning of 
Meaning.
Kant's theory of causation is roughly similar to Hume's 
view of material implication. He states that there is nothing 
necessary in any idea of causation and that what people call 
"cause and effect" is never demonstrable. Such a relationship 
is more a matter of belief than of knowledge. If Kant is correct, 
the connection between Ogden and Richards' Psychological Contexts 
is thrown onto a new plane, that of belief. And, to claim that 
the Psychological Context is a belief that the external world 
is united in such and such a way to form a certain context is 
vastly different from the rather simple one-to-one correspondence 
postulated in The Meaning of Meaning. For the moment, whether 
or not Hume and Kant are correct can be an open question; it is 
sufficient to know that if correct what they say would take all
the wind out of Ogden and Richards' sails. This is no cause
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for loosing heart, however, since more rigorous solutions to 
these problems are advanced in that work which due to its com­
plexity was not discussed in the earlier review of semantic 
theories, but in fact turns out to be the keystone of linguistic 
theory, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Before 
moving to this work, however, more implications of Ogden and 
Richards' mistakes must be spelled out.
It should by now be clear that The Meaning of Meaning 
is a theory of the causal type. Although it is much more 
elaborate than the generalized version discussed earlier, it 
shares all of its faults, which are really those of behaviourism 
itself. The oddity of behaviourism is that in seeking detailed, 
mechanistic explanations of language, it overlooks one of the 
most obvious and certainly the most important single charac­
teristic of language, that language is learned. Modern lingu­
istics begins with de Saussure's emphasis on language as a 
"social fact" (de Saussure, p. 6). De Saussure takes the idea 
from Durkheim (Durkheim, 1938, pp. 1-14) that "social facts" 
are external to the individual and exercise a constraint over 
him. This idea obviates the behaviourists compulsion for 
creating ideal learners who learn the totality of language from 
the beginning. Behaviourists consequently ignore the social 
nature of language; this applies not only to Ogden and Richards 
but to the other great behaviourist theories of language as well, 
the works of Charles Morris and B.F. Skinner.
A further ambiguity in The Meaning of Meaning exists 
in the relation between sign and thing signified. It is not 
clear if Ogden and Richards mean that S is a sign for R if it
produces a reaction similar to R, or if S is a sign for R if R
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follows S. Reacting to S in the same way as R is to mistake S 
for R, not to make sin interpretation of R. Max Black (Black,
1949> pp* 194-5) gives an amusing illustration of the consequences 
of this confusion: confusing the sign and thing signified is to
make the same error as the child who tries to eat the apple in 
his picture hook. This muddle is directly related to the diffi­
culties Ogden and Richards have in showing how the physical 
world is articulated to the mind. Signs may he no more than 
words, hut the ’'external” realm clearly is not verbal. That this 
confusion is tied to the earlier one gives hope that a common 
solution may be found.
In his criticism of Ogden and Richards, Black argues 
that the process they describe is one of tendentious judgement, 
not interpretation. Ignoring the previous objections to the 
theory, it roughly works as follows. Somebody notices something 
that strikes him as similar to a previous experience. He rummages 
through his memory and finds that this "something” is indeed a 
sign for an old experience and that the sign points to several 
other closely associated events. The contextual association of 
these events is the interpretation of the original "something". 
Having finished all this, the observer sits down to await con­
firmation or denial of his interpretation. Without a more 
elaborate way of relating the world to the mind, Black's point 
is well taken, since it is very easy to substitute examples of 
prejudiced thinking. An observer, for example, might see a 
cloth cap, know that it is a sign for "working class", locate 
the ideas of "working class" in a context and then patiently 
sit down to see if the cloth-capped man will put coal in his
bathtub, beat his wife, or go to the local pub to drink mild
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beer. Or, what is more likely, having made the interpretation, 
he would not wait to see if it is justified. Prejudice, of 
course, is as much a part of human thought as dispassionate 
reasoning, but it speaks ill of Ogden and Richards' theory that 
it fits this thought pattern much more clearly than any other.
Ogden and Richards' confusion over the relation of 
the External and Psychological Contexts is unnecessary. More 
than thirty years after publishing "On Denoting", Bertrand 
Russelliproduced another theory of meaning which retains the 
ideas of the early piece and yet incorporates the fundamental 
concepts of a causal theory. This latter effort (Russell, 1940) 
goes a long way toward simplifying Ogden and Richards' problem. 
Unfortunately, while Russell helps to simplify the causal theory 
of meaning, he introduces many more questions of a far more 
difficult nature. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth is every 
bit as ambitious as the title indicates, and is consequently a 
systhesis of many theories and arguments, some philosophical and 
some psychological. Russell may have been singularly qualified 
to effect a synthesis on this scale, but without an intellectual 
endowment as formidable as his own, the book can seem like no 
more than an academic pot pourri. For this reason, only those 
aspects concerned with the problems already raised by Nadel and 
Ogden and Richards are considered here.
Russell argues that instead of talking about "language" 
as a unit, one must consider language as composed of parts which 
are related to each other in a hierarchy. Russell's discussion 
of language hierarchies is novel. Defying the sanctity of 
"language" is the first step in Russell's approach to a descrip­
tion of the relation between words and physical realities.
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Russell advocates a hierarchy with a beginning but no 
end. There must, he says, be a simplest language but the higher 
categories become an infinite regress since for every language 
one can conceive of a more abstract language with which to talk 
about it. Thus, there is a language, a meta-language, a meta- 
meta-language, and so on ad infinitum. Now the only language 
that cannot be reduced to a simpler language, in Russell's view, 
is what he calls the "object language". This corresponds with 
what he describes earlier as "denoting phrases".
The main thing about the object language is that it 
presupposes no other words. Words in the object language can 
only be defined by ostensive definition. When asked, "what is 
the meaning of such and such a word", you must be able to reply 
by picking up or pointing to something and saying, "this is such 
and such", for the word is question to be part of the object 
language. The meaning of object words can only be learnt by 
confrontation with the physical object they denote. Thus, with 
the object language, it is possible to make statements about 
objects, but not to verify the statements, for since 'true' and 
'false' are only meaningful when applied to other words, they 
are part of a higher order of language. Other excluded logical 
words are "all", "some", "but", and "between". Furthermore, 
each word in the object language can express a whole proposition; 
by this Russell means that the utterance, "fire", or "book", 
would be interpreted,"fire here", and "book here". The reason 
that these words have meaning in isolation is that they are 
learned that way. A word of the object language and the object 
are related in a way such that whenever the object word is heard, 
the hearer will act as if the object itself were present. In a
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pure instance of an object word, the object must be present, 
Russell considers that if one says, "cat”, to a dog when there 
is no cat, then this is a language of a higher order since the 
reaction is to the word alone, and not the object. The force 
linking word and object is habit. People learn words, Russell 
contends, through constant association and that this association 
is only complete when the word causes the same reaction as would 
the presence of the object. Russell clearly states the signifi­
cance of this part of his theory: ". . . the meaning of
object-words is fundamental in the theory of empirical knowledge, 
since it is through them that language is connected with non- 
linguistic occurrences in the way that makes it capable of 
expressing empirical truth or falsehood (Russell, 194-0, pp. 26-27) 
Through this elaboration of the ideas in "On Denoting", Russell 
indicates a possible solution to the fatal mistake in the Ogden 
and Richards theory. One of the reasons for this is Russell's 
perspicacious adherence to what seems a simple idea and is yet 
frequently ignored by other writers on the subject, that the 
purpose of words is to deal with matters other than words 
(Russell, 194-0, p. 14-1).
That Russell's theory of denotation might solve Ogden 
and Richards' problem does not mean that it is correct. There
M-
are some very cogent objections to Russell's thinging. The
meaning of a sentence is not reducible to the set of things
denoted by the words in the sentence. Russell's view, in fact,
results in absurdity. This objection to Russell is developed
by Ryle who gives an amusing example:
If Hillary was, per impossibile, identified 
with what is meant by the phrase 'the first 
man to stand on the top of Mt. Everest', it
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would follow that the meaning of at least one 
phrase was horn in New Zealand, has breathed 
through an oxygen mask and has been decorated 
by Her Majesty. But this is patent nonsense.
Meanings of phrases are not New Zealand citizens; 
what is expressed by a particular English phrase, 
as well as by any paraphrase or translation of 
it, is not something with lungs, surname, long 
legs and a sunburnt face. People are born and 
die and sometimes wear boots; meanings are not 
burn and do not die and they never wear boots - 
or go barefoot either. The Queen does not de­
corate meanings. The phrase 'the first man to 
stand on the top of Mt. Everest1 will not lose 
its meaning when Hillary dies. Nor was it 
meaningless before he reached the summit.
(Ryle, 1957, p. 245)
This places limitations on Russell's theory, but it does not 
refute it. Ryle draws the conclusion that "having meaning" is 
different from "standing for", but does not postulate a relation­
ship between the two. So, if Russell's theory is not all wrong, 
it is not all right either. At any rate, working through 
Russell's ideas is instructive since its affinity to Ogden and 
Richards' theory of meaning throws light on what is the raison 
d 'etre for this inquiry, Nadel's theory of social roles.
In An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Russell sticks 
to his early ideas, but he also develops them into a more elabor­
ate theory of meaning. Even so, the idea that language is 
attached to reality by its most basic part, the object language, 
remains the heart of all his writings on semantics. The import 
of this is that the meaning of a word is the object it stands 
for, or words are signs for objects. Por 'sign' Russell gives 
a behaviouristic definition. A is a sign for B if A causes the 
same behaviour as B. He goes on to explain that "signs", and a 
rule, are habits formed by direct experience. And he generalizes 
from this to the statement that "language is a species of the 
genus 'sign'" (Russell, 1940, p. 12). The first similarity with
119
Ogden and Richards, then, is obvious: they and Russell espouse
a theory of meaning which is close to the causal type, and they 
both argue that language is learned by inductive generalizations 
from experience.
There are no sentences in the object language, only 
words. In order to have sentences, a "logical language" must 
be added to the object language. Words such as "and", "or",
"on", and so forth are names of relations, that is, they describe 
the way one object word stands to another. Russell considers 
these to be the simplest logical words. Even if they are the 
least complicated, their analysis contains potentially confusing 
principles which fortunately are not relevant to Russell’s theory 
of meaning. In addition to logical words, sentences have one 
other characteristic that distinguishes them from words, that is, 
they have intention. The effect of a word is, generally speaking, 
unrelated to the personality of the speaker. The sort of pro- 
position made by the utterance, "wolf", is capable of but few 
interpretations, and, unless, the speaker is a recidivist liar, 
the question of what the speaker means is hardly relevant. With 
a sentence, however, the situation changes. Russell says that 
the meaning of a sentence is the speakers intended effect on 
the hearer. In fact, he makes this the criterion of difference 
between a word and a sentence. The intention of sentences is 
social, Russell goes on to say, even if it is no more than a 
wish to communicate information. This is a rather obvious 
point, since, in general, the purpose of every human utterance 
is, in some way or other, social. Babbling for amusement is not 
the first linguistic experience (Fiaget, 1959); singing for one’s 
own pleasure is a later development; first of all, howling is
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intended to cause the alleviation of pain or hunger or the 
expression of affection. But it is hard to think of the little 
hoy crying, "wolf" not having intention. So, by saying that 
sentences are social in intention, Russell is saying nothing 
new or important. And, in fact, his emphasis on this point 
betrays a very important mistake in his thinking. In what way 
could the intention of the speaker be different from the speaker's 
sentence? Take the sentence, "would you please pass me the 
salt", and set it into the context of a dinner party. Does the 
speaker say this because he has a simple wish to put salt on 
his food? Or does the speaker say this to hurt the hostess's 
feelings by indicating that the food is not properly seasoned?
Here is a case where the sentence may be intended to mean some­
thing else than merely the combination of its words. But short 
of a confession of malice by the speaker, these questions are 
not easily answered. Is it a rule of etiquette among these 
particular people not to request the salt? What is the relation 
of the speaker to the cook? A mother may not feel piqued by 
such a request from a son or husband. A guest who is known to 
have an inordinate taste for salt would probably not be offensive, 
and so on. The point being that to infer the intention of a 
speaker is very difficult. One way out of this problem is simply 
to point to the inaccessible nature of other people's minds. 
Russell alludes to this point in "On Denoting", but changes his 
course in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Here he takes the 
easy way out and adopts the behaviourist solution, that what is 
intended is in fact what happens. If a man says, "I am hot" and 
his host opens a window, then this was the intention of the
sentence. If a man shouts, "look out, a car is coming", and a
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pedestrian jumps out of the street, then this is the intention 
of the sentence (Russell, 194-0, pp. 4-9-50). These conclusions 
from Russell’s own examples seem justified, but in the case of 
the hostess and the salt shaker this attitude would result in 
many needlessly harsh judgements about human nature. On this 
rock, then, Russell's theory of the intention of sentences 
founders. The concepts of intention and behaviour are not com­
patible. At first sight, Russell seems to be escaping the 
behaviouristic bias of his definition of the object language. 
Concentration on the purpose of the speaker might be a way around 
the naive determinism of the causal theory of meaning, but by 
pinning intention to behaviour, Russell fails to alter the force 
of this argument.
Another concept jointly held by Rmssell and Ogden and 
Richards is that of context. Russell's formulation is not as 
explicit as Ogden and Richards', but all the essential points
are there. Language learning is never pure, Russell says, and
every reaction to a stimulus consists of two parts, the first 
part caused by the stimulus itself, and the second part by the 
"habitual concomitants" of the stimulus. Object words are 
habitual reactions to sensory stimuli and since sensations are 
never discrete, the formation of one habit causes the formation 
of related habits. Russell gives the example that to see a cat 
is to expect the cat to be soft, to mew, to have feline movements, 
and so on. In this case, the ancilliary expectations are caused 
by the visual percept of a cat. Russell gives an abstract 
account of this process as follows:
A certain experience S (e.g., that which is the
visual core in what we call 'seeing a cat') has,
in my previous history, been usually closely
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accompanied by certain other experiences.
Hence, by virtue of the law of habit, the 
experience E is now accompanied by what 
Hume wopld call 'ideas, but what I should 
prefer to call 'expectations', which may 
be purely bodily states. In any case, these 
expectations deserve to be called 'beliefs'
(Russell, 194-0, p. 115)
Russell further contends that truth and falsity are the outcome 
of this process: ". . . the sole method of discovering error
is, I believe, the experience of surprise owing to a disappointed 
expectation" (Russell, 194-0, p. 205). Knowledge, then, is only 
possible because of expectations acting as hypotheses which are 
disproven or confirmed by events. Every child, thus, learns 
language and manners in the same way that scientists go about 
making discoveries, and scientific method is only an expression - 
of how people have been thinking for millenia. That old phantom 
"belief" does occur in Russell's system, but in a very sterile 
light: "The hypothesis that A is always accompanied or followed
by B precedes the belief that this is the case, and the belief 
never acquires the dogmatic and immediate quality of animal 
expectation" (Russell, 194-0, pp. 257-238). This completes 
Russell's description of meaning. All in all, it is a very tidy 
picture of rational man in a firmly empirical world. Children 
are born as scientists, avidly formulating hypotheses, performing 
experiments, drawing tentative conclusions and allowing convic­
tions only on the basis that they must be re-tested and discarded 
if false.
The principles of An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 
are remarkably like those of The Meaning of Meaning. While it 
seems unlikely that Russell never read The Meaning of Meaning, 
a direct influence need not be assumed. The two books could 
easily be the product of the common influence of other factors.
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Given a behaviourist approach to psychology and a deep faith in 
all knowledge being the result of scientific method, a semantic 
theory with the common elements of both these books is predictable 
Given Russell's dedication to empiricism, the differences are 
also understandable. But even considering the good reasons for 
a common approach to the problems of language, the parallels 
are striking. Both theories of meaning are based on a behaviou- 
ristic theory of learning. Both see the meaning situation as 
composed of a percept which is a sign fitted into its context 
or related to its "habitual concomitants", both of which are
memories of related experiences linked together. In both theor-
•
ies, knowledge comes only through experience.
The parallels between the two books can be extended to 
include possible criticisms. Russell's theory of denotation 
overcomes the problem of relating what Ogden and Richards call 
the "psychological" and "external contexts". But as the theory 
was criticised earlier it is too simple. Russell's object 
language compounded with infinite logical languages is more 
orderly than convincing, -^ he model of language learning is 
naive and in an even more elaborate version has been criticised 
in a famous essay by Chomsky (Chomsky, 1959)• Children learning 
to speak are neither scientists nor rats in boxes. Any theory 
of meaning that depends on such a tendentious view of learning 
is on dangerous ground indeed. But all of this has been said 
before in relation to The Meaning of Meaning and need not be 
repeated here.
It is important to bear in mind that the aim of this 
tour of semantic philosophy is the disclosure of some of the 
ideas in Nadel's The Theory of Social Structure. So far, a few
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conclusions are evident. Nadel's work is related to, if not 
derived from, a causal theory of meaning. Two important theories 1 
of that school have been examined. At the foundation of each 
is a set of influential ideas about the relation of behaviour 
to thought, the foundations of knowledge, and language learning. 
W&ile at least some of these ideas are false, others are persis­
tent enough to warrant closer inspection. In particular, the 
process of sign interpretation is the same in the work of Nadel, 
Ogden and Richards and Russell. That three theories are congru­
ent on such a crucial issue makes one suspect that there is some 
truth in the common ground. Now, all three of these authors 
have a common source of influence, though they all digress from 
it in different ways. This spring common to all three is Witt­
genstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Connection between 
this book and the authors being considered is easy to show.
Ogden and Richards made the first English translation of Witt-
edition, and Nadel quotes from the work in his The Foundations 
of Social Anthropology. Perhaps this book that has been seminal 
to so much thought in this century will hold the key to the 
theory of interpretation sought thus far in vain.
theory of meaning is part of a larger philosophical system.
As such, it would be extremely difficult to summarize, or, 
indeed, somewhat presumptuous to attempt to do so. Several 
writers have devoted large volumes to the exploration and clari­
fication of Wittgenstein's ideas. Hopefully, though, the theory, 
or theories, of meaning may be wrenched from the system as a 
whole without severely distorting them. The theory of meaning
genstein's book; Russell wrote
Unlike the others considered here, Wittgenstein's
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is in some ways the foundation of Wittgenstein's whole philosophy, 
and can therefore be presented in isolation, if not with complete 
accuracy, then at least with less distortion than would result 
to some of his other ideas.
Wittgenstein's first book, the Tractatus, contains two 
strands of thought, each of which has been developed into a 
semantic theory. The first doctrine is called "logical atomism" 
and, in the hands of the logical positivists, has been trans­
formed into the concept of verification and its two variants 
discussed earlier. The second doctrine is the idea of "logical 
form", or "logical space", and in Wittgenstein's own hands, 
becomes the "picture theory of meaning" which Parkinson errone­
ously dismisses as somewhat opaque and of only historical 
interest (Parkinson, 1968, p. 5)* Most commentators see these 
as separate theories even though both are derived from the same 
source. This anomaly is partly due to the oracular style of the 
Tractatus, which encourages vastly different interpretations, 
and partly due to Wittgenstein's abandonment of the book as a 
whole, which seems to give scavengers legitimate title to which­
ever parts they happen to like. Whatever the justification for 
chopping the book to pieces, there is unity in Wittgenstein's 
thought which facilitates a synthesis of the arguments derived 
from it, and since they are part of one rather short book, it 
is only reasonable to assume that this is what their author 
originally intended. The various commentators seem to agree 
that there is no single definitive interpretation of the 
Tractatus, so, if my reading is novel, it shares that feature 
with everyone who reads the book.
To begin with the single idea that pervades all of
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Wittgenstein’s thought is to look at his concept of logic. A 
single view of logic is common to the Tractatus and the Philo­
sophical Investigations and, even though it is insulting to 
describe Wittgenstein's philosophy in Platonic terms, forms the 
irreducible essence of all his thought. This idea has been 
absorbed into symbolic logic in toto and is now so well estab­
lished that people often forget that he is its originator. The 
idea of logic in Wittgenstein's works, and henceforth whenever 
the word is used in this thesis it will have this sense, is 
based on the distinction between "facts” (Tatsache) and "states- 
of-affairs" (Sachverhalte); henceforth these words, too, will 
only be used with the special meanings given them by Wittgenstein.
"Facts", according to Wittgenstein, actually exist.
They are real things; they are physical objects. One becomes 
acquainted with them through sensory experience. Facts exist 
as part of the world.
"States-of-affairs" are different from "facts". 
"States-of-affairs" may or may not exist. One state-of-affairs 
is independent of any other state-of-affairs, that is, knowledge 
of one will never imply existence of another. In language, 
states-of-affairs are ordinary sentences. An example of the 
difference between a fact and a state-of-affairs is this: "The
earth is smaller than the moon" describes a state-of-affairs, 
because, from this sentence, one can imagine what the state-of- 
affairs looks like, but it is not a fact, because it does not 
exist. The definition of facts, then, is that they are states- 
of-affairs that do exist (Wittgenstein, 1921, if2). The key to 
the difference is this, that states-of-affairs are possibilities, 
they need only be conceivable. The world determines which
127
states-of-affairs do or do not exist and thereby determines what 
the facts are. The sum total of all facts is reality. In this 
arrangement of the terms "world" and "reality" is a description 
of knowledge. "States-of-affairs are linguistic formulations 
according to the rules of grammar and "logical syntax" (a concept 
to be discussed later); the world, over which one has no control, 
confirms the existence or non-existence of some of these states- 
of-affairs, those that exist we know are facts and they constitute 
our knowledge of reality. But reality is not the same thing as 
the world; reality is all we know about the world, and knowledge 
of reality only comes by first creating states-of-affairs. States 
of-affairs are the terms with which we approach the world; all 
sensory experience filters through them. Thus the process of 
knowledge begins with language and logic, and logic is primary 
because it is the basis of the rules constituting language.
This corresponds to the principle of symbolic logic that to have 
meaning an expression must be a "well formed formula". Without 
going into the details of this, it supplies an apt description 
of the relation of logic to language, that is, states-of-affairs 
are the possibilities of existence expressed in "well formed" 
sentences or propositions. When it is "well formed", then, a 
state-of-affairs shows what will be the case - the facts - if it 
exists. To be logically complete, a state-of-affairs must show 
all of the possibilities, or everything that could possibly be 
the case if it is true or false. To represent this idea, 
Wittgenstein invented "truth tables". These show every possible 
way in which a sentence could exist and be a fact. The diagram 
here shows all possibilities for one, two, or three propositional 
variables (Wittgenstein, 1921, #• 4-.31) :
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T T T
F T T
T F T  
T T F ,
F F T
F T F
T F F
F F F
This diagram also reveals Wittgenstein's concept of truth. If 
what a proposition asserts exists then it is true and a fact 
and if it does not exist then it is false and not a fact. It 
is important to realize that propositions, or sentences, and 
states-of-affairs are very different. Propositions assert 
something; they make a claim against the world and are therefore 
either true or false. Propositions are derived from stqtes-of- 
affairs, hut states-of-affairs themselves make no claim against 
the world and, therefore, cannot be said to be true or false. 
States-of-affairs only show what may be formulated in language; 
they show what is logically possible. Here, then, is where 
Wittgenstein's concept of logic is obvious. Logic is what is 
shown in states-of-affairs, it is "the order of Possibilities" 
(Wittgenstein, 1953? P* 44-) • ideas presented here in such
cursory form will be clearer as the discussion progressefy and 
after further acquaintance can be taken up in greater depth.
Of the two ideas in the Tractatus which give rise to 
theories of meaning, "logical atomism" is the simpler. This is 
a combination of Wittgenstein's idea about logic, and Russell’s 
idea about "denoting phrases". Wittgenstein accepts Russell's 
thinking with some important modifications. They both agree 
that meaningful sentences can be analysed into irreducible 
constituents or simples. They further agree that these simples
P q P
T T T
F T F
T F
F F , •
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are names. Where they differ is while Hussell contends that 
names in isolation are propositions, Wittgenstein argues that 
names only have meaning in conjunction with other words and 
that only these meaningful statements may be called propositions. 
For Wittgenstein, the basic semantic unit is the sentence, and 
names have meaning only when abstracted from sentences. Never­
theless, Wittgenstein, like Russell, sees names as related to 
reality in a one-to-one correspondence (Wittgenstein, 1921, 
#4.0311)* But even so, names must be placed in a logical matrix 
before they have meaning. Wittgenstein says that names are 
joined together in states-of-affairs to form a "tableau vivant" 
(Wittgenstein, 1921,#4.0311)• This interesting description 
suggests a correspondence between names and facts, and sentences 
and states-of-affairs, but, although there may be some reasons 
for thinking this to be the case, it is not a consistant demar­
cation throughout the Tractatus. Wittgenstein introduces 
another vivid metaphor for the relation between names and 
sentences. Names, he says, are like points, sentences like 
arrows, and it is only as the arrows pierce several points and 
connect them that they have meaning (Wittgenstein, 1921, #■ 3*144-) • 
Wittgenstein's argument here is very cogent. Russell's 
assertion that simple names are themselves propositions is 
facile and unfounded. Russell's own example of "fire" is not 
convincing since to think of it having meaning in isolation is 
to think of it as an abbreviation for a proper sentence. One 
might lift the lid of an Aga stove and say "fire", and mean "yes, 
there is a fire here already", or, by changing the intonation, 
"fire" may mean "there is a fire here now, and this is a bad
thing", which seems to be the only possible meaning Russell
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sees in the word. To take an even simpler example, if I hear 
my name, one that to me has an even more unambiguous reference 
than "fire", it will mean nothing except as an abbreviation for 
a fuller statement. The intonation would be the key to which 
possible sentence is being represented. There are only a few 
possibilities and the meaning of each would be clear in context: 
"Lawrence” as in "here is Lawrence", "Lawrence" as in "Lawrence, 
come here I want you"; "Lawrence" with a wilting tone indicative 
of "Oh, Lawrence, you are so irresistible", or "Lawrence", with 
disgust as in "Lawrence, how could you do such a thing". The 
point here being that what Wittgenstein says is correct, names 
have no meaning at all in isolation unless they are considered 
as abstractions from sentences.
There are two more things to be said about names and 
sentences. First, that sentences are more than names put together 
To Wittgenstein, a sentence has direction; it is, going back to 
his metaphor, an arrow. The arrow joins some names and points 
on to others. Thus, sentences have a meaning which is indepen­
dent of the various things with which the simple names in the 
sentence are correlated. Following the metaphor even further, 
like arrows, sentences have direction, and this is the extension 
and implication of their meaning.
The second point is that names in isolation do have 
certain logical properties. Even in isolation one can tell from 
a name what other names it may be combined with or must not be 
combined with. With no sensory experience of the world regarding 
these statements, one can yet say that "he is smarter than she 
is" is a well formed proposition describing a possible state-of-
affairs, and that "this triangle is more intelligent than that"
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is nonsensical, which is to say that it is not a possible state 
of affairs. The logical properties of a name may be known a 
priori, before any particular application of it. One can predict 
which combinations will be nonsensical. Wittgenstein further 
contends that the logical combinations of a name reflect the 
physical characteristics of the object for which the name stands. 
The name then takes over the properties of its object, or in the 
words of one commentator, the word '‘deputizes" for the object 
(Stenius, I960, p« 6 3 ). That these restrictions are not repro­
duced in grammatical syntax has given rise to a new category of 
language rules known as "logical syntax". These rules are 
designed to reflect the claim of the world against language, 
the constraints it places upon sentence formation. It is one 
of the most forceful ideas in the Tractatus.
reduced to simple names, Wittgenstein argues that they can be 
analysed into elementary propositions. Both are then atomists. 
Wittgenstein's unique conception of logic results in "logical 
atomism". This appellation was, oddly enough, invented by 
Russell in his introduction to the English edition of the 
Tractatus where he saw it as the most important doctrine of the 
book. Since it is so close in spirit to Russell's own thinking 
in "On Denoting", this is not surprising. To continue with the 
exegesis, then, Wittgenstein's conception of logic and his 
atomicity are connected by what is called the( "thesis of exten- 
tionality". How the two ideas merge is stated by
Thus, while Russell claims that sentences can be
Pears:
The sense of a factual proposition is given by 
making alist of all the possibilities and then 
showing which ones the proposition shuts out
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if it is true. If p is analysed into q and r, 
then the possibilities are q, r, not-q, not-r 
which are compounded into four relevant possi­
bilities, q and r, not-q and r, q and not-r, 
not-q and not-r. There are always 2n possibi­
lities whre n is the number of elementary pro­
positions in the original proposition is given 
by saying which of the 2n possibilities it shuts 
out. To put the same point in another way, the 
truth or falsity of any factual proposition 
depends solely on the truth or falsity of the 
propositions in its analysis: or . . any
factual proposition is a truth-function of the 
propositions in its analysis. (Pears, 1971i 
pp. 70-71).
What the "thesis of extentionality" amounts to is this: 
a sentence is broken down to the atomic propositions of which it 
is formed. After doing this, a truth table is made which is an 
extension of all possible truth values the sentence might have. 
The sense of the sentence can be seen in the world by noticing 
which possible values occur. By looking back to the truth-table 
from whatever is the fact one is able to see what is logically 
impossible. And this is the full explanation of "logical 
atomism".
There are two important things to notice about Wittgen­
stein's development of "logical atomism". First, is the inexpli­
cable absence in any of Wittgenstein's writings of an example
of an atomic proposition. In fact, he never analyses a sentence
into its constituents. To make matters even more obscure, he 
does not describe an atomic proposition for the aid of those who 
may wish to follow his precepts. Unless one wishes to think 
that Wittgenstein purposefully omitted this longed-for discussion 
of atomicity, it is only reasonable to conclude that this aspect
of the Tractatus has been overemphasised.
The second point about "logical atomism" is that it is
primarily concerned with truth. One reduces a sentence to its
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atomic propositions, not in order to see what the sentence as a 
whole means, but to see if it is true or false. Indeed, Wittgen­
stein explicitly states that the meaning of a sentence is not 
merely the compound meanings of its component simple names and 
elementary propositions. Nor do truth-tables pertain to meaning. 
A truth-table is a way of showing the possibilities of being 
true or false of one proposition. The truth-table itself makes 
no claim on the world. And regardless of whether the world 
shows the proposition in question to be true or false, the truth- 
table goes on about its task of showing the logical concomitants 
of any fact the world does display. It is important to emphasise 
that this discussion of propositions is closely bound up with 
the rest of the Tractatus. Any proposition from which a truth- 
table may be constructed is itself derived from a state-of-affairs
The final noteworthy remark on "logical atomism" is 
that it is recommended to philosophers as a way of breaking up 
complex sentences to see if they are true or false. "Elementary 
propositions" are analytical units of language, they are not 
meant to be descriptions of the way people think. Wittgenstein 
makes it quite clear that the sentence as a whole is the basic 
semantic unit.
"Logical atomism" is the point at which the "logical 
positivists" part company with the Tractatus. For them, the 
analysis of a sentence into propositions that are either true 
or false is prerequisite to saying whether it has any meaning or 
not. For them, only propositions have meaning. In fact, they 
are more restrictive even than this. Not only must a sentence 
be formulated to be either true or false, but in order for it 
to have meaning, one must be able, or at least know how, to
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decide its truth or falsity, and this may only be decided on 
empirical grounds. Utterances that do not meet these stipulat­
ions are nonsensical. Thus, logical positivists show all of 
metaphysics and philosophy out of the realm of meaningful dis­
course. As indicated earlier, they show so many other types of 
sentence the door that the company left inside is hardly worth 
keeping. With characteristic passion for black and white 
situations, logical positivism lays down the dictum, either be 
scientific or be nonsensical. What they do, in Wittgenstein's 
terms, is to stress facts and ignore states-of-affairs. This 
of course does very strange things to Wittgenstein's theories 
of knowledge and language. In these theories, facts are the 
only touchstone of truth, but this only covers a small part of 
what people can think, say, or know. For Wittgenstein, facts 
are important but they are not everything. Facts would be 
incomprehensible without states-of-affairs. But there is feed­
back even here, for the form, or structure, of language with 
which we express states-of-affairs is derived from the form of 
the world which we know as facts. Logical positivism roots up 
Wittgenstein's atomism and plants it in an alien environment 
where without its neighbors, the theories of knowledge and 
language, its growth is retarded. In such circumstances it 
becomes less logical as it becomes more positivistic. The 
enthusiasm for changing all language to scientific discourse 
has waned since logical positivism was born in the 1 9 3 0 's and 
it may well die a natural death. However, an appreciation of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus as a whole discloses the fact that 
logical positivism's advent was neither legitimate nor natural, 
and one may therefore speculate that its demise will be equally
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perverse.
The original offender in the misinterpretation of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is Bertrand Russell. Others have 
been only too eager to jump on the wagon he set in motion. It 
is instructive to compare the interpretations given to Wittgen­
stein's first book at the beginning of logical positivism to 
that given it now, when logical positivism is more than forty 
years old. In perhaps the most spinal work in the logical 
positivist school, Sir Alfred Ayer remarks that: "The views
which are put forward in this treatise [Language, Truth and Logic] 
derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, 
which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of 
Berkeley and David Hume" (A.J. Ayer, 1936, p. -4-1). Now, in order 
to make this statement, Ayer’s reading of Wittgenstein must be 
tendentiously British. There is undoubtedly an element of 
empiricism in the work of Wittgenstein, who after all was deeply 
influenced by Russell's theory of denotation. But to see him 
as an extension of the British empiricist tradition is very 
strange indeed. Like the paranoid who finds persecution in even 
the most benevolent advances, Ayer's enthusiasm (". 
written with more passion than most philosophers allow themselves 
to show" is how Ayer introduces the second edition published in 
1946) causes him to see empiricism everywhere. Later commentators 
(Anscombe, 1959; Fears, 1971; and Stenius, I960 for example) have 
come round to admitting that Wittgenstein is Austrian, his 
mother tongue German and his philosophical antecedents of the 
idealist tradition. Anscombe emphasises the influence of Schopen- 
haujp, Stenius of Kant and both are mentioned by Fears who goes 
so far as to equate Wittgenstein with Freud since they are both
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coloured by the "darker manner of German idealism" (Pears, 1971» 
p. 74). This movement away from the traditionally British 
reading of the Tractatus results in playing down "logical 
atomism" and emphasising the other possible source of semantic 
theory, the idea of "logical space" and its derivitive, the 
picture theory of meaning.
Unlike "logical positivism", the picture theory of 
meaning is as closely articulated to Wittgenstein's ideas about 
logic as it is to his ideas about the atomicity of facts. It is 
in fact the theory of meaning in the Tractatus. Above all else, 
pictures, and this word is henceforth only used in Wittgenstein's 
special sense, are representations of facts. There are many 
words which might describe this relationship, but of all possi­
bilities Stenius' use of "deputize" is the most graphic. This 
especially applies to names of simple objects where the word 
takes over the form of the object and the rules of its "logical 
syntax" copy the physical characteristics of the world. Only 
the very simplest pictures deputize for simple objects. Most 
pictures are more complicated and are in fact configurations of 
elements which deputize for things. Nonetheless, in this way 
every picture must have a real prototype in that at least some 
of its elements must be facts, or to put it more precisely, 
since pictures are a matter of language and not of the world, 
some of the words in the picture must be simple names, or 
analysable into simple names. This is really all that facts 
have to do with pictures, beyond this point they are more 
related to states-of-affairs. The facts are ordered by a picture 
into a configuration, or state of affairs. It should be seen 
now that Wittgenstein does not really specialize the word
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"picture” at all, except that he only talks about pictures of 
things. Abstract art is excluded from what he calls pictures, 
but this is not a great deviation from standard usage. After 
all, a painting, drawing, or print need not be a picture. 
Wittgenstein's whole theory of meaning, then, is basically an 
analogy between pictures and complex words and sentences. It 
is important to realize however that only complex words and 
complex sentences are like pictures, simple names and atomic 
sentences are not pictures of tiiat they represent, they are like 
what they represent, they deputize for it and copy its form. 
Another way of putting this is that simple names and atomic 
sentences represent facts and pictures represent states-of- 
affairs. The extention from this least point is that only 
pictures can represent states-of-affairs. This in turn throws 
light on the distinction between facts and states-of-affairs; 
states-of-affairs are composed of facts and facts in relation 
to one another are states-of-affairs.
Having said that pictures represent states-of-affairs 
which are configurations of facts, the next question is, what 
do pictures do? This can most easily be answered by explaining 
the difference between propositions and pictures. A proposition 
shows how things stand if it is true and it asserts that they 
do so stand (Wittgenstein, 1921,#4.022). In other words, a 
proposition claims to be true. What propositions do can be 
visualized in a truth table. Obviously, all possible truth 
values cannot exist at once, and what a proposition does is to 
claim that a certain combination exists to the exclusion of all 
others. Thus a proposition makes a claim against reality; what 
this means is that if the proposition in question is true then
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certain other propositions, its opposites, are necessarily false. 
Now, a picture is very different from this. Fictures show facts 
ordered into states of affairs, hut assert nothing about their 
existence: "the most that one could grant would be that we
could use the picture in saying how things are: we could hold
the picture up and ourselves say: 'this is how things are'."
(Anscombe, 1959? PP• 64— 65). Rather than making a claim against 
reality then, pictures make claims against all possible worlds: 
they assert nothing about the world, but they prescribe what may 
be said about the world. A picture is a logical construction 
defining the order of possibilities.
A perfect example of what a picture shows and what it 
does can be seen in the statement that a truth-table makes about 
a proposition. The examples of truth-tables presented before 
were very simple, only showing what the possible truth values of 
one, two or three variables would be. The same technique may be 
used to display the possible truth values of a proposition. The 
following discussion uses some very simple ideas from the pro- 
positional calculus to illustrate Wittgenstein's picture theory 
of meaning. The reader not already familiar with these ideas 
may find them somewhat opaque; if this is the case then little 
harm is done. However, if the ideas are familiar or can be 
even partially understood from the text, then a great deal of 
good will result.
Thw way of defining a proposition is to say that it is 
a subject and a predicate connected by some form of the copula 
(V/ebsters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary) . This common sense 
definition throws some light on the logical one, for in order to
be true or false a proposition must say something, that is, make
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a claim against the world. There are several logical operations 
which form propositions; when connecting a subject and a pre­
dicate, they make a claim against the world that is either true 
or false. Now, each logical operator has a matrix which shows 
its own truth possibilities. These are like multiplication 
tables in mathematics but since the operations in logic are so 
simple, their matrices are finite and may be shown in full. 
Formal logic has five basic operations, all of which will be 
used in the example. They are the conditional, (A— *B) , which is 
read "if A then B"; Negation, (-A) , which is read, "not-A"; 
conjunction, (A & B), read "both A and B"; disjunction, (A v B), 
read "either A or B"; and mutual implication, (A<~^B), which is 
read "if A then B and if B then A", this may also be read "the 
bi-conditional of A and B". This last operation copld in fact 
be written with the other symbols as A — »B & B — »A, but is used 
so frequently that a shorthand notation is convenient. The 
truth matrices for these five logical connectives are as follows 
(These matrices and the following truth-table are adapted from 
E.J. Lemmon, Beginning Logic, pp. 65-66):
B
-A A — > B T F
t "ir* ~y?
F T  A CF
A 8: B
A v B
 FT T T
A£F T F
The matrices are easy to use. Taking the conditional 
as an example, the matrix shows that if A is true and B is true 
then the expression as a whole is true; or, if A is true and B
is false, it shows that the expression itself is false. Each
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matrix works the same way, although each has it own motivation.
The matrix for negation is motivated by the principle that the 
opposite of a true proposition is false. The matrix for con­
junction is motivated by the consideration that for the expressior 
A & B as a whole to be true, both of its parts must be true.
The rationale for disjunction is likewise obvious, but those 
for the conditional and bi-conditional are more complicated and 
depend on theorems which are too involved to present here. All 
of these operations are used in the proposition to be considered.
The procedure id* a complex proposition is to calculate the truth
/
value of the strongest connection first, the truth value of the
entire proposition will then show up under the weakest sign and
is called the "main column". The logical connectives in order
of decreasing strength are: - , & and v, *, and <■— >. Finally,
then, to give an example of a picture, take the proposition
P  »Q v -Q ♦— *P & Q, which is read "the bi-conditional of if
P then either Q, or not-Q and both P and Q", and calculate its
possibilities of being true. The result looks like this:
P P —»Q. v  -Q. < »P & Q.
p p T T T T FT T T T T
T F T T F T TF F T F F
F p F T P T FT F F F T
F F F T F T T E F F F F
The main column is beneath the sign for the bi-conditional, and 
indicates that only if both P and Q are true will the whole 
proposition be true. What is shown here is a syntawically 
correct statement, the possible truth values of its constituents, 
shown on the left of the vertical line, and what the truth value 
of the statement will be for each possible combination of the
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truth values of its two elements. The equation here makes no 
claim against the world, it is neither true nor false. It is 
no more than a legitimate arrangement of the elements P and Q; 
it portrays a state-of-affairs. Now, in order to become a pro­
position, some speaker must say: "the biconditional of if P
then Q or not Q and both P and Q is the case". What happens 
then is that the proposition is held up against the world; 
Wittgenstein says that it is compared to the world. And the 
world determines whether the proposition is true or false. Now, 
the interesting thing about this process is that the same picture 
is used to assert the truth of a proposition as is used to deny
it. Thus, one may say that P >Q v -Q«— *P & Q is the case or
that it is not the case, but either way the picture is used.
This picture is very abstract, but abstraction is a character­
istic of pictures. In order to be a logical construction 
related to the world and yet say nothing about it, it must be 
very abstract. Before a picture becomes a proposition, however, 
the degree of abstraction must be reduced. To do this, the 
elements, P and Q in the example above, must be correlated with 
actual things; only then does a picture become a proposition in
the full sense. Now, to assert the truth of P  v -Q *— »P
& Q is to make a claim not against any particular thing in the 
world but against every thing in the world. Thus, if it is true, 
it says something about the world as opposed to other conceivable 
worlds, or as Wittgenstein puts it, against all possible worlds.
To take a purer example, one may say, "the apples are 
not red" or "the apples are red" and the same picture, of red 
apples, is used in both cases. This is why Wittgenstein claims 
that pictures themselves say nothing about the world, and yet
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nothing can £e said about the world without using pictures.
The sequence is this, that the world is made up of facts, facts 
are only known by the confirmation or denial of propositions, 
and propositions are assertions about pictures. In this way 
all thinking begins with picturing. Picturing is certainly not 
an arbitrary activity. As a name has an internal set of rules 
that govern its possible combinations with other names, so too 
the formation of a picture is governed by certain rules of 
combination. These are the rules of the well-formed formulae 
that govern the logical connectives. They are also called the 
rules of "logical syntax". With these rules, nonsense can be 
spotted a priori. The proposition, "this apple is more bookish 
than that one" is obvious nonsense. One need not carry this 
statement to the world to see if it is true or false. There is 
no picture corresponding to "bookish apples", logical syntax 
lays down a prohibition against a relationship between these 
terms. This is another example of the way that the logic, the 
order of possibilities, of language is a reduplication of the 
structure of the world.
From the example of the truth-table as a picture, 
certain of Wittgenstein’s key ideas should be clearer. In order 
to consolidate the exegesis, here is a diagram of the truth-table 
with its various parts labelled and explained:
# 3#1
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The truth-table is now divided into quadrants each of which 
corresponds to the picture, components of the picture, or the 
logic of the picture.
Quadrant # 1  contains the elements of the picture.
There are only two, P and Q. So long as this remains a picture, 
the elements must be variables. However even as a picture, there 
must be potential correlations between the elements of the 
picture and the elements of the world. When P and Q have par­
ticular references, then the picture becomes a proposition.
Quadrant# 2  shows all possible truth values of the
picture's elements, P and Q. There are always as many truth
possibilities as 2 (since each element can only be true or false)
raised to the power of the number of elements, in this case 
2x22 . This list states every combination of truth values for
two variables and therefore shows every way the world could 
confirm or deny any proposition containing only P and Q. It 
thus expresses the order of possibilities (logic) of the elements. 
It is here that the verification theory of meaning is relevant.
In order to be true or false, the elements of a proposition must 
be true or false; thus, what appears here must be the end 
product of analysis. In propositions derived from the picture,
P and Q must represent only the most simple correlations with 
the world. But note how small a part verification plays in 
Wittgenstein's total scheme, and also how it is conceivable for 
one element to be false and the proposition as a whole to be true.
Quadrant^-3 is the picture. It is a configuration of 
the elements P and Q; it thus shows a state-of-affairs. A 
picture can only be judged to be well-formed or not, and this 
on the basis of the rules of logical syntax. While it is
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completely abstract and asserts nothing about the world, it 
nonetheless displays the structural order of the world. Without 
similarity of form with the world (which is the case if the 
rules of logical syntax are broken), the elements of the picture 
could never be correlated with the world and therefore proposi­
tions could not be derived from it. Pictures for which no 
prototype can be found are not necessarily meaningless. They 
are certainly non-verifiable, but rather than Mmeaningless, 
should be called fictitious. Fictions, of course, are different 
from nonsense.
Quadrant# 4  shows, in the column formed of broken 
lines, the main column which reveals the result of calculating 
the truth-value of the pictire for all combinations of truth- 
values of the elements. This makes it clear what must be the 
case in the world concerning P and Q if a proposition derived 
from this picture is to be true or false. The rows of true and 
false indicators to the left and right of the main column are 
the residue of the process of inserting the values of Quadrant 
2 into the picture and the calculation of the final value shown 
in the main column. The process of calculation is purely mecha­
nical and is based on the matrices of the logical connectives 
which are in turn connected to the world by conformity to the 
rules of logical syntax. The result of these calculations is 
to express the logic of the entire picture.
So far then, the explanation of Wittgenstein's picture 
theory of meaning includes both what a picture is and how it is 
tied in to the other terms of Wittgenstein's system - "world", 
"fact", "proposition", "truth" and "logic" - and this explains 
what pictures do. The next question is, how are pictures
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organized? The answer to this is that pictures are organized 
in two ways, internally and externally. The internal organi­
zation of a picture is primary. This refers to the relations 
between the elements of a picture. Most pictures are not as 
simple as P — v -Q <=— *P & Q, they are in fact more like the 
photographs, paintings, or drawings to which the word usually 
applies. The elements are more concrete than Ps and Qs, they 
are rather people and landscapes and such things, and the 
relationships are not as pure as "&" or "v", but are, again, 
the stuff of ordinary life and language. The drinking song about 
Lloyd George contains such a simple picture. "Lloyd George knew 
my father” is a proposition based on a picture composed of Lloyd 
George, the relationship of "knowing", and the father of the 
singer. And again, the picture is neither true nor false.
Lloyd George obviously knew lots of people's fathers, so that 
many people cog.ld assert this proposition with veracity. If I 
assert it, however, the world will prove me wrong, because LlGyd 
George did not know my father. But still it is possible that 
he did, and it is certain that other speakers could derive a 
truthful proposition from the picture whereas I am unable to 
do so. The point of this is that the relation between Lloyd 
George and the father of whoever makes the statement, that of 
"knowing", is such that the elements can be correlated with real 
objects. And this is what is primary about the internal organi­
zation of pictures. Unless the internal relationship of the 
elements is significant they cannot be correlated with objects 
outside so as to stand for them (Anscombe, 1959» P» 68).
Another way of saying this is that before verifiable propositions 
can be derived from a picture, it must be well-formed.
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An instructive way of seeing the internal organization 
of a picture is developed by Eric Stenius (Stenius, I960, pp. 
89-90). Stenius argues that what Wittgenstein means by "picture" 
can best be understood by thinking of it as an "articulate field". 
The idea of an articulate field is an elaboration of Quadrant 
1 of the truth-table. Remember that for verification to take 
place, the elements must be atomic, that is, the result of 
analysis. Thus for F— »Q v -Q«— *P & Q, P and Q are the only 
elements and they are atomic. Language pictures are not so 
simple, however, since often the categories are analysable into 
finer units. Now, Stenius's point is that some pictures can be 
analysed in several different ways. This is the opposite of 
what Wittgenstein says since he contends that every picture has 
only one correct analysis. Considering that atomicity is the 
weakest part of Wittgenstein's book, however, and that he is in 
fact unable to show an atomic fact or proposition, there is 
cogency in what Stenius says. Stenius overcomes Wittgenstin's 
problem by including in Quadrant #1 the principles of interpre­
tation that yield a particular set of elements. Thus, for a 
complex language picture, the first Quadrant may contain a 
variety of sets of elements along with the principles that 
produce them. This would of course multiply the inhabitants of 
Quadrant #-1, but would otherwise not alter Wittgenstein's ideas. 
The incorporation of the "articulate field" idea complicates but 
does not alter the form of the picture theory of meaning.
Stenius' choice of title indicates that for a given picture 
there may be several discrete fields of elements, but that each 
is articulated to the one picture. To put Stenius' concept back 
into Wittgenstein's language, the "articulate field" of a par-
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ticular picture is the set of all the elements which are produced 
by any possible means of analysis or interpretation. This, then, 
finishes the account of the internal structure of pictures.
The next point is taat a picture is related to the world 
by the correlation of its elements with existing objects. The 
important point here is that a picture is not necessarily related 
to the world at all. This is something that speakers who use 
the picture do. The precise way in which the elements of a 
picture are correlated to the objects of the world is depicted 
by Stenius with the concept of "isomorphism" (Stenius, I960, 
pp. 91-95) • l*his idea is very straightforward. Stenius summa­
rizes it like this: "Isomorphism is a relation between two
articulate fields the elements of which have the same categorical 
structure, and holds or does not hold good in respect of a fixed 
correspondence between the elements of each field" (Stenius,
I960, p. 95)• In relation to his earlier point about "articulate 
fields", it should be clear that two "articulate fields" could 
only be isomorphic in respect of a common key of interpretation. 
This is another way of saying that the elements of a picture do 
not correlate themselves with the objects of the world; this, 
too, is something that every speaker does. Now, this implies 
certain restrictions on the way in which a picture's elements 
may be correlated with the world's objects. The correlation 
cannot be random, each must be, in itself, an articulate field. 
This lays down the restriction that the world must be organized 
in "articulate fields" before it can be attached to a picture. 
They need not be the same, but they must be susceptible to a 
single key of interpretation. In fact, they would never be the 
same since pictures are not exact replicas of the world. But it
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is necessary that they in some ways be similar. Thus, a picture 
has an internal organization and the wor}.d has an internal 
organization, and whenever a relation of isomorphism is estab­
lished between the world and a picture, this is effected by 
interpreting their internal organizations in the light of a 
common principle of analysis. An example of isomorphism is 
given in Chapter I I ,  where it is used to show the categorical 
similarity between Merton's typology of social roles and the 
variants of a morpheme (taken from P.K. Bock, "Social Structure 
and Language Structure", in J. Fishman (ed.), 1968, p. 215)• 
Bock's example raises another important point. What he shows 
is really an isomorphism between two pictures, one a picture of 
society, the other a picture of plural words. The point is that 
isomorphism can exist between any articulate fields, whether 
they are of the world or of pictures. As long as categorical 
structures are equivalent, they are isomorphic.
The relationship of isomorphism is both symetrical and 
transitive. If A is isomorphic to B, then B is isomorphic to A; 
this is the symetrical aspect. By transitivity is meant that 
if A and B are isomorphic in respect of a key (C) and D is
n Inisomorphic to B in respect of key (C ) , then A is isomorphic 
to D in respect of C^. These properties explain at least some 
of the ways people think with pictures. They may reason from 
the picture to the world, or from the world to the picture; or 
they may reason from one picture to another picture and then to 
the world.
One problem threatens to confuse the explication of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, and as usage of the word "structure" 
becomes more frequent the propensity of this problem to obfuscate
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anything that is said will grow. The problem refered to is that 
of the relation between "structure" and "content". Its resolution 
is of obvious importance to everything that has been said about 
Wittgenstein, for although the label is not usually applied to 
him, he is a structuralist par excellance. To realize this, 
one need only call to mind that in Wittgenstein's semantic 
theory, for a picture to have meaning it must copy the "form" 
of the world. Likewise, pictures are articulated to the world 
by way of shared "categorical structure". Furthermore, pictures 
are "configurations" of objects in the world. All of these 
statements point to what can only be called the "structuralist" 
point of view in Wittgenstein's philosophy. "Structuralist" is 
so promiscuous these days that it really has no meaning at all, 
so supplying the label explains nothing about Wittgenstein. But 
since he consistently emphasises the primacy of the structure 
concept, though usually with other words, some clarification of 
its meaning is compulsory. The worst mistake to make in thinking 
about the concept of structure, is to see it as being the opposite 
of content. A look at the word "content" will settle the issue. 
Something is only considered "contents" if it is contained, 
which implies the existence of a container. Hence it is unthink­
able to have contents without a container. In this way, it may 
be said that the container is what defines the contents. The 
relationship is really even stronger than that: a container
determines the contents. To know the container is to know what 
may be contained in it. By knowing the container, then, one can 
write out all the possible things it could contain. This would 
roughly look like a truth-table. Now this is the reason that 
Wittgenstein emphasises the centrality of "form" in the meaning
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process. Pictures are like containers. Correctly seen, all 
structures are like containers. Content is not the opposite 
of structure. Content is, rather, an aspect of structure. One 
must bear this thought in mind when thinking about the way that 
the world’s things are correlated with the picture's elements.
It is the picture that contains the objects of the world. The 
objects of the world may be combined into any articulate field 
consistent with the rules of logical syntax, and since, in 
Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge, it is the picture that is 
first formulated and then carried to the world for comparison, 
it is the key if interpretation of the picture that provides the 
key of interpretation for the world. If logical syntax is broken, 
then the picture is changed or new objects of the world are tried. 
Everything that will fit into some container may not fit into 
this container. Not many conch shells will fit into a sherry 
bottle. The significance of this point will be clearer after 
the forthcoming discussion of the ways in which a picture may 
be adequate or inadequate. The important thing is this, that 
the relation between the picture and the world begins with the 
picture. This is exactly what Wittgenstein says: "That is how
a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it" 
(Wittgenstein, 1921, 2.1511)*
Virtually everything said about the organization of 
pictures is touched on in the example of F— v — *P & Q, 
as a picture. The ideas are important enough to merit consider­
able elaboration, however. The rest of what is said boils down 
to so much elaboration. The justification of this is that the 
complexity of a theme makes it worth developing. And this theme 
is very complex indeed.
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The next development, then, is the reiteration of the
essential point that pictures are neither true nor false. That 
pictures make sense independently of the facts accounts for one 
of the puzzles encountered earlier, namely, that phrases like 
"the first man to stand on the top of Mount Everest", make sense 
when the single man to whom they refer is unknown or dead. The 
answer to this is that the reason it makes sense is that the 
picture it forms is a possible one. It is possible to say that 
Lloyd George was the first man to stand on the top of Mt. Everest. 
The picture is simply that of Lloyd George standing on the top 
of Mt. Everest. Now, Lloyd George did not climb Mt. Everest, 
but the reasons he did not do so are matters of fact rather than 
matters of logic. Lloyd George might have been the first man to 
stand on Mt. Everest. Contrast this picture with one like this: 
"Lloyd George was the first man to climb to the bottom of the 
ocean". This one, of course, is nonsense. One need know nothing 
about Lloyd George to know that what is expressed here is not the 
case; this picture clearly defies the rules of logical syntax. 
Thus, meaning is an attribute of all well-formed pictures and
word "meaning" defeat the force of this last statement, it should 
be clear that "meaning" finds a substitution in the phrase 
"capacity to be understood".
between the way pictures have meaning independently of the facts 
and geometrical projection. Like Wittgenstein's pictures, a 
geometrical projection is intelligible before one knows whether 
or not it is true. They are both "something concerning which 
you can ask whether it is true, and you know what you are asking
has nothing to do with the facts. ambiguity of the
G.E.M. Anscombe provides an instructive parallel
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before you know the answer” (Anscombe, 19591 P« 72). She goes 
on to develop the similarity: "Every picture-proposition has
two senses, in one of which it is a description of the existence, 
in the other of the non-existence, of a configuration of objects; 
and it is that by being a projection. It is the peculiarity 
of a projection that from it and the method of projection you 
can tell what is projected; the latter need not physically exist 
though the points in space that it would occupy must” (Anscombe, 
1959> P* 72). A diagram of geometrical projection reveals the 
truth of what Anscombe says and furthers the explanation of the 
picture theory of meaning by lucidly showing the difference 
between picture and fact, and yet how they are related.
This diagram shows a box, which is not a perfect cube, and its 
projection in space. They exist independently and yet if the 
box exists then the projection exists. But if the projection 
alone exists then no boxes exist at all, but rather the possi­
bility of an infinite number of proportionally identical boxes. 
Any number of points in the projection define a box, but each box
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of these dimensions is a part of this one projection. The box 
as fact may come and go, be burned, decay, or be distorted by 
the feet of small boys, but the projection, a picture, knows no 
temporal alteration. The idea of a picture as a projection 
animates Wittgenstein's statement that a picture is related to 
reality by reaching right out to it. An equally lively and 
legitimate way of seeing this process is by saying that it 
projects itself into the world, and there is something more than 
metaphor in this description.
In the same way that there can be a projection in space 
of a geometrical figure without that figure existing, the phrase 
"the first man to stand on the top of Mt. Everest" has meaning 
independently of Hillary; it is a projection in logical space 
just as the box shown above is a projection in physical space. 
This idea also explains how things that do not exist can be 
denoted by Russell's "denoting phrases". "The present King of 
France" is a projection in logical space. It is an intelligible 
expression because even thopgh there is now no King of France, 
if there were one, it is possible to patch together an image of 
what he would be like. This is also the way "denoting phrases" 
can denote things with which one may never be acquainted, like
"the centre of mass of the solar system".
Although pictures represent the objects of the world, 
and they take over the logical form of the world, they can still
produce statements that distort the nature of the world. Since
the words "true" and "false" do not apply to pictures, the only 
way they can be evaluated is to call them "adequate" or "inade­
quate". These ideas are extensively developed by Stenius. In 
order to be adequate, the relation between a picture and the
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world must be more than isoraprphic. Taking for granted that 
the categorical structures are congruous, there must be redupli­
cation of logical connectives between the categories. To make 
this clear: "If there exist any logical connections between
the elements of the prototype, the corresponding logical con­
nections should exist between the elements of the picture and 
conversely" (Stenius, I960, p. 102). So much, then, for pictor­
ial adequacy, as "inadequacy" is a much more informative concept.
Stenius* discussion of inadequacy leans heavily on 
the idea of "logical freedom" (Stenius, I960, pp. 102-108).
This simply refers to the total number of possible combinations 
of the elements of an articulate field. To say that an element 
has great logical freedom means that its combination with many 
of the other elements is permitted. The first kind of inadequacy 
occurs when the elements of the picture have greater logical 
freedom than the elements they stand for. The other way of 
looking at this is that there are logical connections between 
the elements of the prototype to which there are no corresponding 
connections in the picture. Most language pictures are more or 
less inadequate in this respect. In the terms of conventional 
grammar, there is nothing incorrect with the sentence "Lloyd 
George was the first man to climb up to the bottom of the ocean", 
but it is still nonsence. Language in general has much more 
logical freedom than does the world, but this is hardly lament­
able. The logical freedom of language is the source of all 
metaphor, humour and fantasy. Cn the other hand, people get 
notoriously confused, and this is one of the reasons.
It is of some importance to insert here that "Lloyd 
George was the first man to climb up to the bottom of the ocean"
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is acceptable only in an evaluation by the principles of tradi­
tional grammar. Chomsky, would throw it out on the grounds that 
it abrogates the rules of ’deep syntaxtical structure” (Chomsky, 
1968 ). Chomsky’s attempt to explain and predict nonsense is 
remarkably close to the various concepts of logical syntax which 
all begin with Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The interesting thing 
is that from the Sans Grit grammarians up until the beginning of 
this century, nobody has worried about nonsensical statements 
not being prohibited by grammatical rules and categories. Surely 
this is the relevant question: why have theories of grammar
been independent from theories of meaning for so long? An 
attempt to answer this is made while discussing the difference 
between language and speech, but until then is not pressingly 
important. Having digressed this little bit, the discussion of 
"inadequacy" must resume.
The second kind of inadequacy is when there are logical 
connections between the elements of the picture to which there 
are no corresponding connections in the prototype. This is to 
say that the world has greater logical freedom than the picture. 
It is very difficult to give even a single example of this. 
Perhaps it exists only as the converse of the first kind of 
inadequacy, which is to say that it is a picture and not a fact. 
At any rate, since all knowledge is first derived from pictures, 
it would be impossible to know what logical connections exist 
without being reflected in pictures. Therefore, Stenius' second 
kind of inadequacy is impossible. It is one of those things 
that are beyond the limits of our language. The only way out 
of this dilemma is to say that certain pictures, say spatial 
ones, have logical restrictions that their prototypes do not
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have, so that we can know some aspects of the prototype only by 
using other pictures, for example temporal ones. In this light, 
the second kind of inadequacy does have a relative existence.
It is a fault that some pictures may have, but that all pictures 
cannot have.
The final development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
only twqgentially related to this theory of meaning, this is his 
theory of causality. Put in general terms, Wittgenstein supports 
Hume and Kant in their theories of causation. Hume's thesis is 
that there is no necessary connection between what is the case 
at one point of time and what is the case at another point of 
time, and that therefore all inductive inferences are hypothe­
tical. Kant asserts basically the same thing in somewhat strongei 
language: causation, he says, is only a belief. That Wittgen­
stein corroborates these views may be seen in the following 
propositions of the Tractatus:
5.135 There is no possible way of making an 
inference from the existence of one situation 
to the existence of another, entirely different 
situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such 
an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future 
from those of the present. Belief in the causal 
nexus is superstition.
6 .3 6 3 H  It is an hypothesis that the sun will 
rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not
know whether it will rise.
6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing 
happen because another has happened. The only 
necessity that exists is logical necessity.
Thus, for Wittgenstein, the events of the world are 
not predictable from one another. They may well be predictable
from hypotheses, hut that is a different thing entirely. These 
views make Wittgenstein's approach to implication somewhat 
strange. If P — >Q is always true, then it is tautologous and 
says nothing ahout the world, being true a priori without 
experience or knowledge of the world. On the other hand, if 
P — is only true some of the time then it is solely a matter 
of fact and logic alone does not permit an inference. Logic 
does however show the truth possibilities of any proposition, 
but this only reveals what the world must do for the proposition 
to be true, and gives no hint at all what the world will in fact 
do. At this point, the significance of Wittgenstein's notion 
of causation may seem remote, but this will not be the case in 
the pages to follow.
It remains to show where pictures are located in 
language. The answer to this is that all thinking takes place 
with pictures, and further that every picture can be verbalized. 
Words are pictures, sometimes simple, sometimes complex.
Sentences, too, are pictures and may be more or less complicated. 
The solution to the problem of meaning is that whatever is 
intelligible is based on a picture and the picture is its 
meaning. Now, bearing this in mind, it makes no difference 
whether the meaning is attached to one word, a phrase, a sentence, 
a paragraph, an oration, or a hook. All that can be said is 
this: analysis of meaning invariably leads to a picture.
What, then, does analysis involve? There is no answer 
to this in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein was so certain that ■
practical solutions would follow his logical vision, that he 
never bothered to exemplify a real analysis. But truth did not
follow logic as he hoped. Several years after the Tractatus
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was published, Wittgenstein realized that he had not solved all 
the problems of philosophy. He began again from the other side 
of the problem. By painstaking analysis of words in the context 
of sentences, Wittgenstein build up another approach to semantics. 
These ideas are contained in the Fhilosophical Investigations.
The theme.-.of this work may be put into a nutshell in his now 
famous statement that one must not look for the meaning of a 
word, but for its usage in sentences. The meaning of a word 
thus becomes the rules for using it in sentences. Perhaps the 
greatest change in Wittgenstein's philosophy from the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations, is 
that in the latter work he completely drops Russell's theory of 
denotation. Of course, this changes much of the Tractatus, but, 
on the other hand, the atomicity that Wittgenstein derived from 
Russell's theory of denotation is probably the single most 
troublesome part of his early work. So there are few who lament 
its passing. The important thing is that the force of Wittgen­
stein's picture theory of meaning does not depend on the prin­
ciple of atomicity. Cr, if it does in the Tractatus, Stenius 
largely solves the problem by permitting the atomicity of a 
picture's elements to be the results of various principles of 
interpretation. "'When pictures are seen as articulate fields, 
they no longer depend on the possibility of being reduced to 
one set of atomic elements. Dropping Russell's denotation
important idea in the Tractatus persists through the Philosophical 
Investigations, and this is the idea of logic as the order of 
possibilities.
theory is thus much extra weight. The most
Now, it is the concept of meaning as the rules of
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use that furnishes a way of discovering pictures. We discover 
what a word is a picture of by watching intelligible combinations 
with other words and seeing what their meanings share and also 
how they differ. The use of a word is written down as rules.
In the rules of usage, one may see the underlying picture which 
is the meaning. The rules of usage are, in effect, a notation 
describing a picture, and through them the picture governs the 
meaning of the word. There is one conspicuous problem here: 
does each different use of a word outline a new picture, or to 
put it another way, is each different use of a word derived from 
a different picture? The analogy to this question may be seen 
on the diagram of geometrical projection by asking whether each 
figure named "box" is part of the same projection. The example
'/• • , ‘ .* . • f; ? v t  y . ' * ■ ■-
defines boxes of certain proportions, but could one draw a 
projection of all boxes? This is, of course, the ancient 
question of essences, and Wittgenstein proposes a novel answer.
His conclusion is an emphatic no. There is no "essence", in 
the Platonic sense, beyond the different usages of a word. But 
this is not to say that they have nothing in common. Wittgensteir 
claims that the different usages of a word bear a "family resem­
blance". They are not identical, but they are clearly of a 
kin. Like most of his rather poetic similies, Wittgenstein does 
not carry this one very far. Like all poetry, however, it has 
its own momentum, pointing to things beyond itself (the reason 
it does this is that "family" inescapably describes a picture, 
or it is derived from an obvious picture, but this point will 
be clearer in a moment). Now, what a "family resemblance" 
implies is a common ancestry. And things with a common ancestry 
have but one source. The common source that most vigorously
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suggests itself for the different usages of a word that bear* 
a "family resemblance" to one another is a picture. This can 
easily be the case without resorting to Platonic essences. How 
an analysis of this sort works may be seen by taking the word
"invest" as an example.
Begin by looking at three different uses of the verb 
"invest": (1) Prince Charles was invested at Caernarvon Castle;
(2) Wellington invested Ciudad Rodrigo before beginning the
seige; (3) It is unwise to invest money in an obsolete industry. 
Now, the word "invest" clearly does not mean the same in each 
of these sentences. The "meaning" of each sentence can be seen 
by noticing which other sentences describe the same thing. The 
first sentence may be replaced by: Prince Charles was officially
given the title 'Prince of Wales' at Caernarvon Castle". The 
second sentence is the same as saying that Wellington's armies 
surrounded Ciudad Rodrigo before beseiging it. And the third 
sentence actually means that one would be silly to buy the shares 
of an industry that is behind the times. Each sentence containing 
the word "invest" may be translated into one that does not 
contain the word; and when this is done, one is not tempted to 
look for similarities among these three sentences at all, much 
less to seek a common essence. It is conclusive then: the
three sentences do not mean the same thing. But what of the 
word "invest"? Must one be content only to say that there are 
three rules governing the use of the verb invest? Is this the 
final statement of the word's meaning? No, it is not, there is 
a family resemblance every bit as strong as a Medici jaw or a 
Hapsburg nose. The resemblance is this: at Caernarvon, Prince
Charles became the incumbent of an ancient office; as the robes
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of office were put upon him, he becomes Prince of 7/ales. At 
Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington placed his army around the fortress.
And in the compelling piece of financial wisdom, one is counsel­
led not to put one's money into decrepit industries. The same 
process takes place in each sentence: one thing is enveloped in
another thing and the character of the thing inserted is radically 
changed. By investment Charles V/inclsor became Prince of Wales, 
Ciudad Rodrigo became British rather than French, and the inves­
tor's money becomes part of a business he cannot control. The 
family resemblance, then, is rather dramatic. But the analysis 
goes even further than this. Our word "invest" is the historical 
product of the Latin words in and vestire. Since the Latin verb 
vestire means to dress or clothe, the picture behind the English 
word is clear. The picture of a man getting dressed is such a 
primitive form of the envelopment picture, that the analogy with 
"family resemblance" would have to be that it was a Habsburg 
nose that begot the rest of the family. What could be simpler 
than this? And yet all the ingredients are present. 7/hen a 
man gets dressed, he covers or encloses his body in garments 
that radically change his character. The importance of the 
wrapper altering the inner object is clear, for even the Romans 
would not go outdoors without clothes on.
The picture in this case turns out to be a historical 
residue. Although this will not always be the case, it will 
certainly be a factor with many of our words whose etymology 
is clear. This point is admirably made by J.L. Austin:
I will mention two points of method which are, 
experience has convinced me, indispensable aids 
at these levels [referring to levels of semantic 
analysis].
One is that a word never - well, hardly ever -
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shakes off its etymology and its formation.
In spite of all changes in and extensions of 
and additions to its meanings, and indeed rather 
pervading and governing these, there will still 
persist the old idea. In an accident something 
"befalls: by mistake you take the wrong one:
in error you stray: when you act deliberately
you act after weighing it up (not after thinking 
out ways and means). It is worth asking ourselves 
whether we know the etymology of 'result' or of 
'spontaneously', and worth remembering that 'un­
willingly' and 'involuntarily' come from very 
different sources.
And the second point is connected with this.
Going back into the history of a word, very often 
into Latin, we come back pretty commonly to 
pictures or models of how things happen or are 
done. These models may be fairly sophisticated 
and recent, as is perhaps the case with 'motive' 
or 'impulse', but one of the commonest and most 
primitive types of model is one which is apt 
to baffle us through its very naturalness and 
simplicity. We take some very simple action, 
like shoving a stone, usually as done by and 
viewed by oneself, and use this, with the features 
distinguishable in it, as our model in terms of 
which to talk about other actions and events: 
and we continue to do so, scarcely realizing 
it, even when these other actions are pretty 
remote and perhaps much more interesting to us 
in their own right than the acts originally 
used in constructing the model ever were, and 
even when the model is really distorting the 
facts rather than helping us to observe them.
(J.L. Austin, 1961, pp. 201-202).
Stressing the point that pictures need not be derived from 
etymology, what Austin says about models goes exactly for pictures 
It will be remembered that Austin's ideas were cited as justifi­
cation for the treatment given the word "role" in the second 
chapter. Now that the whole body of theory behind that manoeuvre 
is given, it may be more comprehensible.
Thus an analysis in terms of use discloses the picture 
governing the meaning of a word. At this point, the quest for 
a theory of meaning to elucidate the dark corners of social role 
theory has made a full swing through Wittgenstein's philosophy.
It has been a hasty journey; the selection of scenic spots has
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been very eclectic . But even if the integration of this view 
of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning depends on eclecticism, 
there will be no apologies. Interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
contribution to Philosophy have varied wildly since 1921. The 
commentators closest to my own evaluation of his work have all 
published within the last twelve years. And so far as I can 
tell, this change of opinion concerning Wittgenstein happened 
after Nadel's death. And certainly the Tractatus as read by 
Ogden and Richards was a very different book than the one read 
today. So, with the conviction of the moment, I advocate the 
integrated view of Wittgenstein as the correct theory of meaning. 
Rejection of Wittgenstein usually depends on fragmentation 
before refutation. In this manner, Findlay says, "Wittgenstein 
is the author of three wholly differing accounts of meaning, 
all of which merit entire rejection: meaning is not reduplication
of structure; it is not verification or verifiability, it is 
plainly not what he meant by 'use'" (J.N. Findlay, "Use, Usage,
and Meaning" in Parkinson, 1968, pp. 126-127). I suggest that
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this and similar attacks on Wittgenstein (for example Gellner, 
1959) are grossly unfair. In his typically enigmatic way, 
Wittgenstein recognizes the continuity of his work in the 
preface to Philosophical Investigations: "Four years ago I had
occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philo-
i
sophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly 
seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the 
new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right
light only by contrast with and against the background of my 
old way of thinking" (Wittgenstein, 1953» P* viii). Thus, in 
conclusion, this admonition should be carried through the rest
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of this thesis: The meaning of a word is the picture from which
it is derived; the picture is known from analysis of the differ­
ing uses of the word in correctly formed sentences; and the 
proper uses of the word are written in rules which are a 
notation for the picture and describe it.
Before returning to the questions of social roles and 
social structure, I shall suggest a change in the way Wittgen­
stein relates rules to language and meaning. The importance of 
rules slips into the Fhilosophical Investigations when Wittgen­
stein draws an analogy between language and games. The simpli­
city of this thought is shown in the statement: ’’The question
'What is a word really?' is analogous to 'What is a piece in 
chess'.” (Wittgenstein, 1953?#108). There is one obvious 
answer to the question about chessmen, and this is that to 
explain one piece in chess, one must e:jq?lain the whole game, 
the way each piece is moved, the object of moving and pieces, 
in short, the rules of the game. Wittgenstein suggests that an 
explanation of a word is really the same thing. One word can 
only be explained by placing it into the context of language, 
that is, its rules of usage only make sense in relation to other 
wores, and their rules of usage and that this will eventually 
add up to language as a whole. To put the entire matter another 
way, a definition of chess is a collocation of its rules, and 
the same is true of language, and the parts can only be dpfinde 
by fitting them into the whole. Furthermore, Wittgenstein 
argues that what the rules of chess and language govern is 
meaning. For example, no rule of chess prohibits picking up a 
pawn and removing it from the board. But such a move is not 
part of the game, that is, it is not intelligible. One would
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react to this by sayimg, "What on earth did you mean by that?"
The same is true of the rules of language. Nothing stops one 
from saying "red apples are easier to read than green ones", 
that is to say there is no sanction against saying nonsense like 
this. However, the statement is not a move in the language game, 
it is like twirling the King round and round in its square. The 
only reaction to this sentence would be, "what on earth did you 
mean by that?". There is one possible exception to this last 
example. If I were professor of anthropology at the Sorbonne
t
rather than an obscure post-graduate, and I were to conclude a 
public lecture with the statement "red apples are more readable 
than green ones", some of my enthusiasts might take up my state­
ment saying: "The great professor is not talking nonsense, he
is speaking in symbols which really mean 'while Chairman Mao is 
easier to read than Georges Siraenon, they are both a bit fruity1". 
Only in this way can nonsense be meaningful, that is, be a move 
in the language game. While these sorts of interpretations do 
occur, they must be added on to the theory of meaning rather 
than made the basis of it. Oracles are, after all, very rare 
these days.
These two examples express Wittgenstein's notion of a 
rule. This idea is used consistently inJ'the Philosophical 
Investigations. All in all, it is a very strict formulation of 
the rule concept. It may be characterized as saying that rules 
are imperative commands, which govern by fiat. As an elaboration 
of this, Wittgenstein shows several properties of rules. The 
first is that rules express normality. Wittgenstein puts it 
like this: ". . . if things are quite different from what
they actually are - if there were for instance no characteristic
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expression of pain, or fear, ot joy; if rule became exception 
and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal 
frequency - this would make our normal language-games lose their 
point. - The procedure of pyitting a lump of cheese on a balance 
and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its 
point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow 
or shrink for no obvious reason” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 142).
The second point about rules is that they admit of
only one interpretation. *'hat Wittgenstein does here is to
define "interpretation”. His idea is really a prohibition
against the facile, but regrettably common, view that rules may
be interpreted to suit one's purpose. To combat the inclination, 
,0-
which is anathe ia to any concept of rule, Wittgenstein lays down 
the restriction that the term "interpretation” should be limited 
"to the substitution of one ejcpression of the rule for another" 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #*201). Thus, a rule is not a particular 
set of words. It is something that various combinations of 
words may express. And if each expression has a subtly different 
sense, they only show the many possibilities of the rule, like 
all the terms in a truth table. Thus, "do not kill", "do not 
deprive of life", "do not destroy the vital essence of any 
animate being" are really one rule, they all say the same thing 
and may be substituted for each other.
Wittgenstein's first two points about rules may be 
summarized by saying that rules are normal and discrete. These 
two points determine the way that rules are learnt, and how they 
may be taught. Rules are obvious; this is how they are learnt: 
"But we say that it [the game] is played according to such-and- 
such rules because an observer can read these rules off from
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the practice of the game - like a natural law governing the play. 
- But how does the observer distinguish in this case between 
players' mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic 
signs of it in the players' behaviour" (Wittgenstein, 1953* #54-)- 
Rules of the game, then, can be picked up by an intelligent 
observer. This goes hand in hand with the fact that rules are 
often difficult to explain: "But surely you can see. . .?'
That is just the characteristic expression of someone who is 
under the compulsion of a rule" (Wittgenstein, 1953>4£231).
To those who play the game, the rules are so obvious that they 
may be overlooked, and this is the origin of the expression "the 
exception that proves the rule". Often if there is no exception, 
the rule is not noticed. In this fact lies the accuracy of 
Wittgenstein's similie between rules and "natural law".
Teaching rules is somewhat different from learning 
rules, but the principles are the same. Because rules are 
obvious and discrete, they may be taught by example. This is, 
of course, just the converse of learning by observation. Witt­
genstein gives an example of how a rule is taught: "One might
say to the person one was training: 'Look, I always do the
same thing: I. . . . "' (Wittgenstein, 1953, #-223)* From
this, Wittgenstein concludes that two synonyms for "rule" would 
be agreement" and "same". These are certainly the two possible 
interpretations of "rule" directly responsible for the way rules 
are communicated. If what one does is always the same, then 
there is a rule for it. Likdwise, things under the operation of 
one rule will agree. These two synonyms contribute to a defini­
tion of the word "rule", they partially reveal the configuration 
of possibilities of which it is a picture. Ferhaps the most
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important conclusion from this is that a person can use, learn 
and teach rules without being able to put them into words. It 
is possible to write good prose without knowing all the rules 
of English grammar. In fact one could learn to write by studying 
acknowledged masterpieces of English literature. The advantage 
of verbalized rules is clear, however, when one has difficulty 
on a particular point. If the question arises, whether or not 
to use a comma after a direct address, it is handier to pick 
up a manual of grammar than to read through Jane Austin's novels 
looking for examples and agreements. But the essential point 
is that whoever uses rules need not be sapient or articulate 
about them.
That rules are obvious has one more implication, that 
rules are never secret. As Wittgenstein says: "And to think
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one
was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it" 
(Wittgenstein, 1953* #-202). The intent of this is that one's 
.rules cannot be concealed. This point is really an implication 
of the way rules are learned. If rules can be learned by non­
verbal observation, then they cannot be concealed. If the 
players do in fact play the game then it is impossible that any 
rule could be concealed. This is not the same thing as saying 
every rule will be revealed. Conceivably a game of football 
could end with no fouls and no corner kicks so that the rules 
governing those activities would not be revealed, but what 
Wittgenstein is saying here is that if the activity does happen, 
then the rules cannot be concealed.
Wittgenstein gives two highly suggestive examples of
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rules. Like all his examples they are very simple and, perhaps 
for that very reason, a hit outlandish. The first one illus­
trates the way a line on a sheet of paper can be, or in this 
case not be, a rule:
Imagine someone using a line as a rule in the 
following way: he holds a pair of compasses,
and carries one of its points along the line 
that is the ’rule', while the other one draws 
the line that follows the rule. And while he 
moves along the ruling line he alters the 
opening of the compasses, apparently with 
great precision, looking at the rule the whole 
time as if it determined what he did. And 
watching him we see no kind of regularity in 
this opening and shutting of the compasses.
We cannot learn his way of following the line 
from it. Here perhaps one really would say:
"The original seems to intimate to him which
way he is feo go. But it is not a rule.
(Wittgenstein, 1953? #237) •
Now, this example dangles with loose ends like a polyp, but 
before picking them up, I shall pursue Wittgenstein's argument 
further in the hope that clarification will bring facility when 
the time comes to knot them together.
The second example is more helpful than the first 
because it neatly fits an image begun in the Tractatus. The 
combination of old and new examples is one feature of the 
Philosophical Investigations that encourages a synthesis of the 
two books. This instance of a rule goes back to the analogy 
with geometrical projection: M. . . w e  might imagine rails
instead of rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the
unlimited application of a rule" (Wittgenstein, 1953? 218).
Think now of the example of geometric projection presented 
earlier. Think of the lines of projection as rails and remember 
that it is the abstract projection that is the picture. Here, 
then, is the hint that unifies Wittgenstein's two books.
Pictures are rules. Thus, Wittgenstein in thinking about rules,
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works his way back to the picture theory of meaning. For those
who are prone to see Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, this
is the trump that takes the trick.
The significance of the rule concept may be seen
further in Wittgenstein's critique of the causal theory of
meaning, which is au fond, advocated both by Ogden and Richards
and Nadel. Wittgenstein's discussion of this point goes far
toward indicating how his theories can be integrated with social
role theory:
Let me ask this: what has the expression of
a rule - say a sign-post - got to do with my
actions? ’“hat sort of connexion is there here?
- Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained
to react to this sign in a particular way, and
now I do so react to it.
But this is only to give a causal connexion; 
to tell how it has come about that we now go 
by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the- 
sign really consists in. On the contrary; I 
have further indicated that a person goes by 
a sign-post only in so far as there exists a 
regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (Wittgen­
stein, 1 9 5 3 , #198; .
It is slightly ironic that Wittgenstein's critique of the causal 
theory of meaning should result in a word so dear to the hearts 
of social anthropologists. That "custom" is the element missing 
from the causal theory is certainly damning, and no doubt this 
is the reason for its failure to produce an accurate theory of 
social structure. The absence of the idea of custom is the one 
of the deficiencies Wittgenstein's theory remedies. For the 
time being, however, this must be left as smother tentacle 
hanging from the polyp. The overriding task now is to examine 
Wittgenstein's ideas about rules as such. That Wittgenstein's 
theory of rules is wrong is discovered in Gilbert Ryle's dis­
cussion of Wittgenstein's own archetype of rules, chess.
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Ryle’s attitude to rules (Ryle, 194-9* pp. 74— 80) is
radically different from Wittgenstein's. Like Wittgenstein,
Ryle allows that by observing the game, one may learn all the
rules. But this is only the beginning. The rules actually
predict a very few things about the game. From the rules, one
knows that a Bishop will always end on a square as the same
colour as that on which it began, but this is little help in
understanding particular moves of the white or black Bishop.
Ryle's point is really quite simple: the rules of chess do not
pre-ordain the game. They govern the moves, they do not ordain
them. Ryle emphasises this point by claiming that even the laws
of nature are not fiats. But even more to the point, he moves
from chess to discuss the rules of grammar. Exactly what
grammatical rules do and do not govern is eloquently displayed
in this passage:
It may well be that throughout the whole length
of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
Gibbon never once infringes the rules of English 
grammar. They governed his entire writing, yet 
they did not ordain what he should write, or 
even the style in which he should write; they 
merely forbade certain ways of conjoining words. 
Knowing these rules and Gibbon's obedience to 
them, a reader can predict from the fact that 
a particular sentence has for its subject a 
plural noun that its verb will be a plural verb.
His predictions will be uniformly correct, yet 
we feel no inclination to lament that Gibbon's 
pen ran in a fatal groove. Grammar tells the 
reader that the verb must be a plural verb, 
but not which verb it will be. (Ryle, 194-9* 
pp. 76-77)
There is an important difference between Ryle and Wittgenstein 
here. For Ryle, the rules of language are not like rails, that 
is, they are not strict and deterministic. Or, at least, in 
Ryle's view what rules determine is a fairly small part of what
they purport to govern. Ryle's point on this issue is well
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taken; Wittgenstein's theory is too deterministic as it stands. 
Although he does not use exactly these terms, Wittgenstein 
argues that rules ordain, not govern. Now, Ryle's position is 
so obviously the more judicious one here that it may be that 
the two philosophers are not talking about the same thing. The 
Philosophical Investigations is an enigmatic as the Tractatus, 
but unlike the latter work has not the virtue of a rigorously 
systematic pattern. Therefore, it could be that when Wittgensteir 
talks about rules of language, he really means the rules of 
logical syntax. On the other hand, his reference to "custom", 
quoted above, makes this seem unlikely. At any rate, as the 
issue stands now, Ryle's contention that rules govern without 
ordaining is the more cogent. What then is this process of 
governing? The example of grammatical rules and prose style, 
given by Ryle, is somewhat tangential to the main trend of this 
chapter, the problem of meaning. So the question is, then, how 
do rules govern meaning? An answer to this question is found 
by studying a symbolic system akin to language, and yet much 
simpler. This is the rules of musical notation. It is important 
to stress that musical notation is like a language, if indeed it 
is not a language.
Even though much simpler than language, musical 
notation is still very complicated. Since the point I want to 
make is really very simple, musical notation as a whole is not 
relevant. Por purposes of this discussion, then, consider the 
relation of a key-signature to the rest of the musical compo­
sition. The key-signature is a rule. At the outset it lays 
down the key of the whole piece. Quite often the piece will 
take the name of the key; all of the works in Bach's The Well-
173
tempered Clavier, for example, are known this way. One identi­
fies a piece by saying "the prelude and fugue in E major". The 
key signature has a definite reference, which is a scale of the 
same name. The pianist looks at the key signature and can play 
the scale of E-major. In this scale,f^C^€j4.*toare sharp, all 
other notes are natural, the scale is easy to play even though 
the pianist may have never seen that particular piece before.
The scale is a rule. It stands like a sentry at the portal of 
every piece of music. Now, when the pianist begins to play, he 
will find that at least the first several measures contain only 
those notes in the title scale. Of course, the province of the 
key-signature is very limited. It is never expected that the 
key-signature will govern the pitch of the notes played, or the
rhythmic value, or the tempo. But, if the pianist is playing
Bach's E-major prelude, and admittedly Bach's keyboard works are 
especially good examples of this sort of thing, he will find 
after the first two bars that for the next three bars every A 
is sharped. These are technically called "accidentals", but 
they are hardly accidents, if that word bears its usual meaning
of being unplanned and unintentional. The third fourth and
fifth measures of this piece are not founded on an E-major scale 
at all. Adding A-sharp to an E-ma#or scale changes the scale 
to B-major. But there is no difficulty in playing B-major scales 
under an E-major key signature, as there is but one small 
deviation from the rule. Following the fifth measure, however, 
f e ~ •. chaos seems to reign. In the seventh measure there are 
nine accidentals, in the eighth measure eight. After this, with 
a few notable exceptions, the piece becomes closer to the rule. 
Interestingly enough, the next to last sound is a discord
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containing two accidentals. Significantly, though, this 
"accidental" discord is followed by a straightforward E-major 
chord which ends the piece. Now, if E-major were the ruler of 
country, and each accidental a crime, he would no doubt be out 
at the next election or, even worse, taken over by the opposition 
party, B-major, in an outright coup d ’etat. To say this about 
Bach's prelude, however, would be to miss the point entirely.
Even in the composer's day when musical tastes were much stricter 
than our own, this piece was never thought of as disorderly. On
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the contrary, Bach's music has always been thought the epitome 
of harmony. Looking back at all these minor delicts, though, 
how can the E-major key-signature be said to rule anything?
Here is the answer, that the key-signature governs the meaning 
of the composition, that quality which though etherial in the 
highest degree is nonetheless the vital heart of music. To even 
the untutored ear, the change to B-major is obvious. The 
measures with more accidentals are even more conspicuous. 
"Meaning" of a musical piece is clearly different from the 
pictures of language. There is not even an abstract picture to 
which music refers or points. One is directed to play the E- 
major prelude "dol_ce", but clumsy hands could easily change this. 
Regardless of interpretation, however, some spots in the music 
are always bound to be different from the rest of the piece.
These are the places of tonal change. If a person who listens 
reasonably intelligently were to hear the E-major prelude once 
and then write down what he noticed as the major divisions of 
the piece, he would undoubtedly pick those places where the 
composition's tone changed. Measures three through five are 
clearly different from the first two which state the theme.
The change is very dramatic even though it is hard to name.
Bach's music is only vaguely related to the things of this world. 
Still, if a listener is inclined to anthropomorphize his music, 
he would do so at these points. Ferhaps after hearing the E- 
major section, the B-major section does not sound quite as 
"dolce". Certainly when the piece shifts to F-sharp minor, in 
measure fifteen, the listener feels very differently. An even 
stronger example is in the resolution of a dischord ending the 
piece. There is movement here. If the composition ended one 
note sooner, listeners would he left with the feeling, so common 
in Twentieth-Century concert goers, of hanging in the air, or 
of the piece stopping prematurely. The final return to E-major 
is so much like a homecoming because it is the signature of the 
whole prelude. It sounds normal even to listeners who are 
ignorant of music. It does not sound normal because it is the 
statistical norm; it is not the statistical norm but sounds 
normal because it is the rule. This, then, is what the key- 
signature does. It does not ordain that any particular note 
must be in any measure, but it does govern the tonal significance 
of etfery note that is played. Music is most interesting when 
it varies. Nearly every jbiece is built of a theme and variations 
on it. The key-signature determines which tones are themes and 
which are variations, and thereby points to which parts of the 
music are most enticing. So, the key-signature exists beside 
another rule that allows for endless deviance from it, any note 
may have any tonal value if the proper accidental mark is 
affixed to it, but still it is the original scale described by 
the key-signature that determines what the piece sounds like, 
in effect, its meanigg. Taking tonality as an example is a
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propos to Bach because every other musical rule is constant in 
the E-major prelude. There is but one mark for tempo and the 
eighth note rythm is broken by only two measures of sixteenth- 
notes. Thus, while this situation is admittedly rare, the 
variations in this prelude are almost entirely total which means 
that the key-signature governs virtually every change to which 
meaning may be ascribed. Most music is more complex than this.
Perhaps a more lucid, though not more accurate, 
instance of rules in music is the way that a composer determines 
the rythm of his notes. Immediately following the key-signature 
is the time-signature: they are rules of equivalent structure.
The time-signature 4-/4- tells one that every measure has four 
beats and that every quarter note gets one beat. Thus the time- 
signature as rule determines that if a measure contains four 
quarter-notes, no more notes may be inserted. However, there 
are many options: one measure may contain one whole-note, two
half-notes, eightth-notes, and so on for thirty-second and sixty- 
fourth notes. So the time-signature does not predict how 
quickly the notes will follow one another. But the time-signa­
ture does determine the relative value of notes: an eighth-note
must always be half as long as a quarter note, and visa versa, 
so that if either note is played, the value of the other is 
fixed. There are more radical rules for breaking the time- 
signature rule though. Any note may be given any time value, 
that is, be held indefinitely (fermata); or, there may be an 
odd number of notes to the quarter note as in triplets, quin­
tuplets and so on. The point is that the time-signature like 
the key-signature exists along side of numerous rules for 
breaking it. Yet even when it is broken, it still governs the
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significance of the deviant notes by maintaining the norm. A 
B-major chord is unremarkable unless it occurs in isolation in 
a piece governed by some other scale. Time-signatures govern 
the same way. These rules do not ordain. They are not like 
rails. If one looks to them to ordain one wou^d find chaos.
But they do govern; and they govern everything that falls into 
their domain. What they determine in their domain is meaning, 
the possible ways in which notes may be interpreted. Useful and 
descriptive though they are, the accuracy of Wittgenstein's 
parallels between language and geometrical projection and the 
rules of chess comes to a halt. His ideas are too deterministic 
to bear comparison with the world. The conclusion drawn from 
this entire discussion takes form in the odd suggestion that 
the rules of language are more like the rules of music than they 
are like the rules of chess or the lines of geometrical projec­
tion. Another illustration of this can be seen by returning to 
Wittgenstein's own example of a line on a sheet of paper as a 
rule.
Wittgenstein writes of a man following a line with a 
pair of compasses. One point of the compass follows the line 
exactly; the other moves about in what seems to be a random 
manner. Is the straight line a rule for the wavy one? Wittgen­
stein says not, it seems to be an intimation, but not a rule.
Like many of Wittgenstein's illustrations, this one is deceptively 
surreal. Look at what he says: the actor moves the compasses
"apparently with great precision, looking at the rule the whole 
time as it if determined what he did". And yet watching him, 
Wittgenstein discovers no regularity. How does this case jobe 
with the aformentioned trait of rules, that they are ^lways
178
obvious? To the detriment of Wittgenstein's internal consistency, 
it does not. If the draftsman seems to be following the rule 
and is not, then he must be pretending to follow the rule. But 
surely if this were the case Wittgenstein would have said so.
The conclusion that the man is pretending to follow the rule is 
more reasonable than to say the rule gives him hints as to where 
his line should go. Wittgenstein's own principles provide hooks 
for snaring this example. That there are no secret rules 
invalidates this example. The idea of a line on paper as a 
rule, however, provides another instructive example of how rules 
govern without ordaining. Consider a "ruled" sheet of paper 
(there is not a pun here for no reason). I take the ruled sheet 
and place it beneath an unruled sheet so that the lines of the 
ruled sheet show through the other. Say, further, that the 
ruled sheet has one-half inch horizontal lines and a single 
vertical line on the left exactly one inch from the edge. Now, 
how can this sheet be said to be a rule for what I do on the 
clear page. First of all, think of what the case would be if 
the rule ordained everything that happened on the other sheet.
If this were the case, the rule would be a prototype; I would 
see the rules peeping through the sheet, take out a straight 
edge and mechanically trace over each one. Finally, there would 
be an exact model of the prototype. In this case, the rules 
really are like rails. How silly though to think like this'.
The fact is that I did not place the ruled sheet under the clean 
sheet in order to draw models of the prototye. That is one 
possibility of the rule, but when writing an essay, that aspect 
of the rule is not highly valued. Actually, I want the rule 
beneath the sheet because I need a definition of lines for my
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writing, and left-hand margin for purposes of paragraph inden­
tation. So when I see the rules peeping through the sheet, I 
see a way of keeping my lines and paragraphs neat. And when I 
have filled up a sheet with words, I may rip it off the pad and 
compare it with the rule - obviously it is not a model of the 
rule, and yet the lines of handwriting are straight, and only 
so tall and the paragraph indentation is uniform. All of these 
features are governed by the ruled sheet of paper. The rule 
has even more possibilities than this. Say I want to put a 
diagram in my essay, a truth-table for example. Then I will 
use the rules to help me locate the columns of letters and space 
them evenly on the page. Hence, another activity is governed by 
the one rule. But of course, everything that is drawn on the 
page is not governed by the ruled sheet. I may begin writing in 
the upper right-hand corner and continue diagonally to the lower 
left-hand corner. In this case, one would not say I broke all 
the rules, one would rather say that I did not pay any attention 
to the rules, or more exactly, that I did not play the game 
defined by the rules. If I tried to write along the rules and 
did a messy job of it, that situation wo^ld be obvious. Then 
a judgement would only be possible on the basis of the rules.
But writing from corner to corner is not a misguided attempt to 
follow the rules. I now consider this discussion sufficiently 
developed to obviate Wittgenstein's example of a man following 
a line with a compass. Rules govern, they do not ordain.
Oddly enough, the Philosophical Investigations contain 
a very good eaample of how the rules of language govern but do 
not ordain:
When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar"
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and "Bring me milk" make sense, but not the 
combination "Milk me sugar", that does not 
mean that the utterance of this combination 
of words has no effect. And if its effect 
is that the other person stares at me and 
gapes, I  don't on that account call it the 
order to stare and gape, even if that was 
precisely the effect that I  wanted to produce. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953? #4-98).
Note first of all that this passage is another implied criticism 
of the causal theory of meaning. The second point is that the 
reason the utterance "Milfi^me sugar" might cause a listener to 
stare and gape is that the rules of grammar are being defied. 
There is nothing peculiar about the phrase "Milk me sugar" that 
produces staring and gaping, any other absurd phrase would have 
the same result. So it is not this phrase but the act that it 
breaks certain rules that brings the reaction. As Wittgenstein 
indicated earlier, a statement of cause and effect misses the 
point entirely. What matters is the rule. A statement of the 
rule should stress that breaking it results inxxmsense, and in 
this way the rule defines, or governs, even those cases that 
break it. The reason that this is so is that statements of 
sense and nonsense are parts of one language game; one set of 
rules govern them all. Rules express certain possibilities of 
activity; they are not prototypes. Adoption of this argument 
does not nullify Wittgenstein's general argument about rules; 
rather, I  suggest, it makes them more lucid and convincing.
Rules are learned by observation; rules are taught by example; 
without suspending the game; rules are not secret and rules do 
characterize normality. This list must be emended, however, 
with the statement that rules govern, they do not ordain. The 
final point is especially important in considering systems of 
rules that govern meaning, which is to say the sort of system
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that makes up social structure.
The road hack to the theory of social structures is 
slowly becoming apparent, but it is still long and circuitous. 
There are two stops along the route before the descent to the 
problems raised in the second chapter. The first of these is 
Wittgenstein's omission of de Saussure's distinction between 
language and speech. It is remarkable that Wittgenstein should 
overlook one of the most fundamental concepts in Linguistics, 
but the rudiments of this distinction are found in his thought 
and incorporation therefore adds to its acuity.
is as old as modern linguistics. This is equivalent to saying 
that it began with de Saussure. What de Saussure has to say is 
very simple, which is, no doubt, the main reason for its per­
severance. Speech is obvious. Everyday people are seen talking. 
That people speak is indisputable. Squally conspicuous is the 
fact that only one person at a time can speak. De Saussure is 
the first to point out that there is much more to speaking than 
this, however: "Speech has both an individual and a social side,
and we cannot conceive of one without the other" (de Saussure, 
1959? p. 8). He goes on to say that "speech always implies an 
established system" (de Saussure, 1959? P* 8). This dual nature
namely that speech is a pastiche of different things: "Taken
as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous, straddling 
several areas simultaneously - physical, physiological, and 
psychological - it belongs both to the individual and to society; 
we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot
discover its unity" (de Saussure, 1959? p» 9)• His conclusion
Some sort of distinction between language and speech
of speech presents the linguist with
1H5UP1
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is that there is really no such thing as speech, it is rather 
an aggregation of separate entities that fall apart whenever 
they are lifted up for examination. Analysis of speech, then, 
is not the beginning of linguistics; this is rather, the other 
side of de Saussure's coin, language.
Language is purely social; it "is not complete in any 
speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity" (de 
Saussure, 1959? P» 14-) • No one individual can create or alter 
language; "it [language] exists only by virtue of a sort of 
contract signed by the members of a community" (de Saussure,
1959i P* 14). Language is acquired and conventional. Language 
is learned: "the individual must always serve an apprenticeship
in order to learn the functioning of language; a child assimilates 
it only gradually" (de Saussure, 1959? P« 14). Unlike speech, 
language is self-contained; it is basically a principle of 
classification. Language is independent of speech. If a man 
looses his ability to speak, he may retain his knowledge of 
language and therefore be able to understand others. However, 
without the knowledge of language, the ability to speak could 
never be acquired. De Saussure summarizes the differences this 
way:
In separating language from speaking we are at 
the same time separating: (1) what is social
from what is individual; and (2) what is essential 
from what is accessory and more or less accidental. 
Language is not a function of the speaker; it is 
a product that is passively assimilated by the 
individual. It never requires premeditation, 
and reflection enters in only for the purpose of 
classification. . . . Speaking, on the con­
trary, is an individual act. It is wilful and 
intellectual. (de Saussure, 1959? P* 14).
Ullmann (Ullmann, 1962, p. 26) distils de Saussure's opposition 
between language and speech into two trends, that between actual
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and potential, and between individual and social. Language is 
everything people can say, speech is what people are saying now. 
Language is an entire code, speech is the encoding of a particular 
message. Ullmann's suggestion that language expresses the 
potential of actual speech is so close to Wittgenstein's concept 
of logic, that the temptation to put de Saussure's idea into 
Wittgenstein's terms is irresistable. Language then expresses 
the order of possibilities of speech. It is the logic of speech. 
Other similarities support this equation. For de Saussure, 
language resists temporal change whereas speech is ephemeral.
And for Wittgenstein lpgic is atemporal whereas the events of 
the world are transient. Furthermore, it is in relation to 
language that de Saussure develops the concept of structure. 
Interestingly enough, he, like Wittgenstein uses the game of 
chess as an example. His discussion has striking resemblances 
to Wittgenstein's analysis of the rules of chess:
Take a knight, for instance. By itself is it 
an element in the game? Certainly not, for by 
its material make-up - outside its square and 
the other conditions of the game - it means 
nothing to the player; it becomes a real concrete 
element only when endowed with value and wedded 
to it. Suppose that the piece happens to be 
destroyed or lost during a game. Can it be 
replaced by an equivalent piece? Certainly.
Not only another knight but even a figure shorn 
of any resemblance to a knight can be declared 
identical provided the same value is attributed 
to it. (de Saussure, 1958, p. 110).
Thus, the container again defines what is contained. De Saussure 
is the father of structural linguistics, but, as indicated 
earlier, Wittgenstein's whole philosophy clarifies and in a way
the language and speech problem. The distinction between 
society and the individual intrinsic fie de Saussure's discussion
%
"structuralism" per se. This, then, takes care of
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of language and speech is a different problem entirely and need 
not be mentioned now. The critical ’matter at the moment is to 
see how de Saussure's thoughts re-order Wittgenstein's discussion 
of rules.
Gilbert Ryle, in a very elucidating article in Parkin­
son's book, correlates de Saussure with Wittgenstein. Ryle's 
idea of language is roughly equivalent to de Saussure's, even 
though his acquaintance with the idea comes, not from de Saussure 
himself, but from Sir Alan H. Gardiner's The Theory of Speech and 
Language. Whatever his intellectual antecedents, though, Ryle 
finds several interesting metaphors for the old idea and from 
there develops it in his own way:
A Language, such as the French language, is a 
stock, fund or deposit of words, constructions, 
intonations, cliche phrases and so on. 'Speech' 
on the other hand, or 'discourse' can be conscripted 
to denote the activity or that the clan of 
activities of saying things, saying them in 
French, it may be, or English or some other 
language. A stock of language-pieces is not 
a lot of activities, but the fairly lasting 
wherewithal to conduct them; somewhat as a 
stock of coins is not a momentary transaction 
or set of mementary transactions of buying, 
lending, investing, etc., but is the lasting 
wherewithal to conduct such transactions.
Roughly, as Capital stands to Trade, so Language 
stands to Speech. (Ryle, "Use, Usage and Meaning" 
in Parkinson (ed.), 1968, p. 109).
From this passage, it may be seen that Ryle is primarily inter­
ested in language as the potential for speech. This is of 
course nothing remarkable. So far what Ryle says only reiterates 
what others have said before. His ideas are novel, however, in 
that he argues that language and speech are governed by funda­
mentally different kinds of rules. In order to show this, he 
first argues that mistakes of language are not all like the 
mistakes of speech:
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The reproof 'You cannot say that and speak good 
French' is generically different from the reproof 
'You cannot say that without absurdity'. The 
latter is not a comment on the quality of the 
speaker's French, since it could be true though 
the speaker had spoken in flawless French, or 
had not been speaking in French at all, but in 
English or Greek instead. The comment, if true, 
would be true of what was said whatever language 
it was said in, and whether it was said in bar­
barous or impeccable French or English. A mis­
pronunciation or a wrong gender may be a bit 
of faulty French, but a self-contradiction is 
not a fault-in-French. Cicero's non sequiturs 
were not lapses from good Latin into bad Latin.
His carelessness or incompetence was not linguistic 
carelessness or incompetence, if we tether the 
adjective 'linguistic' to the noun 'Language' 
as this is here being contrasted with 'Speech'. 
(Gilbert Ryle, "Use, Usage and Meaning" in 
Farkinson, 19^5? p» 112).
Ryle's thought is especially prone to a Wittgensteinian inter­
pretation. V/hat he says is only convincing if the premise that 
language is the potential for speech is granted. And, as 
mentioned earlier, this contention is most clearly expressed 
by demonstrating its congruence with Wittgenstein's view of 
logic. Logic, remember, is the order of possibilities. In 
accord with this view of logic, language may be seen as a set 
of words and the legitimate rules for their combination. Every 
speaker has access to the same language, or since few speakers 
are true masters of the language, or to parts of the same 
language. Speech is a selection from this pool. Ryle's point 
is simply that sometimes a speaker might look in the pool, find 
words and rules and then make a blunder. "He had took the book 
away*: what is wrong with this sentence is a solicism, there
is a misuse of language, that is, a standard rule is broken.
But nevertheless the meaning of the sentence is undistorted. 
Compare this with "bookish apples are often petulant in the 
afternoon". Here, the words and the rules are in perfect order,
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but the sentence is patent nonsense. This is, of course, the
• *•
same phenomenon responsible for Wittgenstein's concept of
"logical syntax" and of Chomsky's "deep syntaxtical structures".
They both try to explain the nature of nonsense. what Ryle does
is to correlate the idea of "logical syntax" with the division
of speech and language. Ryle makes the point quite explicit:
A so-called Rule of Logical Syntax is what a 
nonsensical dictum is in breach of. [and he 
goes on] The Rules of Logical Syntax, 
belong not to a Language or to Languages, but
to Speech. A person who says something sense­
less or illogical betrays not ignorance but 
silliness, muddle-headedness, or in some of 
the interesting cases, over-cleverness. We 
find fault not with his schooling in years gone 
by but with thinking here and now. (Ryle,
"Use, Usage and Meaning", in Parkinson (ed.),
1965, p. 115).
So the correlation is made, language is governed by the conven­
tional rules of grammar, and speech is governed by the rules of 
logical syntax. The importance of this is its bearing on the
nature of rules. Wittgenstein was earlier criticised for
arguing that rules are like rails, they ordain. The point is 
this: if Wittgenstein were only talking about speech then what
he says would be more cogent. The rules of logical syntax do 
not ordain, but they come much closer to doing so than do the 
rules of language. Since he does not say otherwise, it must be 
concluded that Wittgenstein is talking leither about language, 
nor about speech, but about the aggregation of the two that de 
Saussure rejects as unwieldy. What Wittgenstein says is still 
wrong, of course; the distinction between language and speech 
does not rectify his mistakes, but it is helpful to know how 
such a distinction partially unscrambles the jumble of linguistic 
examples in the Philosophical Investigations. But the division 
between language and speech has a greater impact on Wittgenstein's
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theory of meaning than to give one more sympathy with his 
mistakes.
Before outlining the more important ramifications of 
the language/speech dichotomy, it must be stressed that Ryle 
and de Saussure agree on the essential point that language is 
primary to speech. Upon consideration, this is very obvious. 
Without knowledge of a language's grammar, one could say nothing, 
sensical or nonsensical. As Ryle puts it: "The rules of Latin
syntax are part of what we must learn if we are to be able to 
produce or construe Latin dicta. They are parts of the equipment 
to be employed by someone if he is to say either sensible or 
silly things in decent Latin" (Ryle, in Parkinson, 1965, p.
115)• That language is more important than speech is an inter­
esting parallel to the way Wittgenstein makes the picture primary 
to statements about or knowledge of the world. Like a picture, 
language makes no statements about the world. Also like a 
picture, language embodies the potential for making statements. 
Likewise truth and falsity or sense and nonsense of the statements 
derived from either system of potentialities bears no reflection 
on them. One could not say that the pattern Noun-verb-adverb- 
preposition-direct object is true or false. Language is a 
system of elements and rules, as are pictures. It is impossible 
to think of one without the other.
By way of summary, here are the significant differences 
between language and speech. Some of these differences have 
not been exhaustively treated here, but will soon be granted 
fuller treatment. Language is a body of knowledge, which 
constitutes the potential to speak; speech is the actualization 
of language. Language is social, no individual knows all the
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language, there is differential access to it, and everybody 
who speaks intelligibly knows some of it; speech is individual; 
in his speech every person makes an individual selection from 
the possibilities of language. Language is resistant to change, 
no one person being able to change it by fiat; speech is highly 
subject to change, there are trends in speech of short duration; 
twenty years ago people called "the cat's pajamaV^ what someone 
today might dub "really cool man". Language is governed by the 
rules of grammar, which are conventional; speech is first of all 
prescribed by the rules of language and secondly subject to the 
rules of logical syntax which reflect its articulation to the 
structure of the world. Being conventional, language is inde­
pendent of the world. A final thought is that the division 
between language and speech is reflected in the everyday usage 
of English. One does not say of the "Gettesburg Address" that 
it is Lincoln's finest language. Rather, one says that it is 
a speech and its excellence shows his command of language.
The discussion of language and speech suggests another 
division of verbal phenomena which is much more relevant to the 
problems of social structure, that between factual and conven­
tional discourse. Everything that Wittgenstein says about the 
problem of meaning is an attempt to define and understand factual 
discourse. Hence, his preoccupation with truth and the resultant 
development of verifiability. "Fact" here is, of course, being 
used in a way that is consistent with the Tractatus. Facts are 
produced by confirmation of propositions about the world which 
are derived from pictures. The "world" is the totality of known 
facts. One can think about states-of-affairs that are not facts, 
but, in Vittgenstein's scheme, when one speaks of "knowledge",
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one is referring to facts, states-of-affairs that are actually 
the case. Thus, the alternatives are to speak of facts, factual 
discourse, or to speak of states-of-affairs that are not facts. 
The latter arrangement of speech, I suggest, should be called 
"conventional discourse". Wittgenstein is concerned with the 
non-factual side of linguistic phenomena. In the Tractatus, he 
clearly sets out to define the limits of factual discourse, to 
put borders on what may and may not be said. In his treatment, 
factual discourse becomes coextensive with the language of 
science. Following from this, Wittgenstein argues that what 
can be known is equivalent to the sum of all the propositions 
of natural science. Beyond natural science, one knows nothing; 
about which one knows nothing, one may not think; where there is 
no thought there can be no speech; and, finally, the concluding 
statement of the Tractatus: "What we cannot speak about we must
pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein, 1921, #-7)» Part of the 
beauty of the Tractatus Logico-Fhilosophicus, is that the aim 
of its author is so clearly laid out and so rigidly adhered to. 
Wittgenstein is often criticised for not saying more about the 
non-factual side of discourse, but since this was not his aim 
at all, he can hardly be held culpable for its omission. Bear 
in mind, then, that scientific discourse includes only a small 
fraction of linguistic phenomena, and that Wittgenstein’s theory 
of meaning refers exclusively to this small part of the whole.
Now, the glaring problem is this. The question of 
the meaning of words in the vocabulary of social structure is 
obviously not susceptible to any solution that is solely concerned 
with scientific discourse. It is inconceivable that the state­
ments of this realm of discourse are verifiable in the same way
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as are those pertaining to Wittgenstein’s "facts". "Is she an 
adultress?" is of a different order than "Is that book Red?".
The latter question is articulated to the physical world and 
is answered on the basis of sensory experience. The former is 
not articulated to the physical world and sensory experiences 
are of no help in answering it. But precisely here is the 
puzzle of this thesis. Questions of this form are answered.
How is this possible? At last it is possible to give an answer 
to this question.
Suffice it to say for the moment that statements of 
the form "she is an adultress" are part of the realm of conven­
tional discourse. The problem now becomes, what is conventional 
discourse? How does it differ from factual discourse? What 
semantic principles operate in this non-scientific domain? Only 
by solving these quandaries can the more specific ones about the 
meaning of the vocabularies of social structure be considered.
The only difference between conventional and factual 
discourse is that conventional discourse is neither true nor 
false. It makes no sense to say that statements in the conven­
tional realm are true in the sense that the word can never be 
correlated with its object. Here is Just the difficulty: there
is no object. Conventional discourse floats free of the world. 
To verify the assertion "he is married" one must first of all 
know what country "he" lives in and what people in that country 
think about marriage. Or, to put it another way, one must know 
what the conventions are that deal with marriage. Knowing the 
convention, then, one could compare the history of the person 
concerned to see whether he had committed those actions deemed 
necessary by the convention for him to be married. The nature
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of a convention is obvious from the word itself. A convention 
is an agreement. Only people make agreements. Agreements are 
often broken; they are easily changed. 'Thus, conventions are 
human creations; words that have conventional meaning are arti­
ficial in a way that is different from other words. "Dog” is a 
human creation in so far as the same object can just as easily 
be called "Hund", but the artificiality only extends to the 
name. In conventional discourse the thing itself is artificial; 
it is created and dispelled by human contract. A criminal may 
be called by some other name, MVerbrecherM for example, but also 
what is "criminal” today may not be "criminal" tomorrow. The 
world itself changes at man's whim: this is the oddity of con­
ventional discourse. Or, to reverse Wittgenstein's proposition, 
the conventional world does depend on man's will: note, "man's
will" not mine, and not yours. You nor I can change conventions.
Statements made in the conventional domain are precisely 
those about which Wittgenstein advises us to be silent. Yet 
conventional discourse is a remarkably large part of what people 
do with speech. And, people persist in using conventional dis­
course these fifty-one years since the publication of the 
Tractatus Logico-Fhilosophicus. What then are the semantic 
principles of this segment of discourse? Oddly enough, Wittgen­
stein himself gives the answer to this, albeit by a serpentine 
route.
Through much comparison of African customary law cases 
and reading of semantic philosophy, I am convinced that the 
theory of meaning most applicable to courtroom ratiocination 
is Wittgenstein's picture theory. How can this be so if it is
expressed as the pattern of factual discourse only? The answer
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to this is simple. People think about conventional things as 
if they were physical things. Conventional discourse operates 
as if it were factual discourse. The two are very different, 
but that people often loose sight of the artfulness of their 
own agreements is a common human foible and belies the fact that 
conventional discourse is usually thought to be factual. Even 
in the age of reason, constitution-builders did not appreciate 
this fact. The theory of "natural law" has gone hand in hand 
with the theory of "social contract" for precisely this reason, 
(see the "Introduction" by Sir Ernest Barker in Social Contract: 
Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, London: Oxford University
Press, 1947)- Even in the act of drawing the convention, men 
could not take full responsibility for their deeds. "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident" says Jefferson, not, "we have 
decided that things would run more smoothly if such and such 
were the case". Even Marx does not argue that artificially 
conceived institutions are wrong, but that those who formed 
them did not know the facts. And this is still the great temp­
tation of Marxism, that it is scientific, that it discourses on 
factual matters. That this would be the case, that the semantic 
principles of factual and conventional discourse are the same, 
is indicated in the Tractatus. The structure of language, says 
7/ittgenstein, reduplicates the structure of the world. Thus, 
the order of the world generates the order of language. And 
this applies to all language being opposed to all speech. 
Remember that all speech (discourse) is an epiphenomenon of 
language, so that once the order of the world is duplicated by 
language, all speech will partake of the same structure. Thus, 
it is inevitable that factual and conventional speech are built
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on the same semantic principles. To prove this one really need 
only say that they are speech, all else follows from the nature 
of the language/speech division. The conclusion may thus be 
drawn that Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning in the form 
it is given here is the theory of meaning. It is in the light 
of this theory that thought about social roles must grow.
At the end of Chapter Two the conclusion was reached 
that the nature of social roles should be discovered by concen­
trating on them as words. Nadel's theory of social structure 
provided the clue for this being the case, but The Theory of 
Social Structure itself does not contain the promised theory of 
meaning. In this chapter, it is argued that there is an incip­
ient semantic theory in Nadel’s work and that it is of the type 
developed first by Ogden and Richards and later by Bertrand 
Russell. These views were examined and found wanting. Their 
several deficiences were traced back to several mistakes either 
founded on falsely placed enthusiasm for behaviourism or on a 
misreading, characteristic of the times, of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus Logico-Fhilosophicus. Beginning with that work, 
Wittgenstein's philosophy is seen as a whole. After some quali­
fication Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is accepted. 
What does this portend for the theory of social structure 
advocated by Nadel and largely accepted in the second chapter?
First of all, remember that "meaning" is an ambiguous 
word, and that the particular usage of the word most relevant to 
the theory of social structure is the one for which "interpre­
tation" may be substituted. How then is Wittgenstein's picture 
theory of meaning an account of interpretation? The interpre­
tation of a word is its picture. The picture of a word shows
194-
every possible way a word can be understood. The total of all 
these possibilities is the meaning, or interpretation of a word. 
Sentences form pictures as well. The picture of a word is an 
expression of its possibilities. A certain sub-set of the 
possibilities are incorporated into a sentence. Without seeing 
the word used in a sentence, it is not clear which of its 
possibilities are being realized. The process of interpretation 
is to see a word in a sentence and to wonder about its other 
possibilities. By studying many different uses of the word, 
one sees its picture. The picture may be written down as the 
rules of usage, Just as a scale is represented by a key-signature. 
These rules govern, not ordain, the ways the word may be intel­
ligible, i.e., its uses. The picture is an aspect of language, 
not of speech. All discourse is derived from pictures, both 
factual and conventional. Without pictures there would be no 
thought. It should, thus, be obvious how pictures interpret 
past events. Any history is verbal; the past only exists as a 
story. The words of the story are understood only with pictures.
If Judgement must be made between varying accounts of a history,
the
pictures will be invoked to see which is/correct, that is. the
i
only possible, meaning. This is the way customary law Judges 
are able to draw conclusions on verbal accounts alone. This is 
how the vocabulary of a social structure expresses the logic of 
customary law. Also, to follow up a metaphor used earlier, 
pictures are the bees buzzing in the bonnets of customary law 
Judges.
The second aspect of role names is that they are used 
as a basis for expectation or prediction of the future. The
picture theory of meaning accounts for this property of social
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roles more eloquently than any other theory of meaning. Knowledge 
of the picture governing a word is knowledge of every possible 
way the word could be used. This, as V/ittgenstein says, makes 
a claim against all possible worlds. Only the uses prescribed 
by the picture are possible. Knowing what is possible amounts
to knowledge that certain things will never happen. In this way
/ * /
a word shows what the future may bring concerning its own use. 
For example, imagine a society where there is sibling rivalry.
If, in a particular case, one brother closes his camp to another, 
the anthropologist may say that this was caused by the presence 
of an etherial property most likely based on the rules of inheri­
tance called "sibling rivalry". This, however, is erroneous. 
Remember Wittgenstein's support of Hume's thesis: belief in
the causal nexus is superstition; if B always follows A then it 
is not correct to say that A causes B, but that A and B are the 
same proposition. Hence, in this example, one should take the 
word "brother" and see that in the conventional formulation of 
its picture there is the possibility of sibling rivalry, that 
this is part of the logic of the word itself. Rivalry, then, is 
an intrinsic part of brotherhood in this imaginary society and 
it is inaccurate to speak of cause. This sort of analysis is 
tautological. A word and its picture are the same thing.
Defining a word in this way is to make an analytic proposition, 
in Kantian terms. In effect, it is saying 10 = 6 + 4, which is 
saying no more than 10 = 10. But while analytic propositions 
are tautologies, it is still possible to learn a great deal irom 
them. Analytic propositions, of the kind advocated here in 
relation to defining words, constitute a special sort of expla­
nation, called by Gilbert Ryle the dispositional explanation.
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This is, in turn, linked to a particular understanding of what 
anthropological explanation should be like.
Ryle's example of "dispositions" is really quite 
simple. Imagine a pane of glass; somebody picks up a stone and 
throws it against the pane; the glass shatters. Now, according 
to Ryle, there are two ways of explaining this. First one may 
say that the glass broke because so and so smashed it with a 
rock. Or, secondly, one can say that the pane broke because it 
is brittle. The first is an "episodic" explanation, that is, 
the glass broke because it is part of an episode beginning with 
the hurling of the stone, the lifting of the arm that threw, the 
beginning of the decision to destroy the glass, and so on in an 
infinite regress. The second is a "dispositional" explanation.
In this case, the pane is said to break because of its nature; 
glass is brittle and therefore disposed to break when heavy 
objects hit it. Ryle emphasises that both kinds of explanation 
are valid, but that they do very different things. Episodic 
explanations are perforce historical; they can only explain the 
present with reference to the past. Dispositional explanations 
are, if known before the fact, predictions about the future.
One can never predict when a rock will happen to strike a brittle 
pane. But one can accurately say that because a particular pane 
is brittle, if it is struck by an object with sufficient force, 
then it will break. The advantage of a dispositional explanation 
is that it enables one not to know how a particular event 
happened, but to know why a general event will happen. It should 
also be seen that an elaboration of the dispositional properties 
is tautological. Saying that glass is brittle or banana skins
slippery is like saying ten is msde up of five and five. If
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one has even an elementary knowledge of these things, one would 
say Mbut of course that is so, what is the point of telling me 
that". Such statements are only interesting to those who know 
nothing of the thing in question. But in crude terms, this is 
an anthropologist's situation.
In this sense a picture, too, is a tautology; it and 
the word are the same. In so far as a tautology reveals dis­
positional properties, it shows the order of possibilities, the 
logic, of whatever it refers to. Thus, pictures summarize the 
dispositional properties of a word. And this shows how they 
govern expectations about the future. "Expectation" is a better 
word than "prediction" here, because it carries less force, and 
is therefore more consonant with the principle that rules govern, 
not ordain. To say "as a rule so and so smokes" or "so and so 
is disposed to smoke" does not bind one to saying that "so and 
so is smoking now". Or, if someone sees me smoking and says 
"but I did not know you smoked" I might say, "but as a rule I 
do not". This is what rules, and pictures are rules, are all 
about; they do not determine the future, they are but rough 
guides to it. This is how social role names cause expectation 
about other people and what they will do. Finally, emphasis on 
dispositional properties is equivalent to what Ardener calls 
the "program" (Ardener, 1971 > P- 4-56). This thesis thus shadows 
his conclusion that in the "primacy of the program" lies the 
correct view of anthropology.
These, then, are the solutions to the problems of how 
role names furnish interpretations and stimulate expectations. 
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning forces a major change in Nadel's 
theory of social roles. Once again consider Nadel's formula for
198
a general role, « ^ p ,  a, b. . . 1/m/n. The main
expression of the formula is that perception of a pivotal aspect 
triggers the rest of the role, or, more accurately that the role 
itself is inferred from the pivotal aspect. This is the part of 
ITadel's theory most influenced by the Ogden and Richards "con­
textual reference theory", or some other brand of the same thing. 
In short, what happens, is that an event in the world, p, occurs 
and when perceived rather mechanically causes all knowledge bound 
to a particular role name to emerge. Ogden and Richards' theory 
will just not do; it has already been criticised enough to 
obviate a new discussion of its merits. As Ogden and Richard's 
behaviouristic theory of meaning is shown the door, the idea of 
cause goes with it. "Belief in the causal nexus is superstition", 
says Wittgenstein, and though superstition is not as daunting to 
anthropologists as to philosophers, in this case it is best to 
adhere to the philosopher's solution, for, we are after all dis­
cussing his problem. Without 0g3en and Richards, Nadel's theory 
is left contending that one event is an inference ticket to the 
role. Cnee again, Nadel is right without being lucidly so.
Nadel's description of the process is right, but his account of 
the mechanism behind it, leaning on behaviourism, is not very 
strong, Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning gives a more 
satisfying answer to the problem of inference.
For Nadel, the pivotal aspect of a role is the basis 
for making an inductive inference. It is, in effect, a hypo­
thesis that if p appears then a, b. . . etc. will follow.
The only reason for believing this to be the case is experience.
It is like Ogden and Richards' "engram", sin accretion of episodes 
which lead to expectations. Strict adherence to the realities
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of life in society does not confirm this, however. Social life 
is seldom regular enough to permit every individual to learn so 
much. Just as language is not learned by practicing scientific 
inquiry, neither are social role systems. They are learned and 
taught in toto. In the brief course of a lifetime, one may know 
a few people well enough to be able to make inductive inferences 
about their actions, but this is not learning their roles, it is 
getting to know them. Idiosyncracies are not roles.
A new look at the events described in Nadel's formula 
will show exactly why Wittgenstein is right. First of all, there 
is an event. This event means nothing by itself. Before it has 
meaning it must be interpreted. The event appears and fades 
away; it becomes a history. It is interpreted by a picture.
Once it is interpreted it may point to various other configura­
tions, but before this, comes the intervention of the picture.
The mind is like a filing cabinet full of pictures, some are 
more abstract than others, some are more common than others.
The point is this: in the gap between the pivotal aspect and
the role in Nadel's formula falls the picture. In a simple 
situation, the pivotal aspect would bersomething represented by 
a word, or a simple sentence. That simple picture may be com­
bined logically with only a certain number of other simple 
pictures. Role names are complex pictures, but still they are 
pictures, they order the possibilities of what the thing itself 
might be.
One other point is obvious. All thought about social 
roles begins with interpretation of past events. If there is a 
projection from a past event to the future, this is not done by 
the event alone, but equally by the method of projection.
200
Existing as an abstract arrangement of possibilities, the 
knowledge of social roles is a means of projection. What is 
projected is not a new course of events, but a new arrangement 
of possibilities. Thus, expectations, too, are interpretations; 
they are never predictions. Rules govern they do not ordain.
An expectation based on a past event is not an inductive infer­
ence, it is rather a deductive inference. From established con­
ventions one deduces the meaning of the relevant word; the word 
has certain possibilities and no others, these possibilities 
are the expectation.
Finally this rather convoluted discussion comes to its 
object. Social roles are words, as Nadel indicates. They are 
part of language, as opposed to speech. Roles are potential, 
not active; they are social, not individual. Roles are pictures, 
showing possible states-of-affairs. The same picture is used 
to make interpretations and expectations; both of these come 
about by deductive inference. Furthermore, roles are rules; as 
such they govern but do not ordain. Nevertheless, they always 
govern meaning. Concrete examples of this theory of social 
roles are not given here, since the final chapter of the thesis 
is composed solely of illustrations taken from the literature on 
African customary law.
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CHAPTER III 
PART 2
$
SOLIPSISM AND SOCIETY
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Palls the Shadow
T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men"
All theories of social roles have one peculiarity.
They see society from the view point of an individual person.
The only account of similarity between individuals offered by 
role theories is that many individuals occupy one role either 
simultaneously or through time. This is the problem social role 
theories are designed to solve, hut there are others and they 
are equally pressing. The real problem for social role theories 
is to explain socialization and communication. How do people 
understand each other: Do people mean the same thing by the
same word? Can one know the mind of another? These questions 
are perplexing. But on the basis of the role theory outlined 
above, an answer is clear. It is quite simply the idea of society 
as first developed by Durkheim.
Durkheim's first attempt to define the concept of 
society is in The Division of Labour in Society. This book has 
i^ich to say about many things, but all in one way or another 
hinge around the concept of society. Durkheim's expression here 
is notoriously vague: "Social life comes from a double source,
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the likeness of consciences and the division of social labour.
The individual is socialized in the first case, because, not 
having any real individuality, he becomes, with those whom he 
resembles, part of the same collective type” ; (Durkheim, 1933? 
p. 226). His discussion of the division of labour is not as
germane to our problems as his treatment of society. Signifi­
cantly, Durkheim relates his account of society to the nature 
of law: "The similitude of consciences gives rise to juridicial
rules. . ." (Durkheim, 1933* P* 226). Suggestive as these
remarks are, they are hopelessly etherial. Durkheim never says 
what this conscience consists of. His translator in fact affirms 
that his use of the word nconscience" is strangely similar to 
"subconscious" as that word is used in psychoanalysis. There 
is a reason for this, but Durkheim misses the point. Thus, 
while at first glance, Durkheim's idea of society in his earliest 
book seems promising, it is at best only an undefined hypostati-
zation and at worst a chimera.
Even in his own day, Durkheim's critics realized that 
this mystical treatment of society is inadequate. Through per­
sistent attacks, they hounded him into an attempt to clarify the 
concept. The Rules of Sociological Method is Durkheim's second 
attempt to explain what the concept of society is all about. As 
such, it is a great improvement over The Division of Labor in 
Society. Durkheim argues that the essence of society is found 
in what he calls "social facts". "Social facts" have two 
characteristics (Durkehim, 1938* P* 13)• First, they are inde­
pendent of individuals. This means that they exist before 
individuals. A certain concept of "son" existed before I was 
born; it is therefore a social fact. Secondly, social facts
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exert a constraint upon the individual. This aspect of social 
facts usually either refers to socialization or to crimes. In 
either case, "social facts" constrain or compel.' the individual. 
Now, helpful as these stipulations are, they nevertheless do 
not say what "social facts", or by implication society, are. 
Durkheim acts as if he is describing the centre of mass of the 
solar system when, in fact, he is describing a stone. Durkheim 
sees society from a distance and through many clouds. One who 
followed him sees this phenomenon clearly and describes it in 
precise detail. The influence of this man’s thought is already 
found in the preceeding discussion of semantics. Ferdenand de 
Saussure is the link between the theory of meaning and the theory 
of society. All social facts are linguistic and language is the 
only social fact.
would fit Durkheim's description of "social facts" is language. 
The division between language and speech is the division between 
society and the individual. This is really very obvious when
; the only way a person has knowledge of what
external to an individual, is to be told. To risk making the 
point too often: knowledge of the past is only possible through
storage in language. An infant is not socialized at the same 
time as he learns the language, learning the language is socia­
lization. Any social activity is impossible without language. 
The point could be made over and over again, but need not be. 
Social roles are names and the society is the language; they 
are not two things identical, they are one thing. This is the
view of society implied by the theory of social roles based on
De Saussure notices that the only concrete entity that
and this is the essence of anything being
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the semantic aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Emphasising 
the priority of language makes lucid Durkheim's ideas of society 
which has been tempting, and haunting, thinkers for nearly 
ninety years. Awareness of this extension of the Durheimian 
tradition into Linguistics is seemingly widespread in France 
where the sources are more accessible, Roland Barthes remarks 
on this in a rather offhand way: "The manifest affinity of the
language according to Saussure and of Durkheim's conception of 
a collective consciousness independent of its individual mani­
festations has been emphasised very early on. A direct influence 
of Durkheim on Saussure has even been postulated. . . "
(Roland Barthes, 19^7» P- 23)- It is remarkable that in British 
social anthropology where Durkheim's influence has been so strong 
the tradition growing out of his work should be ignored. This 
lamentable state of affairs should now be remedied.
Pointing a finger toward language, however, only solves 
part of the problem. As mentioned earlier, language is an 
abstraction that is related to individuals. In society, separate 
people act in common and sometimes in harmony. How does the 
relation between language and individual speakers permit this?
A nice metaphor for the relation of the individual to language 
and society is found in Leibniz's metaphysics. Here, Leibniz 
is concerned with two problems both of which have a bearing on 
the questions posed above. He is primarily interested in the 
relation of parts to a whole and also of the harmony of different 
representations of one category. Leibniz's thought is more 
abstract than any so far considered; he is puzzled by the 
relation of any part to any whole and of all harmony. Our
problem is not this ambitious and so to adopt Leibniz's general
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approach is not to pass final Judgement on his metaphysics. But 
for these parts of this whole, his ideas are wonderfully illu­
minating and remarkably similar to Wittgenstein's own. Or, to 
get the chronological order straingt, Wittgenstein's philosophy 
of language parallels Leibniz's metaphysic without embracing 
its final solution. A further extension of the parallel is thus 
appropriate. It is not as outlandish as it may seem to embrace 
Leibniz's metaphyics on one point and reject it on others. In 
an essay that is overwhelmingly hostile to the Monadology, Russell 
concludes that it is still "useful in relating perception to 
physics" (B. Russell, 1946, p. 576). What Russell does for 
physics it is surely permissable to do for linguistics and social 
theory.
The point of similarity between the two philosophers 
is in their treatment of parts. As the senior of the two,
Leibniz is discussed first. The parts in Leibniz's scheme are 
called "monads". Monads are like particles; they are discrete 
and are not affected by any other monads. Monads are windowless, 
that is, there is no connection or communication between them. 
Monads are part of a whole, the universe. They are like mirrors 
that all reflect the same reality. In this reflecting lies the 
unity and harmony of the universe.
Wittgenstein's philosophy is about language, not the 
nature of the universe, but it nonetheless has an equivalent of 
Leibniz's monads. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein asserts that 
solipcism is the only realistic philosophy. Solipcism is the 
doctrine that the self can know nothing but itself. From this 
it follows that communication between people is impossible.
^ven ..ittgenstein' s strongest advocates chafe at swallowing or
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even apologizing for his solipcistic position. But that he 
does not provide the answer in the Tractatus does not mean he 
is wrong. I want to suggest now that Wittgenstein, once again,
cation. One's knowledge of other people's minds is virtually 
nil. Life is too full of misunderstanding, deceit, and misery 
for anyone to imagine that communication is anything but imper­
fect. In one sense at least, the sense that Wittgenstein is
or, to follow Eliot's image, life is infested with Shadows.
But like the windowless monads, there is often harmony and what 
passes for communication in even this solipcistic world. This 
is possible because people, like monads, refelct a supraindividual 
reality. Wittgenstein does not use the reflection metaphor 
himself, but I think it shows the point of his argument. As a 
clue to understanding Wittgenstein's solipsism, first look at 
Latta's account of Leibniz on parts and wholes:
Thus the parts are not determined or character­
ized without reference to the whole, and the 
whole is not a mere vague aggregate of independent 
parts. In some sense each part must contain 
the whole within itself, each unit must include 
an infinite manifold. The whole stands not 
merely in a mechanical but in a dynamic relation 
to the part. The whole is not merely other than 
the part, but in some way passes into it and expres­
ses itself through it. (p. 31)
The part must, therefore, contain the whole 
potentially and ideally or by means of represen­
tation. The relation of whole and parts is not 
to be conceived as one of greater and less, of 
thing containing and things contained, but rather 
as a relation of symbolized and symbols, sign 
and thing signified. (Leibniz, 1898, pp. 32-33)•
Now compare this with the following propositions from Wittgen­
stein's Tractatus:
is right. account of human communi-
getting at, all people are monads and solipsism reigns supreme,
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2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a
thing can occur in a state of affairs, the 
possibility of the state of affairs must be 
written into the thing itself.
2.0121 If things can occur in states of affairs, 
this possibility must be in them from the beginning.
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its 
possible occurrences in states of affairs,
(Every one of these possibilities must be part 
of the nature of the object.)
A new possibility cannot be discovered later.
What is so interesting about Wittgenstein's passage is the way
that objects contain their own possibilities. Objects are like
particles in Leibniz's system, that is, the possibilities are
"written into the thing itself" and this""must be in them from
the beginning". In just this way, Leibniz's whole passes into
and expresses itself through the parts. Wittgenstein's idea
that the object contains all its own possibilities at any given
time is again congruent to Leibniz's idea that "the part must,
therefore, contain the whole potentially and ideally or by means
of representation". Nor is there much difference between the
wholes that each system of parts reflects: for Leibniz it is the
Universe, for Wittgenstein it is the "form of the world" that
is displayed in language and therefore our conception of objects.
But similarities on the metaphysical level do not solve the
quandary of how communication can be reconciled to solipcism.
This is exactly the point on which Leibniz's explication
clarifies Wittgenstein's doctrine.
Remember that the windowless monads cannot influence
one another, and that there is absolutely no communication
between them. This does not hinder Leibniz's explanation of
harmony in the universe however:
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Though no true substance can really act upon 
another, everything in the universe takes place 
as if this mutual interaction were real. Sub­
stances form a system, not of physical relations, 
but of harmony or mutual compatibility. (p. 41)
One Monad influences another ideally, that is 
to say, not abextra, but through an inner pre- 
established conformity1'. (p. 42)
A.nd later: "But in simple substances the influ­
ence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, 
and it can have its effect only through the 
mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of 
God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regu­
lating the others from the beginning of things, 
should have regard to it. For since one created
Monad cannot have any physical influence upon
the inner being of another, it is only by this
means that the one can be dependent upon the 
other. (Leibniz, 1898, p. 246)
Harmony for Leibniz, then, is not brought about by communication, 
but by something that seems like communication. The monads move 
in mutual accord, but this is caused not by some pact among the
monads, but by the mediation of God, the force reflected in each
monad, and it is God that is contained ideally and potentially 
in every monad.
Now, Leibniz's vocabulary is somewhat dated, but the 
structure of his system is totally applicable to the solipcism 
of individuals and the harmony of social intercourse. Naturally, 
the isolation of individuals is not as complete as that of monads 
and the harmony of social life is not as extreme as that of 
Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds" but in the descent to 
physics from metaphysics this corruption is expected. Just as 
the semblance of communication between two monads depends on 
their common articulation to God and the universe, the semblance 
of communication between two people depends on their common 
articulation to language, that ideal form contained in each of 
us ideally and potentially. There is no direct knowledge of 
other people's minds, and to tie degree that this is true,
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solipcism is increasingly realistic. But mediating between our 
inapproachable minds is language, the social fact. One person 
activates part of the language existing in him as potential and 
transforms it into speech. Whoever hears and understands this 
will not be drawing back the curtains of the other's mind. He 
will only be seeing speech and he will only understand if that 
speech is intelligible in terms of his own language. The 
language is impersonal, it is not your soul and it is not my 
soul. But without it there would not even seem to be communi­
cation from one to another. It is as if we never saw one another 
directly, but always reflected in a mirror. The mirror is 
language. Is the mirror image in this case a distortion? There 
is no way of knowing. This is essentially the view of language 
Ryle uses in The Concept of Mind to dispell Descartes' fallacious 
division of mind and body. We do not know other people's minds, 
but we know through language what they say. This is why the 
appeal "yes, that may be what I said but it is not what I meant" 
is always ludicrous. Other than what you say, there is no way 
of knowing what you mean. Saying is thinking. Without language 
there wopld be no evidence of thought or of other minds. Thus, 
solipcism reigns supreme in human affairs, but it is patched 
together with language, the common ground of all minds. Without 
language there v/ould be no society: they are one and the same.
Thus, people are like monads and language like Leibniz's 
concept of God or the Universe. This is the way that social 
roles are communicated. -'hat is said here forms the backdrop 
for the episodes described in the next chapter where all of 
these ideas are illustrated and the more anthropological problems 
of customary law in Africa considered.
210
CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND JUDICIAL PROCESS 
PART 1 
BACK TC THE SOGA
At long last the way is clear to return to the original 
problem of this thesis, the case of "Genatio Magino versus 
Yowasi Maliwa". The reasons for obscurity in the original 
presentation should by now be fairly obvious. The thoughts of 
chapter III and a little imagination disperse what earlier seemed 
impenetrable fog. It must be remembered that the method of 
analysis developed in the preceeding chapter is tautological, 
and so what is said here will seem obvious. But, as Wittgenstein 
says, whatever is logical is obvious. And also it is important 
to bear in mind that what is obvious now was not so before.
The expansion of a quadratic equation is obvious to one familiar 
with algebra, but to one not so enlightened its mysteries are 
unfathomable. Since this next discussion is but a projection of 
the method developed earlier it should seem very familiar indeed.
First of all, think of the English glosses of the Soga 
personal nouns seen in "Genatio Magino versus Yowasi Maliwa".
They are: sibling, husband, wife, adulterer, father-in-law, and
mother and daughter. Next, think of the way these words are 
used in the arguments of the various litigants. Yowasi's first 
defense is that he and Matama called each other "sibling-of-the-
opposite-sex". Playing in the understanding that adultry between
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siblings is impossible, Yowasi1s is an attempt to deduce from 
the picture of the sibling relationship the impossibility of 
his guilt.
The second use of the picture of siblingship is in 
Yowasi’s attempt to demonstrate his relationship with Matama by 
claiming that he visited her after her marriage to Genatio. As 
before, his plea is that siblingship Justifies Matama staying in 
his home. The interesting thing here is that the court tries to 
verify this contention. The picture involved here is obvious. 
Brothers are entitled to visit their married sisters, therefore, 
if Yowasi and Matama are siblings, he would have visited her.
The Judge has a picture and holds it up against the world. The 
attempt at verification takes the form of asking Genatio if it 
is true or false. However, as is so often the case in the inter­
pretation of histories in the realm of conventional discourse, 
the world, which is no more than Genatio in this case, equivocates 
The court asks Genatio of Yowasi once visited his home, but they 
conjoin this question with the more basic one whether or not he 
knows if Yowasi is brother to Matama. Genatio avoids the first 
question, denies having knowledge relevant to the second, throwing 
the question instead to Yose Toli. Now, the important thing is 
that Genatio completely ignores the question of Yowasi's visits. 
There are two pictures in operation here. That brothers visit 
married sisters is one picture held up for verification and the 
other is the picture of genealogical descent. Genatio ignores 
the former, the court permits this and thereby establishes the 
primacy of the latter. This could well be the turning point of 
the trial. Here is possibly the exact spot where Yowasi loses 
the case.
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The argument about the genealogical evidence bears on 
the concept of siblingship rather dramatically. It turns out 
that true siblings not only call each other "brother" or "sister", 
there must be a demonstrable genealogical connection as well.
That Yowasi fails to produce this evidence is the main reason 
for his conviction.
The argument centering around Yose Toli and the picture 
"father-in-law" is probably the most instructive. Tose Toli is 
suspected of harbouring Matama, not on the basis of any evidence, 
but on the logical strength of the picture alone. Likewise, 
the picture of "father-in-law" is behind Genatio's interpretation 
of Yowasi's being at Yosi Toli's compound as an attempt to 
negotiate bridewealth. The accusation of "eating two hens" also 
arises from this picture. There is no evidence of bridewealth 
negotiation other than the direction of the picture saying that 
this is the most likely interpretation of the events. The 
picture of "father-in-law" is used by Genatio to put Yose Toli 
in a very weak position. In effect, the court assumes the worst 
about fathers-in-law, or rather, their language leads them to 
expect the worst of fathers-in-law and to interpret their actions 
in a consistently bad light. It is the picture that gives 
Genatio power over Yose Toli and, untimately, it is the picture 
that makes it in his interest to deny acquaintance with Yowasi.
The possibilities of harbouring and eating two hens are draped 
around Yose Toli's neck as inevitably as the ancient mariner's 
albatross, and its effect is far less dramatic. All of Yose 
Toli's statements about the world are designed to extricate 
himself from the all too obvious proclivities in the picture
of his social role. Note that the charges of "harbouring" and
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"eating two hens" are part of the logical formulation of the 
picture of fathers-in-law. These two charges are possibilities 
in the idea of the social role. They form part of the order of 
possibilities, or logic, of the term itself. The logic of the 
term not only decrees that Genatio is in a position of power 
over Yose Toli, it also gives Yose Toli a clear set of choices 
and further lays down the consequences of each alternative.
Given the structure of Soga social life, Yose Toli is the only 
person in the case who has a decision to make; and as he exoner­
ates himself, he convicts Yowasi.
The clarity of Yose Toli's position is thus informative, 
but no less so is its ambiguity. Fallers speculates that Yose 
Toli might bear a grudge against Yowasi. The logic of the term 
father-in-law is enough to explain his actions, but Fallers' 
hunch is interesting and worth pursuing. Yose Toli is the 
divorced husband of Kale, and the cuckold of Kintu. The nature 
of these past deeds gives rise to suspicion about Yose Toli's 
motives in the present case, at least in Fallers' mind. But 
that there seems to be no Soga word for exactly this relationship 
is the reason for the court's discounting the possibility of its 
being a contributing factor. Conversely, that Soga are not 
interested in such relationships is the reason they have no 
term for it.
Yowasi's final defense is again deduced from the 
meanings of ordinary social roles. He argues that because his 
two wives stand in the position of calling Matama "daughter" 
adultry is inconceivable. This claim is also a failure. It is 
Yowasi's final attempt to prove his innocence; with this argument 
he seemingly exhausts the possibilities of the social structure.
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Yowasi1s conviction is, in the final analysis, the 
result of a picture. The court presumes that any man with a 
woman to whom he is neither married nor related is having sex 
with her. Thus, Genatio has to produce no direct evidence that 
illicit relations occured between Matama and Yowasi, he has only 
to show that his wife deserted him and was found with another 
man. This conjunction of events is prima facia conviction. The 
roles "wife" and "man", permit only one interpretation. There 
is no possibility but that adultry took place. Or, in Nadel's 
terms, the situation recruits Yowasi and Matama into their 
respective roles. Ratiocination is concerned with only one 
issue, whether or not Yowasi1s relationship with Matama justifies 
their intimacy. One picture is played against another until the 
court decides which picture is the most important. Finally, in 
this case, the predominant picture is that of an unhappy wife 
and her lover. Guilt is deduced from the conventions attached 
to the vocabulary of social structure. The verdict is not at 
all "fact-minded”. The result of this case can only be understood 
by acknowledging that the words which compose its arguments are 
animated with a certain momentum, or logic, of their own, and 
that this is as important as the circumstances of the episode.
Of course, the logic of the social system is also factual, to 
be!.o precise it is a "social fact", but this is the opposite of 
what Fallers earlier refers to as "fact-minded". It is not the 
"facts", in his restricted sense, but the facts plus their 
principles of interpretation that yields the verdict in this 
sort of customary law case. The pictures that interpret the 
facts direct the court's suspicion, to Yowasi, allocate the 
burden of proof, again to Yowasi, and prompt their questions
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and cross examinations, for example, that Genatio is permitted 
to kill the issue of post-marital visiting. Thus, the logical 
basis of the judge's decision, that ghost of something beyond 
the facts alluded to in the first chapter, turns out to be the 
logic of the social roles, the pictures which interpret them 
and render them meaningful.
This analysis is restricted to an a posteriori view of 
one case. But it must be seen that observation of the word's 
usage in one case leads to the formation of a dispositional 
structure which could predict the outcome of future cases. From 
even a single case there emerges a range of germs and incipient 
rules constituting their disposition. Think of the more dramatic 
ones encountered so far: "siblings" and the rule that adultpy
between them is impossible; "mother" and "daughter" and that 
they never call the same man "husband"; "father-in-law" and the 
ease with which he is suspected of harbouring and eating-two-hens 
and even "man", that his company with women is indicative of a 
sexual relationship. These concepts govern the meaning of every 
case, or episode, of adultly. Obviously though, an analysis 
based on one case is inadequate; but, then, any number of a 
posteriori analyses are bound to be inadequate. A true disposi­
tional model would have to prove itself against the world by 
predicting the outcome of cases yet unheard concerned with 
episodes yet uncommitted. Thus, the limitations to the factual 
side of this thesis are rather severe. This case, and what 
follows must thus be seen as faint illustrations and hints 
regarding future research rather than a conclusive demonstration 
of the arguments presented in the preceding pages.
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PART 2
TH5 REASONABLE MAN UlTMASKED
Having admitted the limitations of an analysis done 
after the fact, it is no less important to see that this sort 
of analysis can throw light on deeply shadowed problems, most 
of which are themselves the outcome of an a posteriori view.
The first problem subjected to the Wittgensteinian view of social 
structure is the old one of the "reasonable man".
While studying the legal institutions of the Barotse 
kingdom in what is now Zambia, Max Gluckman came upon an old 
friend. Gluckman's jubilant cry of welcome, "Hullo, the reason­
able man!" has introduced a long and often tedious debate into 
both law and social anthropology.
Gluckman's study concentrates on the Lozi, the dominant 
tribe of the Barotse kingdom. Barotse courts are arranged in a 
hierarchy, with privilege of appeal granted to litigants whether 
they win or lose. The Lozi word for court is kuta, for judge 
induna, though indunas have powers and duties greater than those 
of English judges. Gluckman studied a middle kuta, cases being 
appealed to it from sub-district kutas with the privilege of 
appeal existing beyound it. Since Gluckman's analysis of Barotse 
court procedure and process is found in separate volumes over a 
period of more than ten years, I will put his central themes in 
what, I suggest, is a logical order.
First, the norms of Lozi society are well known: "Lozi
society is on the whole homogeneous, and customary modes of 
behaviour are widespread, constant, and generally known to all,
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despite tribal and status differences" (Gluckman, 1955* pp»
155-6). Since these norms are well known, they form, from the 
Judges point of view, an effective corpus Juris, or body of law.
Characteristic of all legal rules and of every corpus 
Juris, Lozi norms are ambiguously stated. This imprecision 
serves an adaptive function (Gluckman, 1955i p» 141). As 
society changes, legal institutions are able to incorporate 
these alterations precisely because they are so diffusely stated. 
It is important to realize that Lozi "law" in the sense of norms 
is not written down; Gluckman largely discounts this difference.
There is, furthermore, around every legally significant 
norm, a "range of permissible leeway" and a "range of actively 
protected leeway", as pointed out by Llewellyn and Hoebel 
(Llewellyn and Hoebel, 1941, p. 23>). In other words, every 
social norm is constructed so that perfect congruence with the 
norm is not demanded. Husbands may more or less approach the 
norm of an ideal husband, some may be nearly perfect whereas 
others may refuse to visit the in-laws, or may refuse to change 
the baby's diapers without being declared a non-husband, that 
is divorced, by the courts.
For Gluckman, the idea of "The Reasonable Man" makes 
the conceptual bridge between actual behaviour and the norms 
used to evaluate behaviour. The "reasonable man" defines the 
"range of permissible leeway and the range of actively protected 
leeway". It is a way of thinking. The Judges ask themselves a 
question: Did A fulfill his obligations to B? Well, say the
Judges, he did not do everything he ideally should have done, 
i.e., what the relevant norm says he should have done; but did 
he do what any "reasonable" man in his position would have done?
218
Yes, say the judges, he did, therefore the relationship of A
to B is not broken, that is, the rights of the relationship are
not forfeited and the duties not suspended.
The concept of the "reasonable man" is very complex.
Gluckman isolates six constituent ideas:
The ideas involved are (1) the measurement of 
standards of fulfillment of specific obligations;
(2) the combination of several such standards 
(degree of performance, observance of etiquette 
or custom, adherence to rule of law) to assess 
whether or not a party has fulfilled the demands 
of his or her role, as the crux and main issue 
of the case; (3) the use of this model as a 
technique in cross-examination to destroy an 
apparently reasonable story; (4) the establish­
ment of proof through demonstration of unreason­
able deviation from custom or of failure in 
degree of performance of obligations; (5) the 
relation of proof to questions of whether res­
ponsibility and liability are strict and absolute 
in the specific relationship involved, with 
problems of onus of proof and possibilities of 
rebutting presumptions of intention; and (6) 
the whole question of "juristic" views on inten­
tion in terms of ethics and law, as against 
actual motivation (Gluckman, 1965* P- 14-2).
Through application of these six ideas, the "reasonable
man" is manifested in two ways. First, the "reasonable man"
establishes a standard of adherence to ambiguously worded norms.
It clearly defines "the range of permissible leeway and the
range of actively protected leeway". Gluckman argues that Lozi
prefix the concept "reasonable" to every personal noun, so that
there is a "reasonable wife", a "reasonable judge", a "reasonable
headman" a "reasonable underling", and so on. In other words,
the Lozi have a clear idea of what a good father is and what a
bad father is, but there is a large area between the two poles.
There is a cut-off point for being a good father; some things a
father must not do. But other things are optional or deviation
from some standards of the ideal father are permitted. Now this
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area ranging from the minimally good father to the ideal father 
is called, by the Lozi, the "reasonable father". Or, as Gluckman 
puts it, the "reasonable man" establishes the "reasonable 
incumbent of a social position" (Gluckman, 1955» p« 94-) •
Secondly, the concept of the "reasonable man" forms 
the chief technique of attacking evidence in cross-examination.
In determining the truthfulness of evidence, Judges attempt to 
"catch persons in departures from usages and norms" (Gluckman, 
1955? P- 82). Some of these norms are definite, in that one 
has broken them or one has not, but many are only stated gener­
ally. In cases like this: "The norms can be fulfilled in
varying degrees, and therefore the Judges require a standard 
by which to assess fulfillment. This standard is 1,1 the reason­
able and customary man' and what he would have done" (Gluckman, 
1955» P« 85)* Judges try to do this in four ways. First, 
"reasonable" can be used as "understandable". If a court is 
able to 1r liimin with a litigant, then the decision is likely 
to go in his favour. A clear illustration of this can be taken 
from English law. "Crimes of passion" are no less crimes, but 
because the Jury understand the motives of the criminal they 
are sometimes likely to grant acquital. In accordance with this, 
Gluckman gives "understandable" as an alternative meaning for 
the Lozi word which he usually translates as "reasonable" 
(Gluckman, 1955i p- 157)*
Secondly, Lozi Judges use the set of ideas involved 
in the "reasonable man" to construct expectations of a wrongdoer. 
Thus, they think in terms of the "reasonable thief" and "the 
reasonable adulterer". In other words, Judges know how criminals 
act, and if a defendant’s actions are like this then the
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probability of guilt rises (see Gluckman, 1955, pp. 129-30).
Thirdly, Lozi conceive of a "reasonable” order of 
nature. Lacking precise measurements of time and a scientifically 
based knowledge of biological cycles, Lozi nevertheless re- con­
struct a case in terms of "reasonable” amounts of time. In 
Gluckman’s words: "I heard several cases in which kutas cal­
culated the number of calves which cows, and their own calves, 
might reasonably be expected to have had over a number of years, 
allowing for a reasonable number of bull-calves against heifers, 
for a reasonable number of barren heifers, and for a reasonable 
number of barren seasons for other heifers” (Gluckman, 1955,
p. 122).
Fourthly, the "reasonable man" is used to erect a 
standardized interpretation of motivation. Lozi Judges are not 
interested in the intentions of the guilty. It is assumed that 
men intend the consequences of their actions. For example, a 
man giving gifts to his cross-cousin is assumed to be committing 
adultry with her. Since this is behaviour of the "reasonable 
adulterer", adulter must have been his aim, his motive, for 
giving the gifts.
Finally, Gluckman argues, the "reasonable man" is at 
the center of every "developed" system of law (Gluckman, 1955, 
p. 83), and has an equal position in the law of less well 
developed societies. He claims this even though Lozi Judges 
do not frequently use the phrase "reasonable man". Rather, they 
always prefix it to a rote name. It is a factor in their 
Judicial process whether they verbalize it or not. In one 
essay, Gluckman re-analyses other studies of tribal law in his 
own terms, claiming even that the idea of "reasonableness" is
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found in societies without formal courts or the values of an 
impersonal judge (Gluckman, 1965)• Gluckman sees the norm of 
the "reasonable man" in any society where arbitration takes 
place. He further says that if the concept is not universal, 
it will be so as soon as primitive populations take over 
colonial judicial structures. Gluckman concludes that not only 
is the "reasonable man" a universal attribute of judicial logic, 
it is an analytical concept of great sociological importance and 
should be placed along side other standard tools of analysis 
like "role", "deviant" and the "ideal type" (Gluckman, 1955> 
p. 129).
This is, I suggest, a fair account of what Gluckman 
means by the "reasonable man", what ideas it entails and a des­
cription of how it is used. Above all else, one thing must be 
made clear. As Gluckman presents it, the "reasonable man" is a 
way of thinking, a process of reasoning and therefore about how 
human beings conceive of social and natural reality and how 
they relate and use these concepts. It is a sweeping hypothesis 
about the nature of the human mind. This point will later be 
important in elucidating the underlying substance of the 
"reasonable man".
Gluckman's detailed case material, and it is without 
doubt the best in the subject, can be subjected profitably to a 
thorough re-analysis. I shall use one of his longer cases 
dealing with the "reasonable man", "The Case of the Violent 
Councillor" (Gluckman, 1955? pp. 82-97)* The defendant in this 
case, Saywa, is himself the induna of a village. The plaintiff 
is called "Y". The problem is that in 1942 the schoolboy son 
of the defendant, "A", made advances to the sister of Y's wife.
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The lad was discouraged with what must have been a severe 
thrashing. But the boy's passions were not stilled. He approa­
ched the girl again after a year and when Y again objected he 
said: "This year is not last year. I have grown up. You
cannot make me defaecate". The Lozi connection between being 
worsted in a fight and defaecating is strange, but more on this 
later. At any rate, A insulted Y's wife. Y challenged A to 
fight. A again insulted Y, and the two fought. After a while 
Y's father-in-law intervened and the fight ended. A went back 
to his father's compound. Y, however, had not yet done with 
fighting and against the council of his own wife entered the 
courtyard of the induna, Saywa. There he claimed Saywa's three 
children attacked him, choking him and squeezing him around the 
middle. Saywa himself then joined the fray and dragged him 
several hards by the wrist. Y screamed "Saywa is breaking me, 
Saywa is breaking me". Whereupon Y's wife entered the compound 
and shouted at Saywa: "You are fighting, leave him", which
Saywa promptly did. Saywa next got a whip which was taken from 
him by his son-in-law. After doing this he sent a child for a 
"stamping pole", but again this was taken from him before he 
could do anything with it. Finally, Saywa's daughter announced 
that Y had defaecated. He was released and was carried home.
Y first sued Saywa and his children at the local sub- 
district kuta. Here, although Saywa was the immediate superior 
of the sub-district induna, he was fined £1 - 10s to be paid to 
Y and 10s. to be paid to the kuta. Saywa paid the fine but 
still Y was not happy. He appealed the case to the higher kuta, 
where the case was re-tried. This appeal is what Gluckman 
actually witnessed.
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Saywa's version of the story was very different. Upon 
hearing that there was trouble between Y and his son A, he 
hurried to Y's compound to head off a fight. Unfortunately, he 
arrived after Y had gone. Saywa hurried back to his compound 
where he found his children fighting with Y. He tried to stop 
the fight by lifting Y by the wrist. Failing in this, he got a 
whip with which to frighten the combatants; before he could do 
this, however, the whip was taken from him. Next he tried to 
remove the "stamping pole" from the reach of anyone angry enough 
to use it wickedly. Having thus accounted for his own actions, 
he concluded by saying that the real fault in this squabble lay 
with the two sister's of Y's wife, both of whom were whores. 
Saywa's defense, then, lies in the purity of his motives.
The kuta's first step was to verify Y's version of the 
critical events as much as possible. That he did, in fact, cry 
out, "Saywa is breaking me", was corroborated by a neighbor.
His wrist was inspected and was found to show signs of swelling. 
Two allegations were moved to the status of fact: (1) that Y's
wrist was effected by violence and (2) that Y connected Saywa 
with this act of violence at the time it occurred. This throws 
no light at all, however, on the motives for which Saywa under­
took this violence. The judges did not go from this directly to
a statement of guilt or innocence. Rather they proceeded to
cross-examine Saywa.
There are three essential questions the kuta poses of 
Saywa: (1) "What manner of arbitrating in a fight is this, to
seize the one who is on the ground, who is being fought, not to
seize those who are overwhelming him"? (2) If you are innocent 
why did you not appeal the decision of the lower kuta? and (3)
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why, then, when the plaintiff's wife cried, "the induna is 
fighting", did you release Y's wrist if you were trying to raise 
him?". Saywa's inability to satisfy the kuta on these questions 
proved his guilt, he was fined and warned that further violence 
on the part of an induna would not be tolerated.
Gluckman sees two standards by which the kuta breaks 
down Saywa's story: "first, he did not behave as a reasonable
man would do when arbitrating in a fight; second, his whole 
behaviour was not that of a reasonable induna, following the 
customs of a good induna" (Gluckman, 1955? p. 87). In other 
words, the kuta sets up standards of what "reasonable" men do, 
and when "reasonable" men arbitrate they do not bruise wrists; 
when "reasonable" men are unjustly convicted they appeal their 
fines and "reasonable" men when falsely accused do not act as if 
they were guilty. Thus, in Gluckman's view the "reasonable man" 
is behind Saywa's conviction. The kuta spent a long time in 
cross-examining Saywa, in inventing questions to reveal that he 
did not intend to do what he claimed. The reason for this, 
Gluckman argues, is that the social relationships involved are 
so important that they could not be broken. Involved here is 
notr merely the relationship of two strangers in a fight, but 
the relationship of induna to subordinate. Saywa and Y live in 
the same village and must go on living together after this par­
ticular grievance is settled. Therefore, the efforts of the 
kuta in cross-examination are directed toward Saywa, to convince 
him of his own guilt and to reintegrate him into the multiplex 
relationship he previously had with his villagers. Gluckman 
allows that proof of violence would have constituted evidence 
of guilt, since it is damning for an induna to be violent in
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any circumstances. But establishing guilt is not the only aim 
of the kuta, for unlike Western courts, the Earotse kuta is 
concerned with ultimate social harmony and tries to produce 
this through its decisions and actions. This, then, is Gluckman'£ 
analysis of "The Case of The Violent Councillor".
It is immediately noteworthy that this case does not 
involve the sort of norm first discussed by Professor Gluckman 
as a function of the "Reasonable Man". There seems to be 
nothing at all uncertain, diffuse or ambiguous about the way in 
which the role of induna is handled. Any form of violent action 
is definitely a breach of the norms of indunaship; this never 
comes into question. The idea of "induna" is used in cross- 
examination but even there in a direct way. Indunas do not 
fight, and there the problem ends. There are no fine shades 
separating the amount of violence permitted an induna from the 
amount denied him. From this, I suggest, it becomes clear that 
a norm can only be used as an argumentative technique in cross- 
examination when it is precisely formulated; "indunas should 
never fight" is a norm that is sufficient for this. Norms that 
are diffusely stated could not be used in situations of cross- 
examination. Thus the two functions of the "reasonable man" put 
forward by Gluckman require two different types of norm. How 
then can Gluckman speak of "the norm of the reasonable man"?
The Wittgensteinian view of social structure makes 
quick work of this problem. When norms are stated abstractly 
they seem to be ambiguous, but when related to a particular 
case are not so. This does not mean, as Gluckman claims, that 
the norm changes its nature or that a new concept must be added. 
Rather, norms, like all words, are like chameleons; they change
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colour to suit their surroundings. The possibilities in the 
picture of a word stated abstractly are legion, but when held 
up against the world, the events of the world constrain the 
number of possibilities in the picture, transforming its ambi­
guity into precision. To make the discussion clearer, "ambiguity^ 
a term distinctly linguistic in reference, is inappropriate in 
relation to words which are social roles and norms. Think of 
the truth-table again; it not only might be said to be ambiguous, 
it actually equivocates by saying that the proposition is both 
true and false, and in relation to the logic of the word it is 
both at the same time. Likewise, a chameleon is both brown and 
green, and from the logical point of view both simultaneously. 
Remember that a thing, like a word, contains all of its logical 
possibilities at once; logic is not acquainted with time. Thus, 
to say that a truth-table equivocates is to miss the point 
entirely. In a similar vein, to say that social norms are 
ambiguous is to miss the point. Yet, that social norms should 
seem this way - i.e., both ambiguous and precise - is further 
evidence that they are pictures describing some order of possi­
bilities. This resolves Gluckman's dilemma, I suggest, more 
handily than his proposed "reasonable man".
Yet another quality of "reasonable" used as a word is 
remarkable. In "The Case of the Violent Councillor" every time 
the word is used it is virtually meaningless. Violence is not 
something a "reasonable induna" does not do, it is something an 
induna does not do. The word itself contains normative meaning. 
Or, as Nadel says, the idea of "should" is incorporated into 
every social role. Likewise there is no difference in saying, 
"Saywa did not act like a reasonable man arbitrating a dispute",
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and "Saywa did not act like a man arbitrating a dispute".
Gluckman makes two points which are relevant here. First, the 
Lozi equivalent for "reasonable man" is rarely used by the 
judges (Gluckman, 1955* P* 125); and, second, that judges often 
use the word for the particular social position under examination 
without the prefix "reasonable" (Gluckman, 1955, p.126). 
"Reasonable" is an expression perceived by Professor Gluckman 
in something that is beneath the surface of Lozi thought and 
affixed by him to their own words for social roles and positions. 
His way of interpreting Lozi statements is equivalent to saying, 
of course you did not say that, but I am sure that is what you 
meant. Both of these points will assume even greater importance 
as the paper develops.
But for the moment we must return to "The Case of The 
Violent Councillor". Quite as important as the questions asked 
by the judges are the questions they leave unasked. Gluckman’s 
account gives the impression that Lozi judges attack the claims 
of plaintiff and defendant with equal vigour. Gluckman further 
acknowledges that to most Western eyes Lozi courts operate on 
the principle that a defendant is guilty until proven innocent; 
this is not so, he goes on to say, precisely because the judges 
are so expert in the art of cross-examination and that they 
apply this art randomly, checking every statement of each 
litigant against the "norm of the reasonable man". In "The Case 
of the Violent Councillor" this is clearly not so. The version 
of the case given by Y is never challenged along the lines which 
one imagines might be laid down by the "reasonable man". This 
is suspicious since Y's story is laden with statements of inter­
pretation as well as allegations of fact. Y's own view of
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Saywafs motives is never challenged by the kuta. Once the 
factual allegations are verified, Saywa is thrown on the defen­
sive, in effect being forced to prove himself innocent in the 
face of presumed guilt. This, then, is an instance when the 
common sense view of African law is correct and the anthropolo­
gist's one too much prejudiced in favour of the people he is 
studying. I suggest that there is a reason for the Lozi judicial 
process being based on the principle of "guilty until proven 
innocent" which is very intimately connected with Lozi thought 
processes in all social situations.
Before doing this, however, it is instructive to 
demonstrate the several confused areas of "The Case of the 
Violent Counsellor". This is the equivalent of the attempt in 
Chapter I to show the non-factual character of the decision 
against Yowasi. Re-analysis of the case proceeds as follows.
The first question is, why is Saywa the one being accused?
Saywa's children were the ones fighting. By no stretch of the 
imagination could Saywa be said to have started the fight. The 
original issue of the fight does not concern him and the fighting 
itself had begun even before he enters the compound. ’Thy then 
is he the one charged and fined? The answer to this is that he 
is an induna, and that his actions are precise abrogations of 
the norms incorporated in that word. "Induna" is the most 
important of all roles in the case. That the requirements of 
induna be fulfilled is somehow more important than the reasons 
for a petty fight. Thus the change of the court against Saywa 
is only marginally related to the episode that precedes it.
This is seen by examining the "facts" of the case with a view 
toward seeing how Saywa's part in the little drama may be seen
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as "reasonable".
The facts of the case are these: Saywa grasped Y by
the wrist with sufficient strength to cause swelling; Saywa took 
a whip in hand but never used it; Saywa then went to fetch a 
"stamping-pole" but again did not use it. The judges could 
have reasoned like this: If Saywa's intent were to fight with
Y, why did he only squeeze his wrist; is this am effective way 
of hurting someone? Is being dragged along the ground for three 
yards sufficiently terrible for Y to shout "Saywa is breaking 
me". Is being dragged equivalent to being "broken"? It does 
not seem as if Saywa's actions are those of a man seriously 
intent on punishing Y; if he were, if this were his end, then 
the most "reasonable" means would have been to fetch the 
"stamping-pole" to begin with and club him in the head straight 
away.
An evaluation of the violence potential of the comba-
CA
tfciits is also significant. How old are Saywafs children?
Gluckman does not say. However, they are three: A, a male just
past adoleslence; B, a crippled boy evidently younger than A 
(unfortunately the nature of the crippled limb is not disclosed); 
and C a girl who from Gluckman's chart (Gluckman, 1955? P* 84) 
appears to be younger than A or B, but is married. Gluckman 
does in one place call this group "youngsters" (Gluckman, 1955? 
p. 85)* Now, how formidable would this lot have been? Cnly the 
year before, A made advances on Y's wife's sister and was 
severely throttled, having been made to defaecate. Only a year 
has passed since Y was able to do this to A, though now A has 
confidence that it will not happen again. However, when Y and 
A fight in Y's father-in-law's compound, the outcome is incon-
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elusive. In the second encounter, the critical one in the "Case 
of the Violent Councillor", A is joined by a crippled brother 
and a younger sister. The sister, incidentally, was the one 
squeezing Y's middle when he defaecated. Ignoring the outcome 
of the fight, would it seem likely that Y will be outmatched 
by this little hand. I suggest not. Y obviously thought he 
could handle Saywa1s children or he would not have gone marching 
boldly into his compound against the prudent council of his wife. 
Prom this line of reasoning I deduce this fact: Y was overstating
his case; he was not being mercilessly subdued by Saywa's off­
spring; his motive in going to Saywa's compound was malicious, 
to further assault A, a mere boy.
To return to an old problem, defaecation as a criterion 
of defeat is perplexing. Is defaecation a ]^tysiological response 
to pain? Yes, it is (personal communication with Dr. N. Malleson 
of London University Health Service). But even so, it is not an 
index of how much pain was inflected on Y by Saywa's children.
From culture to culture, the resistance to defaecation while 
enduring pain varies. It seems to be fairly common among the
Lozi, but certainly is not something James Bond is caught doing.
. . K\
So, like many physiological phenomena, it is not simply a matter 
of stimulus and response. Rather, it must, among the Lozi, be a 
cultural, that is, verbal, way of admitting defeat, somewhat on 
the order of "I will twist your arm until you shout 'uncle'".
If this is so, Y's defaecation is not a measure of how much 
pain he suffered, but is only a sign of his capitulation.
A re-construction of the case following this vein of
cross-examination looks like this. Saywa entered his own court-
■ '■» - A
yard to find all three of his children fighting with Y. He 
.         _____________________________________________________________
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immediately tried to stop the fight. Cf all the ways of going 
about this, he chose to try to raise Y by lifting him by the 
wrist. In so doing, he hoped to retreive Y from his antagonists. 
Had he gone about his peacemaking task as the judges recommended 
he would have faced other difficulties. Assuming that the 
children are intent on pummeling Y as much as possible, as soon 
as Saywa could pull one of them off and then have started to 
pull another off, the first would have rejoined the fray. By 
this method, then, Saywa could have reduced the number of Y's 
opponents by only one at any given time. This would hardly have 
been an effective way to stop the fight. Instead, Saywa chose 
to exert his authority both as father and as induna by raising 
Y from the ground. Perhaps lie thought this attempt would cause 
his children to desist. If so, he was wrong, and his lifting 
effort served only to drag Y along the ground for a few yards. 
Saywa saw the futility of this and decided to pursue a different 
course of action. At this moment, Y's wife came on the scene 
and accused him of fighting. To say, as the judges do, that 
Saywa dropped Y's wrist because of the wife's accusation is to 
reason post hoc ergo propter hoc. But this is not really 
important. What is important is that if Saywa dropped Y's wrist 
because he was aware of his guilt and did not want to be seen 
engaged in such behaviour, as the kuta and Gluckman reason, then 
why, having dropped the wrist, did he engage in even more 
incriminating behaviour, that is, fetching the whip and the 
"stamping-pole"? One of two reasons is possible: either Saywa
was intent on hurting Y as much as possible without concern 
about who saw him, or he was sincerely bent on stopping the 
fight by whatever means he could find, 'Ihe later reason makes
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more sense. By this time, a crowd had gathered and was witnessing 
everything. Saywa had been induna for fifteen years and must 
have been well aware of the prohibition against fighting in his 
role. Would he then join in a fight which was taking place in 
public and which his children were winning anyway? I suggest 
not.
The final question raised by the judges was, if Saywa 
is innocent why did he not appeal after his first conviction?
Saywa's answer was not entirely to the point. He said the first 
conviction was against his children not himself and because Y 
had already appealed. From what is known about indunas and how 
they should act, it is clear that Saywa, regardless of his 
intentions during the fight, would have nothing to gain by 
appealing. His is a case where any publicity is bad publicity. 
This is reason enough for trying to avoid court proceedings.
I suggest it cannot be inferred from this that he was guilty to 
begin with.
All of this shows that Saywa's actions are not as 
"unreasonable” as the kuta makes them out to be. The line of 
questioning they followed is not the only possible one. Indeed, 
some relevant aspects of the case open to verification are 
completely ignored. Did Saywa come into the compound after the 
fight had begun or was he waiting there with his children? Say­
wa 's and Y's versions of events disagree even here and this 
would have marked bearing on any assumptions about Saywa's 
intentions. Surely, someone would have seen Saywa hurrying 
through the village, but the kuta never even raised the issue.
In verification and cross-examination, then, the kuta's actions
show a definite direction of interest, a bias. They could
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easily have thrown doubt on Y's version of events, had they tried. 
This is exactly like "Genatio Magino versus Yowasi Maliwa" . The 
judge knows what to look for and which questions will elicit 
this information. The questions are not designed to cross- 
examine but to demonstrate guilt, the location of which is 
apparent through the logic of the words in the situation.
Once again, there is a set of pictures. Through ratio­
cination, the litigants play off one picture against another 
until, to the court's satisfaction, the possibilities of all the 
pictures are constrained and there is logically only one fact 
remaining. Thus, the kuta discovers that Saywa was violent, 
and this is really the only fact they unearth, and due to the 
logic of the terms in the case, they are able to reason beyond 
that to the guiltiness of his intentions. Ratiocination estab­
lishes the primacy of one picture, the Indunaship, and the rest 
of the trial hinges on this. Induna's are above all else peaceful 
men. There can be no good reason for an induna being violent.
It is a logical impossibility. Hence, the fact of Saywa's 
violence orders the other possibilities of his role. The kuta's 
understanding of his motivation is the logical result of this 
one fact. The judges must have reasoned something like this: 
First, there is proof of violence having taken place; second, 
the victim was heard by a disinterested third party to accuse 
Saywa of effecting this violence; and, third, Saywa is an induna 
and for an induna there is no end that justifies violence, 
therefore his motives were evil, he is guilty and the rest of 
his actions must be interpreted in this light. And only after 
reaching this conclusion does the cross-examination begin, but
even then, cross-examination with a purpose. The judges are
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not impartially critical. Proof of Saywa's violence was prima 
facift conviction, as Gluckman points out. In Nadel1s terms, 
it forcefully recruited him into the role of "violent councillor".
The purpose behind the cross-examination of Saywa is 
now clear. Saywa was routed as soon as violence was proven.
The cross-examination was only an exercise in ordering Saywa's 
actions with what the court knows his motives must have been. 
Gluckman's analysis hints at these points, but does not stress 
them. He contends that the purpose of this cross-examination 
was to convince Saywa of his own guilt, the justness of his 
punishment and therefore to allow multiplex relations centering 
around the indunaship to continue peacefully. Gluckman argues 
this in spite of the fact that Saywa never admitted his guilt,
even five years after the trial. Yet in spite of this Gluckman
concludes: ". . . but the judges undoubtedly demonstrated
his wrongdoing to him" (Gluckman, 1955* p* 91)- Now, unless 
Gluckman's vision penetrates Saywa's mind, this is a non
l *
sequitdr. Nor does Gluckman1s other case material clearly 
illustrate this view. I count six cases where the guilty party 
is totally unrepentant. Admittedly, out of over sixty cases 
this is not dramatically significant, but then the post-trial 
attitudes of those convicted are not always revealed. Thus, 
recalcitrance is at least a possibility.
In the "Case of the Violent Councillor" there are more
substantial reasons for an elaborate debunking of Saywa's story 
than those suggested by Gluckman. The Lozi kuta does not 
operate closed hearings. Court cases are public events. It is 
necessary to convince the crowd of the rightness of guta
decisions. And, more importantly, in this case, to convince
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Saywa!s supporters, who are numerous, prestigious and disgruntled. 
Saywa is never convinced, never admits his own guilt and his 
relations, several of whom are sub-district indunas themselves, 
continuously and vociferously charge Y and his witnesses with 
lying. This trial is a public performance. The crowd is composed 
of supporters of either side. Indunas, like Saywa, are not only 
magistrates, they are of great economic and political influence.
In some ways, an induna is more like an Eighteenth-Century 
English squire than a court Judge. The purpose of the cross- 
examination is to placate Saywa's angry followers and therefore 
to decrease the possibility of political discontent.
One could ask why the role of Mbad induna” is so 
important in this case rather than, say, a role such as ’’spiteful 
villager lying about his induna”? The answer to this is equiva­
lent to the one for the question posed about Yose Toli's possible 
vindictiveness against Yowasi. Among the Soga there is no role 
of ’’cuckold” and, seemingly, among the Lozi, there is no term 
for "spiteful villager”. These concepts simply do not come to 
mind. They are not part of a picture, part of the logic of the 
social systems.
Thus, re-analysis of "The Case of the Violent Council-
. •?
lor" goes far to unmask the "reasonable man”. From this new 
look at this one case the following statements about the idea 
of the "reasonable man" have been deduced. First, there is a 
functional contradiction in the way G-luckman expresses this idea. 
He claims it is both a norm of behaviour used in the kuta to 
attack evidence and a method of relating diffusely stated norms 
to real behaviour. However, one type of norm cannot do both.
In cross-examination norms must be precise. To relate ambiguous
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ideals to concrete hehaviour, the "norm of the reasonable man" 
would have to cover a broad range of equally legitimate contin­
gencies, and become precisely the sort of norm that could not be 
effective in cross-examination. Gluckman presents the "reasonable 
man" as if it were a unitary concept used in different legal 
contexts. This is not so. The "reasonable man" is not a norm 
at all but, rather, an aspect of every norm. This conclusion is 
the result of seeing norms as words, the meanings of which are 
pictures, which contain an order of possibilities.
But the problem of the "reasonable man" goes much 
deeper than this. As Gluckman uses "reasonable" in "The Case 
of the Violent Councillor", it is semantically useless. It does 
not alter the meaning content of the role names to which it is 
attached. It bears repeating that "reasonable" is not a word 
often used by Lozi, either in the judicial process or in day to 
day affairs. Gluckman says they more often use role names 
without the qualificatory "reasonable". And no wonder. The word 
is meaningless. That Saywa did not act like a "reasonable man 
arbitrating a dispute" is to say that Saywa did not act like a 
man arbitrating a dispute. "Reasonable" is not, therefore, a 
substantive aspect of role names. The constituent meanings of 
Gluckman1s "reasonable" are part of the internal structure of 
the roles involved. Application to real behaviour, socially 
accepted imputation of motive, the very components of "reasonable" 
are an integral part of the role, not a secondary factor attached 
externally.
The idea of the "reasonable man" only suggests itself 
when one of the old theories of social roles is being used.
When roles are seen as words and the meaning of those words as
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pictures there is no temptation to use the concept at all. The 
ideas called "reasonable" are part of all roles, not something 
independent of them. These ideas are, furthermore, not analytical 
ones as Gluckman claims, but factual ones, integral parts of a 
semantic reality.
This leads to another ramification of the Wittgenstein- 
ian view of social structure. Role names are words, words with 
enormously complex meanings. Yet if they are to be socially 
useful there must be some agreement on these meanings. Therefore, 
role names which appear to describe diffuse and ambiguous senti­
ments must, in fact, name a complexly structured system of ideas 
with wide social acceptance. Roles and norms that are ambiguously 
stated may be very complex; perhaps they are stated in super­
ficial and simple terms, or seem to be so from the outside 
observer's point of view, but are in fact endowed with an 
orderly semantic structure. In other words, to the person who 
uses the phrase it may cover a wide range of possible actions in 
various contingent circumstances. A statement like "sons should 
help and respect their fathers " is only a way of naming quickly 
and easily more specific behaviourial directives. The statement 
"sons should help and respect their fathers" is a cliche with 
which Lozi summarize certain aspects of the role of son, it is 
an accepted name for part of a complex mental apparatus which 
is too cumbersome to elaborate fully every time it is used or 
discussed. There afe many secondary concepts in the statement 
"sons should help and respect their fathers". A process of 
"controlled eliciting" as outlined by Black and Metzger (Black 
and Metzger, 1969) could no doubt bring these secondary concepts, 
some of the more remote possibilities in the semantic structure,
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into the open and even give a picture of how widely they are 
distributed in a culture. This would take the form of a list 
of specific situations in which sons defer to fathers and how 
they would exhibit deference, when and how sons would be expected 
to work with fathers and perhaps more statements growing out of 
these. It would, in fact, be a list of possibilities.
Thus the activities falling in Gluckman's idea of the 
"reasonable man" are more fully explained as roles, as that 
word is used by Nadel and augmented by Wittgenstein. Finally, 
one can only agree with Nadel1s own criticism of the use of the 
"reasonable man" in The Judicial Process Among the Barotse 
(Nadel, 1956), and say that it is unnecessary; why Nadel said 
this becomes apparent when his final work is related to the idea. 
And if what Gluckman calls the "reasonable man" is in fact a 
social role, albeit a complex one, then no wonder he has had 
little trouble in forcing material from societies with no formal 
jural procedures into his model. And in so far as this is right, 
the "reasonable man", as opposed to other anthropologist's 
theories of customary law, embraces the correct view of juris­
prudence. This issue is taken up in the final section of this 
chapter.
Replacing "reasonable man" with "role" has far reaching 
consequences for an understanding of the judicial process among 
the Barotse. As the kuta reconstructs and investigates events, 
it is directed, biased. The direction is controlled by the 
appearance of events in the external world that constrain the 
manifold possibilities of a well-known social role. This 
process recruits one of the litigants into a role of presumed
guilt, and then guilt is proven by cross-examination. Cross-
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examination takes the form of debunking the guilty party's 
version of critical events by showing that his actions are not 
consistent with his alleged motives. The true motives of the 
guilty party are, of course, obvious to the kuta for they sire 
a function of the social role. There is, furthermore, a political 
side to the trial. The Lozi kuta is a public performance, and 
rival litigants may have supporters present. Certainly one 
reason behind involved cross-examination is the placation of 
potential unrest arising from dissatisfaction with the judicial 
process. It may be said that effective cross-examination is a 
socially accepted, and socially demanded proof of guilt. It is 
a part of what may be very close to the English idea of "due- 
process" . And it is significant that justice is demonstrated 
through the operation of the vocabulary of social structure, 
which is, in fact, the logic of customary law.
PART 3
LAW OR SOCIAL CONTROL?
"Every society is a moral society".
- Durkheim, The Division of 
Labour in Society, p. 228
P.H. Gulliver has taken issue with Gluckman on the
this chapter should make it clear that the idea of the "reason­
able man" is unnecessary, but, nevertheless, it contains a core 
of truth. This core is the operation of the words of a social 
structure. The importance of this becomes obvious by reviewing
the debate between Gulliver and Gluckman.
importance of the "reasonable man".
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Gulliver's book, Social Control in an African Society 
describes the Arusha, a tribe of agricultural Masai living in 
northern Tanzania. The social organization of these people 
emphasizes kinship principles and they are, thus, what some 
anthropologists would call "acephalous". There are families 
and lineages and clans and sub-sections in a pattern familiar 
to students of anthropology ever since Evans-Pritchard’s seminal 
examination of the Nuer. Now, Gulliver contends that because 
the Arusha have little organization that is Iblat^intly political, 
they therefore have no institutions that are worthy of the name 
"legal". On this point, his main antagonists are Llewellyn and 
Hoebel, the joint progenitors of anthropology's involvement with 
legal studies. Llewellyn and Hoebel define "legal" institutions 
in the following way: "As soon as the course of behaviour shows
recognisably, authority in procedures or persons for cleaning up 
trouble-cases, or authority in standards whose infraction is met 
not only by action, but by action carrying the flavour of the 
pro tanto official, at that point the peculiar institutions 
cabled "legal" have become perceptible" (Llewellyn and Hoebel, 
194-1, pi 268). Prom this definition, Gulliver deduces that its 
authors would probably call dispute settlement among the Arusha 
"legal". While recognizing some basis for doing this, Gulliver 
argues that the disimilarities between what happens among the 
Arusha and among more politically elaborate tribes requires a 
re-classification of what should be called legal. His view is 
this:
During my field investigations among the Arusha, 
and afterwards during the preparation of this 
book, I was constantly aware of an essential 
difference between the dispute processes of the 
Arusha and those of peoples who have a recognisable
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system of courts and judges - for example, the
Lozi as described by Gluckman. Clearly there
is a crucial difference in the general methods
of decision-making and decision-enforcing in
these two cases. One way of dealing with this
is to conceptualise two polar types of process -
judicial and political - between which there
is a graduated scale where, ideally, particular
systems could be placed according as to whether
they are more judicial or more political in
their nature. (Gulliver, 1963, p. 297)* I .
First of all, Gulliver presents an "ideal typical"/\of 
dispute settlement among all African peoples. This kind of 
analysis has been criticised throughout this thesis and, there­
fore, only specific objections to this typology need be considered 
here. What Gulliver means by the judicial and the political is 
quite simple. "Judicial", for him, means the presence of a 
supposedly impartial judge, whereas "political" means the absence 
of such a person. Gulliver sees the Lozi and the Arusha as 
examples of these extremes. While not denying that norms play 
some part in Arusha social control, Gulliver maintains that for 
them "a decision is reached and a settlement made as a result of 
the relative strengths of the two parties to the dispute as they 
are shown and tested in social action" (Gulliver, 1963* P* 298). 
"The relative strength of the two parties" is the key to this 
passage, for it implies the predomination of power over justice, 
and gives the impression that dispute settlement among the 
Arusha is more a case of "might means right" than otherwise. 
Gulliver further argues that "the use of the technique of the 
reasonable man and reasonable expectations must be directly 
associated with judicial processes of social control, where the 
judge requires a stable standard of reference" (Gulliver, 1983?
p. 3 0 0 ).
The publication of Gulliver's book was followed by a
242
vigorous rejoinder from Gluckman (M. Gluckman, 1966). Gluckman's 
defense of the reasonable man as an analytical tool is very 
thorough. He re-analyses Gulliver's case material, unearths 
the reasonable man and claims this as proof of the universal 
applicability of his idea. In the appendix to the second edition 
of The Judicial Process among the Barotse, Gluckman claims even 
that Bohannan found the reasonable man among the Tiv of Nigeria 
although he did not use it in analysis. Now, as indicated in 
the last section, Gluckman's idea of the reasonable man is 
actually a way of pointing to certain aspects of every social 
structure. Therefore, the demonstrated ubiquity of the reasonable 
man is no surprise. What is important here, though, is that 
underlying Gluckman*s arguments about the reasonable man is not 
only a resolution of the Gulliver/Gluckman debate, but a theory 
of jurisprudence capable of informing future studies of customary 
lav/.
These points can be seen by taking a fresh look at 
Gulliver's longest case. (Gulliver, 1963, pp. 243-253). This 
case concerns a payment of bridewealth. There are only two main 
players in this drama, Temi and his son-in-law Roikine. At the 
time of the dispute, Roikine has been married to Temi's daughter 
for seven years, and has had four children by her. Part of his 
bridewealth payment is made and part is still outstanding. At 
this time, Temi and his son have recently been fined for failure 
to pay their taxes, and are therefore rather poor. They are too 
poor, in fact, to make the marriage payment of Temi's son, which 
has just fallen due and which he cannot avoid. Thus, in dire 
straits, Temi comes to collect what is owed him by Roikine.
Roikine acknowledges the debt but says he is too poor to pay at
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the moment. Temi decides not to accept Roikine's refusal and 
calls a moot.
Nine days later a conclave is held, Temi and Roikine
both bringing their close kin and lineage mates. Each also
brings a lineage senior to act as his spokesman, or counsellor.
Roikine is supported by Olaimer and Temi by Kisita. Kisita
opens the moot by reminding Roikine that his is a happy marriage
and that while he has four children, they are not really his
children until his bridewealth payments are finished.
Olaimer defends Roikine by listing the payments he has
already made. This discussion is quite detailed and Gulliver
states its purpose as follows:
My assistant, who sat with me, whispered that 
he thought that Roikine and Olaimer were trying 
to establish that Roikine had hitherto^ been a 
good son-in-law. He was doubtless correct in 
his inference, because, when the listing of items 
was completed, Roikine began an account of the 
occasions when he had helped Temi in the ways 
a dutiful son-in-law should.
Temi listens to this, agreeing with everything and 
then makes it clear that his demands are not harsh and arbitrary 
but are rather necessitated by his own poverty.
Roikine then claims that he too is poor, only having 
two cows, one ox and a calf. He furthermore contends that he 
needs all of these for his young children who need milk. He 
concludes that Temi could not take a single animal without 
denying milk to his grandchildren, Roikine concludes by chiding 
Temi with the question "are you not a grandfather?".
At this point Kisita interjects that he has heard that 
Roikine wants to buy land. He furthermore brings a witness to 
corroborate this. There is much surprise since this lets the 
air out of Roikine1s claims of poverty. Confusion grows.
244
Roikine*s counsellor is flabergasted. Temi's older brother 
threatens to take Roikine's wife away from him, but Temi assures 
everyone that he has no wish to destroy a happy marriage. On 
this note the conclave ends without making any transfer of 
property.
Eight days later another conclave begins, this time 
convened by Ndaanya, the head of Temi’s maximal lineage. Temi 
opens the moot by summarizing his claim, and making it clear 
that Roikine does not deny the obligation. Roikine then repeats 
his excuses from the earlier session.
Ndaanya then speaks, admitting that Roikine has been 
a good son-in-law, but saying that Temi has been an even better 
father-in-law, because ha has been tolerant in his demands for 
bridewealth. He reiterates the norms of bridewealth payment 
and recounts what has been paid up to the moment. He next 
counts up Roikine’s wealth and exclaims that affinal obligations 
take precedence over the acquisition of new land. He conclusion 
is very forceful: "'To buy a field is good if another is foolish
enough to sell. But Temi wants his cattle first; that is right. 
You must agree, it is right. Who can say no? We Arusha have 
always given bridewealth; it is our custom from long ago and 
it has always been so. Did not the big men long ago do this?
You, Roikine, you say you have been a good affine; but good 
affines give bridewealth. We want no other words, only cattle. 
You have cattle - I have heard that you have cattle although I 
have not seen them - so give us the cattle'”. (Gulliver, 1963, 
p. 248). Note that Ndaanya's argument is rhetorical, posing 
his statements as being the only possible way of seeing the 
situation.
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The next speaker is Roikine's father. He argues that 
a good father-in-law should be generous to a good son-in-law, 
when the son-in-law cannot pay. Temi's supporters interrupt 
him with shouts that Roikine can pay, and should.
Roikine himself comes forward. He admits to have some 
cattle and that he plans to buy more land with them. He then 
tries to justify this course of action by describing his present 
land as small, arid, and barely sufficient to support his family. 
Roikine1s counsellor, Olaimer, corroborates this and further 
states that Roikine is a hard worker and will use the new land 
profitably. In conclusion, he says that it is difficult to 
find new land and that Temi should give Roikine this chance to 
better himself by delaying the bridewealth claim.
Temi then reiterates the necessity of his claim, that 
he is not being selfish but needs a cow for his son. At this 
point, Roikine's father's brother calls out that he offers them 
a calf. After some consultation, Temi decides to accept this 
as the equivalent of the ox he is owed. After some discussion 
of how the rest of the bridewealth is to be paid, Temi agrees 
to the principle that "a good affine does not claim bridewealth 
for nothing” and gives Roikine ample time to pay the rest. The 
ifioot finished, beer is drunk, and the two sides part amiably. 
Gulliver confirms that all payments kere later made as promised.
Virtually everything that happens in this case is 
explicable in the terms of Nadel and Wittgenstein. Nobody argues 
about the norms of bridewealth payment. Prom the very beginning, 
agreement is reached about what should be the case. The inter­
esting thing, though, is that every other argument is related 
to one word in the social structural vocabulary or another.
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Roikine lists the criteria of a happy marriage and everybody
agrees with him; similarly, he enumerates the constituents of
a dutiful son-in-law, and again the assembly concur. The con*-
cipts of "grandfather’' and "father-in-law" also seem to have
fairly precise definitions. Certain other principles are also
clear. Temi had the right to take his daughter away from
Roikine, and he also could have held out for an ox father than
accept the calf. Taking away these concepts leaves nothing.
The contents of these words are the raison d ’etre of the conclave.
The importance of the Arusha social structure is paramount. This
is something they share with, not only the Lozi, but all organized
societies. In view of the blatency of these arguments, how is
it that Gulliver could see only pushing, shoving and politics
behind the decisions of Arusha moots? The answer to this has
been heard before. Gulliver's error is in his misunderstanding
of the nature of rules. In effect, I suggest, he did not find
"legal" rules among the Arusha because he was not looking for
the right thing. Consider this statement:
What is more important for present purposes-is, 
that the possibility of departure from expressed 
and socially approved norms exists in reference 
to most, perhaps all norms, the transgression 
of which may precipitate a formal dispute. It 
can be said that in the process of discussions 
and negotiations towards a mutually acceptable 
resolution of a dispute, there is most usually 
a departure from the applicable norms in the
end result. Lor the Arusha, one might say that
it is what a plaintiff can obtain (after, if 
necessary, long negotiations) which is important, 
rather than what he ought to obtain.
The mistake in this passage is obvious. It is a perfect des­
cription of rules governing. But then all rules govern, none 
ordain. The words of social structure among the Arusha are the 
loci of rights and obligations, and when disputes arise they 
are solved by arguing about the meaning and implication of
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these words. Thus, arbitration among the Arusha takes on all 
the characteristics of customary law and that appellation must, 
therefore, be prefered to Gulliver's proposed "social control".
In effect, there is no "social" control without law. Outside 
the law, control may be exerted by bullies and tyrants. But for 
control to be social, it must be articulated to social facts, 
or in other words, language. That this process occurs among 
the Arusha indicates that they have a form of society and law 
which is independent of the power of any person or group. This 
is, after all, the meaning of a social fact.
One final point should clarify the degree to which the 
logic of law penetrates all social life. Law is not something 
possessed by the courts solely for bindings society's wounds. 
Rather, law is ubiquitous and penetrates the lives of people who 
never quarrel or even visit a court. I^oots and courts operate 
only when laws are broken. To say this is to say that knowledge 
of the law precedes the delict. This is obvious since abrogation 
of a law defines a delict. In the realm of customary law this 
is no problem since the essence of the law is imbibed with the 
language. They are one and the same.
The ubiquity of the law is also a trait of V/estern 
societies. In fact the point has been made most forcefully by 
scholars of Western jurisprudence. That anthropologists, Gluck­
man is a notable exception here, have largely ignored these 
writings is responsible, I suggest, for some of the problems 
considered in this thesis. That looking for law only in courts 
and squabbles is a point made by Hart, a professor of juris­
prudence :
The principal functions of the law as a means 
of social control are not to be seen in private 
litigation or prosectuions, which represent
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vital but still ancillary provisions for the 
failures of the system. It is to be seen in 
the diverse ways in which the law is used to 
control, to guide, and to plan life out of 
court. (Hart, 1961» p- 39;*
The same point is made by Cardozo, who as judge and thinker, was
probably in a better position than any possible anthropologist
to speak on this issue:
Life may be lived, conduct may be ordered, it 
is lived and ordered, for unnumbered human beings 
without bringing them within the field where the 
law can be misread, unless indeed the misreading 
be accompanied by conscious abuse of power. Their 
conduct never touches the borderland, the penumbra, 
where controversy begins. They go from birth to 
death, their action restrained at every turn by 
the power of the state, and not once do they 
appeal to judges to mark the boundaries between 
right and wrong. I am unable to withhold the 
name of law from rules which exercise this com­
pulsion over the fortunes of mankind. (Cardozo,
1921, p. 130).
Gulliver's preference for "social control" over "law", I suggest, 
ignores these highly cogent arguments.
This chapter has been an attempt to relate the ideas 
of Chapter III to the problems anthropologists have had in 
studying the court and arbitration proceedings of African 
peoples. If the application seems facile, it is because the 
theory was formed after reading the cases finally presented.
The conclusion of the thesis can be stated succinctly: the
logic of African customary law is the logic of society. It is 
hoped that these ideas will breath some life into the Durkheimian 
model of society for which many anthropologists seem to be 
losing enthusiasm. Nevertheless, there is one final word of 
caution. What is said here about customary law is only true of 
purely customary systems. Durkeim's view of law and society 
does not hold for Western social systems with ancient codes, 
systems of precedent, case law and constant legislation. Here,
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the law can be notoriously out of step with prevailing sentiments, 
which in a customary system would be immediately moved to the 
status of "legal". This, then, is the final suggestion of the 
thesis, that customary law is more like what we think of as 
morality than law, so that the thought processes forming the 
logic of customary law may well be the logic of our own morality. 
This is only a hint, but it serves to show that Wittgenstein’s 
ideas about language may have more manifold possibilities than 
those which can be touched on here.
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